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Summary 
The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law. Since the 
Second World War, the United Nations and various other international organs have 
recognised the protection of human rights in various treaties. These treaties protect 
citizen‟s rights against possible infringement on the side of the state. South Africa was 
isolated from the development that occurred in international human rights law due to the 
system of apartheid. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, international law 
had to be made part of South African law so that South Africa could once again take its 
place in the international community. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various 
sections that deal with international law and its place within the South African legal system. 
In particular, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an obligation on courts, tribunals 
and forums to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights. 
 
With regard to section 39(1)(b), this thesis questions whether the Constitutional Court 
fulfils its obligation when interpreting the right to property and housing in sections 25 and 
26 of the Constitution respectively. Through a discussion of Constitutional Court cases on 
the right to property, it is discovered that the Court does not optimally use the international 
law sources that are available. The Court does not reflect on the status of international law 
sources and confuses international law with foreign law. Therefore, the sources relating to 
the right to property in international and regional international law are outlined. On the 
basis of the available sources in international law that relate to the right to property, it is 
argued that there is no justification for the Court not considering the relevant international 
law sources. 
 
With regard to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution 
and the case law relating to the right, the Constitutional Court is more willing to consult 
international law to aid its interpretation of the right. This is partly attributable to fact that 
the right to adequate housing is a well developed right in international law. As a result, the 
Court refers to a wide range of international law sources when interpreting the right of 
access to adequate housing. However, the Court does not indicate the status of the 
various international law sources it uses to interpret the right to adequate housing. 
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Therefore, it is argued that in the instances where there are relevant international law 
sources available to aid the interpretation of the rights to property and adequate housing, 
they should be considered. In the event that the Constitutional Court uses international law 
sources, their status within South African law and their relevance to the rights in question 
should be made clear. As a result, a method for the use of international law as a guide to 
interpretation is proposed.  
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Opsomming 
Die beskerming van menseregte is van groot belang in internasionale reg. Na afloop van 
die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het verskeie internasionale agente, met die Verenigde Nasies in 
die voorgrond, menseregte begin erken in verskeie internasionale konvensies. Omdat 
Suid-Afrika die apartheidstelsel toegepas het, was die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geïsoleerd van 
die ontwikkeling rakende die beskerming van menseregte in internasionale reg. Met die 
koms van demokrasie was Suid-Afrika genoodsaak om internasionale reg deel te maak 
van Suid-Afrikaanse reg om te verseker dat Suid-Afrika weer die internasionale 
gemeenskap kon betree. Gevolglik bevat die Grondwet van 1996 verskeie artikels wat met 
internasionale reg handel. In besonder plaas artikel 39(1)(b) „n verpligting op howe, 
tribunale en ander forums om internasionale reg te gebruik wanneer enige reg in die 
handves van menseregte geïnterpreteer moet word. 
 
In hierdie tesis word daar besin oor die vraag of die Grondwetlike Hof die verpligting in 
terme van artikel 39(1)(b) nakom wanneer die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte 
behuising in artikels 25 en 26 onderskeidelik geïnterpreteer word. Na „n bespreking van 
die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg tot eiendom, word die gevolgtrekking 
gemaak dat die Grondwetlike Hof nie die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) 
konsekwent nakom nie. Die Hof verwys nie na relevante internasionale of streeks- 
internasionale reg nie. Verder verwar die Hof internasionale reg met buitelandse reg. In die 
gevalle waar die Hof wel gebruik maak van internasionale reg, word die status van dié reg 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel nie duidelik uiteengesit nie. 
 
Na aanleiding van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg van toegang tot 
geskikte behuising, is dit duidelik dat die Grondwetlike Hof meer gewillig is om 
internasionale reg in ag te neem. „n Moontlike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die reg tot 
behuising goed ontwikkel is in internasionale reg. Gevolglik maak die Grondwetlike Hof 
geredelik van internasionale reg gebruik om artikel 26 van die Grondwet te interpreteer. 
Nietemin, die status van die internasionale reg bronne wat die Hof wel gebruik word nie 
uiteengesit nie. 
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Daarom word daar aangevoer dat indien daar internasionale reg beskikbaar is wat 
relevant is tot die geskil, behoort die Grondwetlike Hof sulke reg in ag te neem. Indien die 
Hof wel internasionale reg gebruik om die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte 
behuising te interpreteer, moet die status van die bronne uiteengesit word. Daarom word 
daar ook in die tesis „n voorstel voorgelê hoe howe te werk moet gaan indien 
internasionale reg bronne geraadpleeg word.  
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1 
Introduction 
1 1 Background to the Research Problem 
Before South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the apartheid government was 
notorious for violating human rights. Without a bill of rights the courts were unable and 
unwilling to protect citizens‟ rights. Furthermore, the courts could not test legislation 
passed by Parliament. After the United Nations Charter1 came into force in 1945, the 
international community actively started promoting the protection of human rights by 
means of numerous treaties recognising human rights and implementing mechanisms to 
effectively protect human rights. As a result of the apartheid system, South Africa was 
isolated from this development in international human rights law.  
 
Since the United Nations‟ inception in 1945, the South African government was singled out 
as a violator of human rights.2 When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, South 
Africa wanted to enter the international community and „take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations‟.3 In order to succeed at this aim, the bill of rights 
was included in the 1993 Constitution as well as in the Constitution of 1996 to protect the 
fundamental human rights of all people within the Republic. The Constitution recognises 
the fact that international law has an important role to play in South African law. This is 
evident through the various sections in the Constitution that deal with international law.  
 
Section 231 of the Constitution makes international agreements binding on South African 
law when it has been approved by the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces. However, in terms of section 231(3) an international agreement of a technical, 
administrative or executive nature becomes binding on South African law without the 
approval of the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces.4 Section 232 of the 
                                            
1
 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June, entered into force on 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
2
 See Dugard J „Racism and Repression in South Africa: The Two Faces of Apartheid‟ (1989) 2 HVHRJ 97-
99 at 97. 
3
 Preamble of the Constitution of 1996. 
4
 Botha N „Treaty-making in South Africa: A Reassessment‟ (2000) 25 SAYIL 71-96 at 77 states that an 
agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature is an agreement that flows from the day to day 
activities of the government departments. 
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Constitution makes customary international law part of South African law if it is not in 
conflict with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. With regard to customary 
international law, South Africa follows a monistic approach in which domestic law and 
international law are regarded as one system of law.5 According to Dugard, section 232 
gives constitutional standing to the common law position regarding customary international 
law and gives it additional weight.6 Section 233 of the Constitution requires courts to 
favour an interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law rather than 
inconsistent, if such an interpretation is reasonably possible. Therefore, international law is 
deemed to play an important role in South African law. 
 
The Constitution of 1993 also made international law applicable in the interpretation of the 
bill of rights.7 This approach was carried forward to the Final Constitution of 1996. Section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution of 1996 obliges courts to consider international law in 
interpreting the bill of rights.8 According to Liebenberg, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution 
„signals the Constitution‟s openness and receptiveness to the norms and values of the 
international community‟.9 In addition, section 39(1)(c) makes it possible for courts to 
consider foreign law when interpreting the bill of rights.  
 
To fulfil the obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b), courts must consider international law 
when a right in the bill of rights is interpreted. Therefore, when a right in the bill of rights 
needs to be interpreted, courts must take due cognisance of the relevant sources of 
international law to guide their interpretation. In S v Makwanyane (hereafter 
„Makwanyane‟),10 the Constitutional Court stated that binding and non-binding international 
law, together with customary international law, create the framework within which the bill of 
rights must be understood. In Makwanyane, the Court specifically included the regional 
                                            
5
 See Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 55. 
6
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 55. 
7
 S 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. 
8
 The obligation in terms of s 39(1) of the Constitution applies to courts, tribunals and forums. 
9
 Liebebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 101. 
10
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
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international law of the European Council and the Organisation of American States as 
international law that can be used as a guide to interpret the bill of rights.11 
 
The obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) should be distinguished from the obligation to 
apply international law that is binding on South African law.12 The obligation in section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution is an obligation placed on courts, tribunals and forums to 
consider international law as a guide to the interpretation of the rights in the bill of rights. In 
the event that South Africa ratified a treaty, it becomes directly binding on South African 
law in terms of section 231 of the Constitution. 
 
The right to property in section 25 of the Constitution forms part of the bill of rights. 
Therefore, section 25 should also be interpreted with the aid of relevant international law. 
However, with regard to the case law on the right to property, the Constitutional Court has 
not consistently adhered to this obligation. As an example, the Constitutional Court 
attempted to use international law in the case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance (hereafter „FNB‟).13 In the FNB decision, the Constitutional 
Court had to decide whether the detention and sale of goods in terms of section 112 of the 
Customs and Excise Act14 constituted a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution and should therefore have been declared unconstitutional. 
 
During the course of the judgment the Constitutional Court acknowledged the obligation 
placed on it in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court noted 
the discretion it has in considering foreign law as made possible through section 39(1)(c). 
However, the Constitutional Court did not have proper regard to international law. The 
Court presented a lengthy discussion of the laws of the United States, Australia, Germany 
and the United Kingdom on the subject of deprivation.15 The Court also considered the 
                                            
11
 S v Makwanyane 1993 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. The Court also stated that reports made by specialised 
agencies such as the International Labour Organisation can be used by the South African courts as 
interpretive guides. 
12
 See Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 103. 
13
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
14
 Act 91 of 1964. 
15
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2001 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 71-97. 
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laws of these jurisdictions, together with the law of the Council of Europe as developed by 
the European Court on Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.16 Therefore, not only did the Constitutional Court confuse 
international law with foreign law, it also did not have proper regard to the status of 
regional international law. In subsequent property law cases, such as Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng17 and Du Toit v 
Minister of Transport,18 the Constitutional Court made no reference to international law that 
might have been available. 
 
The right of access to adequate housing also forms part of the bill of rights and courts 
must consider international law when this right needs to be interpreted. With regard to the 
right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court has been more willing to consult international law sources. In Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,19 the Constitutional Court relied on the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the „ICESCR‟)20 as well as the General 
Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Similarly, in Jaftha 
v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz21 the Constitutional Court relied on the ICESCR and the 
General Comments of the Committee. However, the Court did not consider or discuss the 
status of these sources. The ICESCR is not binding on South African law, and although 
courts are able to consult non-binding international law,22 its status within South African 
law was not made clear. 
 
Therefore, the main research problem addressed in this thesis concerns the role that 
international law should play and has played in the interpretation of the property rights in 
sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution. To illustrate the discussion the thesis will analyse 
the various cases before the Constitutional Court where the obligation in terms of section 
39(1)(b) was either completely ignored or, in the event that it was recognised, applied 
                                            
16
 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 222, ETS 5. 
17
 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
18
 2006 (1) 297 (CC). 
19
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
20
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1973, 993 UNTS 3. 
21
 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
22
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
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incorrectly. The Court tends to confuse international law with foreign law, and as a result 
does not give proper effect to international law when interpreting the bill of rights. The 
status of international law sources and their relevance in South African law is also not 
made clear at all times. 
 
1 2 Research Question, Hypothesis and Methodology 
The research question guiding the research is to determine how international human rights 
law can be used effectively by South African courts in interpreting and expanding human 
rights entrenched in the bill of rights. This question is addressed with specific reference to 
the protection of property and the right of access to adequate housing in sections 25 and 
26 of the Constitution. 
 
South Africa is party to numerous conventions, both international and regional.23 Parts of 
the Constitution were drafted with these and other conventions in mind24 and in some 
instances the Constitution was drawn up to adhere to the principles set out in these 
conventions. Therefore, in addition to the constitutional obligations in terms of section 
39(1)(b) it can be argued that courts must consider these conventions because the 
Constitution and many of the international human rights conventions which the 
Constitution emulates have the same objective. As was stated by the Constitutional Court 
in Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa, „these international instruments 
enshrine the fundamental human rights that are generally to be found in our 
Constitution‟.25 It is also argued that international law can prove to be an effective guide on 
the interpretation of certain rights. 
                                            
23
 Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 171; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entered 
into force on 2 September 1990, 1557 UNTS 3, 28 ILM 1456; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 December 1981, 1249 UNTS 13, 
19 ILM 33 and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, adopted by the 18
th
 Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 27 June 1981, entered into force on 
21 October 1986, OAU doc CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
24
 See in this regard a discussion of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child with regard to the drafting of the Interim and Final 
Constitutions in Heyns C and Viljoen F „The Impact of Six Major UN Human Rights Treaties in South Africa‟ 
(2001) 16 SAPL 28. 
25
 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) para 158. 
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As a point of departure it is assumed, in view of the case law presented above, that South 
African courts do not consistently adhere to the obligation to consider international law to 
interpret the bill of rights. The courts fail to take international and regional international law 
into consideration as they are obliged to do in terms of section 39(1)(b). Furthermore, the 
courts tend to confuse international law with foreign law, and judges are sometimes under 
the impression that when they have considered foreign law or made a comparative case 
law study, they have fulfilled their obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution.26  
 
With regard to sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution the hypothesis guiding the present 
research is that the courts can only fulfil their obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) if they 
consider the international law sources that could be applicable in the matter in order to 
assist the interpretation of the bill of rights. As a result, the aim of the thesis is two-fold. 
The first aim is to set out the relevant international law sources available to the courts to 
interpret sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The second aim of this thesis is to 
propose a possible method for the application of these sources, as briefly addressed in 
chapter 4 and further outlined in the concluding chapter. 
 
The relevant international law sources discussed in the present research consists of 
international conventions open for signature to all states, as well as general comments and 
communications produced by various international supervisory organs. The regional 
international law of the African Union, the European Union and the Organization of 
American States is further discussed, since regional international law falls under the broad 
term of international law.27 In addition, regional international law is relevant because it is 
an effective guide of interpretation. The law of the African Union, as developed under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights28 by the African Commission on Human 
                                            
26
 For instance, First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 71-97. 
27
 Shaw MN International Law (5
th
 ed 2003) 2. Shaw states that international law may also be regional, 
„whereby a group of states linked geographically or ideologically may recognise special rules applicable only 
unto them‟. 
28
 Adopted by the 18
th
 Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 
27 June 1981, entered into force on 21 October 1986, OAU doc CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 
ILM 58 (1982). 
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and Peoples‟ Rights, is an important international law source, because it is directly binding 
on South African law. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as the communications of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights are also discussed because they complement 
and strengthen the international human rights conventions, even though they are not 
directly binding on South Africa.29 
 
The international law sources available to the courts to help interpret the right to property 
and the right of access to adequate housing in terms of sections 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution respectively are outlined and analyzed in the chapters that follow. The 
hierarchy of these sources is discussed, as well as whether these sources are binding on 
South Africa or not. As a result of the Makwanyane30 decision, courts are allowed to 
consider non-binding international law. However, the Constitutional Court has in the past 
referred to non-binding instruments without proper justification as to why the particular 
non-binding instrument finds application in a particular case.31 
 
To determine the use of international law prior to the constitutional era, the place of 
international law within the South African legal system is considered. This serves as an 
illustration of South Africa‟s isolation from the international community. Through a 
discussion of South African case law and constitutions before the Interim Constitution of 
1993, the change which both the 1993 and 1996 Constitution brought about with regard to 
international law becomes apparent.  
 
The constitutional provisions dealing with international law in the 1993 Constitution are 
discussed to indicate the effect that the 1993 Constitution had on the status of international 
law within South African law. Thereafter the international law provisions in the 1996 
Constitution are considered to compare the effect this Constitution had on the use of 
international law under the 1993 Constitution. Early constitutional case law is discussed to 
                                            
29
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 330. 
30
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
31
 See for instance Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), in which the 
Constitutional Court relied on the ICESCR, an instrument that in not binding on South African law as well as 
the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without making the status 
of these sources clear. 
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present an overview of the utilization of international law in order to derive general 
principles on the applicability of international law in South African law. Although the early 
Constitutional Court cases indicate a willingness to consider a wide range of international 
law sources to interpret the bill of rights,32 further case law suggests that the Court did not 
adhere to this approach consistently.33 Recent constitutional case law is further discussed 
to illustrate this point. 
 
Furthermore, an overview of international treaties and regional conventions dealing with 
the right to property and housing is presented. International treaties and regional 
conventions dealing with specific groups of persons, for instance children, refugees and 
women, are also outlined. The jurisprudence of regional international courts as well as 
communications by regional commissions are discussed, since these supervisory organs 
have interpreted the right to property and housing to some extent. The general comments 
made by international committees that have interpreted the right to property and housing, 
or the property and housing rights of specific persons, are discussed. Furthermore, the 
writings of academic authors on the topic of international law, both in relation to the 
general principles of international law and the right to property and the right to adequate 
housing are analyzed.34 
 
1 3 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 discusses South Africa‟s isolation from the development that took place in 
international law during the period of apartheid. It is indicated that the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the fact that courts could not protect the rights of citizens 
against the powers of the supreme government resulted in many human rights violations. 
While the international community began to actively protect human rights through 
international treaties, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (the 
                                            
32
 In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35 the Constitutional Court noted a wide range of 
international law sources that might be used to aid the interpretation of the right to life. 
33
 In Azanian Peoples’ Organisation v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) para 
26, discussed in chap 2 at 2 4 3, the Constitutional Court rejected international law from the outset without 
further investigating the principles relevant to the case that have crystallised in international law. 
34
 According to art 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the „teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations‟ may be recognized as a subsidiary source of international law that 
courts may consult: Dugard J „International Human Rights‟ in Van Wyk D, Dugard J, De Villiers B and Davis 
D (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (1994) 171-195 at 193-194. 
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„UDHR‟)35 and the International Covenants of 1966,36 South Africa implemented the 
system of apartheid and violated various human rights protected in international law. The 
use of international law prior to the 1993 Constitution is discussed to illustrate the effect 
that both the 1993 and 1996 Constitution had on the use of international law in South 
African jurisprudence. 
 
In chapter 3 the use of international law in interpreting the right to property in section 
25(1)-(3) of the Constitution of 1996 is discussed. The international and regional 
international law sources available to courts are outlined according to their hierarchy, to 
indicate the sources available to courts in interpreting the right to property. It is argued that 
the Constitutional Court does not effectively use the available international law sources 
when interpreting the right to property. Furthermore, it is shown that the Court confuses 
international law with foreign law and as a result conflates the obligation to consider 
international law in terms of 39(1)(b) with the discretion to consider foreign law in terms of 
section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the property rights of refugees and 
women in international and regional international law are discussed, because these 
vulnerable groups‟ right to property has received additional attention in international and 
regional international law.  
 
In chapter 4 the Constitutional Court‟s use of international law in interpreting section 26 of 
the Constitution, the right of access to adequate housing, is discussed. Through the 
discussion on the sources of international law it becomes apparent that the right to 
adequate housing is a well developed area of international law, even though an 
independent right to adequate housing is not found in international law. The Constitutional 
Court is prepared to consider international law when interpreting the right to adequate 
housing to a greater extent than in the case of interpreting section 25. Although the 
regional international law systems discussed do not contain a right to adequate housing, 
the relevant supervisory organs of the African Union, the European Union and the 
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Organisation of American States have attempted to protect the right to adequate housing, 
and the development in this regard is discussed.  
 
The tension that exists between the right to property and the right to housing is also 
discussed in this chapter. Protecting a property right of one person may lead to a violation 
of the right to adequate housing of another person and the balancing of these competing 
interests is discussed briefly. Chapter 4 continues with a discussion on eviction. The 
protection against arbitrary eviction is found in section 26(3) of the Constitution. The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, under the auspices of the ICESCR37 
has indicated that protection against arbitrary eviction is an important component of the 
right to adequate housing. Therefore, the prohibition against arbitrary eviction in 
international law is compared with section 26(3) and additional legislation that deals with 
eviction. 
 
1 4 Definitions and Limitations 
Certain limitations are placed on the research in order to effectively answer the research 
question that was presented. In addition, since international law uses terms that might 
differ from the terms used in South African law, those terms are briefly explained here.  
 
Although the obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) applies to courts, tribunals and forums, 
attention is given to the use of international law by courts only. Furthermore, only 
judgments handed down by the Constitutional Court will be considered for reasons of 
space. The international law discussed mainly includes international human rights law, as 
developed under the UDHR,38 the IESCR39 and the ICCPR.40 Although humanitarian law 
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also protects property and housing rights, it was omitted from the present research 
because it only finds application during times of war or civil unrest.  
 
With regard to the right to property in section 25 of the Constitution, international law that 
concerns deprivation and expropriation in terms of section 25(1)-(3) is discussed. Section 
25(4)-(9), which deals with land reform, including restitution, has been excluded to limit the 
scope of the discussion, since land reform deserves so much attention that it will shift the 
core question of the present research. 
 
The property rights of indigenous and tribal peoples are protected in international law by, 
amongst others, article 27 of the ICCPR. Article 27 protects minority group rights and has 
been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee to include the land occupied by 
indigenous peoples.41 Although the ICCPR is binding on South African law, the property 
rights of indigenous and tribal peoples are not discussed here because these rights relate 
closely to land restitution and a discussion of their protection would incorporate a 
discussion of section 25(7) which, as was indicated above, has been excluded from this 
project. 
 
With regard to the right to housing, section 26 of the Constitution provides for a right of 
access to adequate housing. In international law, it is merely a right to adequate housing. 
Although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that the right 
to adequate housing should be accessible,42 the difference between the right of access to 
adequate housing in South African law and the right to adequate housing in international 
law is addressed in chapter 4. It is argued that the accessibility factor laid by the 
Committee, which is aimed at specific groups of people, cannot limit the right in section 26, 
which is a right of access to adequate housing available to everyone.  
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In international law, forced eviction is spelt out in broad terms. Furthermore, international 
law provides guidelines to states regarding problem areas concerning eviction. In South 
African law, eviction is more defined and developed than in international law. However, 
international law still provides over-arching principles regarding evictions that could be 
useful to the further development of eviction law in South Africa. Therefore, the position 
regarding forced eviction in international law is compared to the position regarding eviction 
in South African law. 
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2 
The Constitutional Obligation and International Law 
2 1 Introduction 
The Interim Constitution of 19931 changed the constitutional system that prevailed in 
South Africa since the early 1900s. Before the 1993 Constitution was agreed to, 
Parliament was supreme in the sense that it could pass legislation without fear that the 
substance of legislation would be tested by a court of law.2 According to Mureinik, the 
dawning of the new constitutional era in South Africa, with a supreme Constitution and an 
entrenched bill of rights, represents a bridge from a culture of authority towards a culture of 
justification.3 The authority that Parliament once had to promulgate laws and change 
parliamentary institutions at will had to make way for a system where Parliament‟s actions 
need to be justified and where its decisions may be reviewed judicially. 
 
Before 1994, various human rights were violated by numerous laws that were promulgated 
by Parliament. There was no bill of rights or other legislation available to either citizens or 
courts to protect the citizens‟ human rights against the power of the state. As the Appellate 
Division stated in 1934: 
„Parliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty or property of any 
individual subject to its sway, and ... it is the function of courts of law to enforce its will.‟4 
 
The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law.5 International 
law can be described as the rules and principles that bind states in their relations with 
each other and, in relation to human rights law, place obligations on the state towards its 
citizens.6 Since the Second World War it has become clear that international law also 
                                            
1
 Act 200 of 1993. 
2
 According to Carpenter G Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (1987) 77, „[p]arliamentary 
sovereignty means, in brief, that Parliament, consisting of the elected representatives of the people, is the 
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3
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4
 Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11 at 37. 
5
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 308. 
6
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 1. 
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extends to individuals. This is evident from the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 (the „UDHR‟).7 This declaration was followed by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the „ICESCR‟)8 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the „ICCPR‟).9 These three instruments form the 
international bill of rights, which strives to protect the individual‟s human rights if a state 
fails to protect such rights. Before the 1993 Constitution was enacted the protection of 
individual human rights in South Africa had not received the attention it generally enjoyed 
in the international community. A possible reason for this was the fact that South Africa 
followed the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, in which Parliament could pass 
legislation that was contrary to international human rights standards and that violated 
human rights. The courts could not protect citizens against the encroachments of their 
rights as the courts had no right to test the substance of legislation and there was no 
justiciable bill of rights to prevent the violation of human rights. With the enactment of the 
1993 Constitution and the justiciable bill of rights, international law came to play an 
important role in the interpretation of human rights for two reasons: Firstly, international 
law principles contain provisions similar to those found in the bill of rights and as a result of 
the numerous debates concerning the interpretation of these rights in the international 
community there is vast literature on the interpretation of these rights10 and, secondly; 
courts are obligated by the Constitution to consider international law when interpreting the 
bill of rights.11 
 
Below, the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament together with the inability of the courts 
to test the substance of legislation will be discussed in order to demonstrate the lack of 
protection of human rights and the change that the 1993 Constitution brought about in 
protecting human rights. The violation of human rights during the apartheid regime came 
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at a stage when the protection of human rights came to the forefront on the international 
arena. In entering a democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,12 
human rights, already protected through international law instruments, were afforded 
protection in the 1993 Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. The place of international 
law, especially when the interpretation of a specific right is at issue, will be discussed with 
reference to the influence that the 1993 Constitution and the 1996 Constitution 
respectively had on the application of different areas of international law in South African 
law. 
 
2 2 Constitutional History 
In the late 19th century, Chief Justice Kotzé of the High Court of the Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek (hereafter „ZAR‟) tried to establish the courts‟ power of judicial review in the 
case of Brown v Leyds.13 Kotzé CJ and Ameshoff J found that legislation in conflict with 
the Constitution of the Republiek was invalid.14 President Kruger, the president of the ZAR 
at the time, did not accept the principle of judicial review and passed a bill through the 
House of Assembly denying the competence of the judiciary to test legislation. The bill also 
made it possible for the President to dismiss any judge who failed to assure the President 
that he would not exercise the right to test legislation.15 When Chief Justice Kotzé refused 
to assure the President that he would not exercise the courts‟ testing right in subsequent 
cases, the President dismissed Kotzé as Chief Justice. Kotzé ultimately left the bench after 
he gave a warning of the possible dangers of the supremacy of the House of Assembly.16 
With the swearing in of the new Chief Justice, Gregorowski, President Kruger declared the 
testing right to be a principle of the devil himself, advising judges not to go the devil‟s way 
by exercising the testing right. 
 
In 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being through the acceptance of the South 
Africa Act of 1909 by the British Imperial Parliament. The 1909 act was „the logical product 
of the prevailing legal and political climate‟17 at the time. JC Smuts, educated at 
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Cambridge University, and JX Merriman, who held the British constitution in high esteem,18 
were responsible for drafting the 1909 Constitution. As a result, the 1909 Constitution was 
based on the Westminster parliamentary system, a system which held as a fundamental 
doctrine the sovereignty of Parliament.19 The principle of parliamentary supremacy 
entailed that courts were unable to set aside an act of the legislature, even if such 
legislation was morally repugnant.20 In line with the Westminster model, this constitution 
did not afford individual rights, nor did it contain a bill of rights.21 
 
However, in 1910 the functions of the Union‟s legislative and executive branches of 
government were still subordinate to the will of the British Parliament. The British 
Parliament ended this subordination by adopting the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The 
Union government „accepted‟ the Statute of Westminster in the Status of the Union Act22 in 
1934.23 As a result of this Act, the Union Parliament held sole legislative power in the 
Union. Therefore, the restraints that previously prevented the Union Parliament from 
passing legislation that would be void if the British Parliament found it to be repugnant, 
ceased to exist. With the adoption of the Statute of Westminster the Union Parliament 
became sovereign in its own right. 
 
The National Party came to power in 1948. At that time, the coloured community in the 
Cape was still included on the voters‟ roll in the Cape. Their right to vote was at that time 
still protected by section 35 of the 1909 Constitution. Section 35, together with section 
137,24 were entrenched clauses which required a two-thirds majority of both the House of 
Assembly and the Senate before it could be amended.25 The National Party government 
promulgated the Separate Representation of Voters Act26 to remove the coloured 
community from the common voters‟ roll in order to create an all-white voters‟ roll. When 
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 See Dugard J Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1977) 25-26. 
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the validity of the Separate Representation of Voters Act27 was challenged in Harris v 
Minister of the Interior,28 the Appellate Division found that the act was invalid. The 
Government in turn passed the High Court of Parliament Act.29 The function of this court 
was to review cases in which the Appellate Division invalidated an act of Parliament. The 
High Court of Parliament reversed the decision of the Appellate Division in Harris v 
Minister of the Interior.30 The High Court of Parliament stated that the 1909 Constitution 
must be interpreted against the backdrop of English constitutional law and the powers of 
the British Parliament, whose actions could not be tested by the courts.31 Therefore, the 
South African courts were also unable to test the powers of the Union Parliament. In the 
subsequent case of Minister of the Interior v Harris,32 the Appellate Division invalidated the 
High Court of Parliament Act,33 deciding that the High Court of Parliament was not a court 
as such and that the entrenched provisions of the 1909 constitution were protected only by 
the proper courts of law.34 
 
However, as a result of parliamentary supremacy, Parliament was able to override 
judgments given by the courts by various means if such judgments were in conflict with 
decisions made by Parliament. After the judgment was given in Minister of the Interior v 
Harris,35 Parliament restructured both the Appellate Division and the Senate.36 
Consequently, the House of Assembly and the Senate passed the South African Act 
Amendment Act of 195637 which, in section 35, made it impossible for the courts to 
pronounce upon the validity of any law that was passed by Parliament. This was the final 
blow to the courts‟ right to test the validity of legislation passed by Parliament. Therefore, 
as Dugard explains, „the dispute over the entrenched clauses convincingly established the 
principle of parliamentary supremacy‟.38 
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In 1961, the ruling National Party changed the Union of South Africa into a Republic. This 
was done through the Republic of South Africa Constitution, Act 32 of 1961. This 
constitution did not effect any change to the constitutional principles that prevailed at the 
time. It could by now be established that the „National Party Government had identified 
itself completely with the Westminster model and the principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty‟.39 Although the courts‟ power to judicially review Parliament‟s actions had 
already been curtailed, section 59(2) of the 1961 Constitution provided that „[n]o court of 
law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any act passed by 
parliament‟, thereby constitutionally entrenching the principle that the courts had no testing 
right. 
 
In 1983 a new constitution was accepted by the House of Assembly; the Constitution of 
South Africa of 1983.40 This constitution did not change the supremacy of Parliament, nor 
did it afford courts the right to test Parliament‟s actions. The 1983 Constitution did, 
however, create a State President who could freely declare a state of emergency, during 
which time he could consolidate power in the executive even further.41 The major change 
this constitution introduced was to create the three houses of Parliament: one for whites; 
another for coloureds; and a third for Indians. This so-called tricameral Parliament was 
established in order to give each group equal footing in political life, but since the black 
population was excluded from this process and the white house of Parliament could 
override decisions made collectively by the coloured and Indian houses, this tricameral 
structure did not change the constitutional composition of the state since it still prevented 
the majority of South Africans from participating in the highest level of government. 
 
It has been argued that the South Africa Act of 1909 and the Republic of South Africa Act 
of 196142 were flexible constitutions, because they were based on the flexible Westminster 
system.43 The 1983 Constitution contained more entrenched provisions than the previous 
constitutions did, but because none of the constitutions could be regarded as the highest 
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law it meant that general legislation could not be declared invalid because of conflict with 
the spirit and values of any of the constitutions.44 Entrenched provisions only meant that 
these provisions could only be changed by a special procedure.45 
 
As a result of the implementation of the policy of apartheid by the National Party 
Government, South Africa had been singled out by the United Nations since the 
organisation‟s inception as a „principal violator of human right norms contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter‟.46 From 1985 
onwards, South Africa experienced numerous states of emergencies in order to deal with 
the uprising of black people against the apartheid policy. The National Party government 
retaliated, with the aid of emergency regulations, by adopting dictatorial methods to 
oppress black people, which involved „a notorious assault on human rights‟.47 
 
When the system of apartheid was abolished by President FW de Klerk in February 1991, 
it was clear that a justiciable bill of rights was needed to protect all South Africans against 
the power of the government. Therefore, a constitution with an entrenched bill of rights 
was needed that would afford individuals the necessary protection against the 
encroachment of their rights by the legislature or executive.48 As a result, parliamentary 
sovereignty was abandoned and the bill of rights was inserted into the Interim Constitution 
of 1993,49 which was declared the highest law.50 Unlike the previous dispensation, the now 
independent judiciary was entrusted with the power to safeguard the entrenched bill of 
rights and the will of the legislature and executive was no longer absolute. 
 
Before the Constitution of 199351 South Africa never had an entrenched bill of rights. 
Therefore, the question regarding the interpretation of these entrenched rights arose. 
Section 39 of the Constitution of 1996 indicates to the courts how to interpret the bill of 
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rights. In particular, section 39(1)(b) requires the courts to consider international law when 
interpreting the bill of rights.  
 
2 3 The Role of International Law 
2 3 1 Introduction 
For the reasons set out above, international law has not played an influential role in South 
African law during the apartheid era. Before the 1993 Constitution South Africa has not 
been party to any human rights convention, except for those concerning the suppression 
of slavery.52 While the South African government violated various fundamental human 
rights, the protection of human rights in the international community gained momentum.53 
Some of the laws that were promulgated in South Africa that contravened human rights 
included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,54 the Population Registration Act55 and 
the Group Areas Act.56 The democratically elected government had to rectify this situation 
by ensuring that the protection of human rights received the consideration it had not 
received previously under South African law. 
 
Before the coming into force of the Constitution of 1993, international law was generally 
viewed as law existing between recognized states and not enforceable by individuals. 
Therefore, it proved to be difficult to effectively enforce international human rights law in 
the South African domestic legal system before the 1993 Constitution was adopted.57 
South Africa had to devise a mechanism through which international human rights could 
be protected and enforced. In response to this problem, the justiciable bill of rights was 
included in the constitution so that an individual could lay claim to rights similar to the ones 
ordinarily found in international human rights law. As a result of this it is important to 
consider international human rights law and the application of these laws in international 
law in order to understand how these laws could be applied in the South African context. 
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This will be illustrated later with reference to cases such as Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom,58 in which the Constitutional Court considered findings of the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to ascertain what the 
right to adequate housing, entrenched in section 26 of the Constitution of 1996, entails. In 
that case, international law was considered partly because there have been many debates 
in the international community on this specific subject resulting in numerous literature on 
the topic. 
 
During the apartheid era, before the text of the 1993 Constitution and the constitutional 
principles were agreed to, international law was approached differently. Before the 1993 
Constitution was enacted, international law played a secondary role in South African 
jurisprudence, since South African courts failed, as Dugard explains it, „to use the limited 
opportunities available to them to apply international human right norms‟.59 With the 
enactment of the 1993 Constitution, the exclusion of any reference to international law in 
any previous constitutions was rectified by including provisions that call for an inclusive 
approach towards international law.60 
 
The different approaches to international law during these three periods will be discussed 
below. General principles will be drawn from case law and other sources with regard to the 
interpretation and application of international law in constitutional adjudication. This will be 
done by examining the principles regarding the application of international law in South 
African law, mainly made evident through case law; and considering the new constitutional 
approach to international law. 
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2 3 2 International Law before the Interim Constitution of 1993 
The Constitution of 199361 was enacted by the Multi-National Negotiations Forum of 
December 1993. In the preceding period, international law had not played a prominent role 
in South African courts. There are various reasons for the courts‟ behaviour in this regard. 
Dugard maintains that South African courts were unfamiliar with international law; they 
were unaware of the importance of international legal norms; and they were antipathetic 
towards international law as a result of South Africa‟s isolation from the international 
community.62 This meant that South African law was isolated from the developments that 
took place with regard to international human rights. Consequently, international law was 
seldom raised in court cases, and limited attention was paid to it in the event that it was 
raised.63 
 
Before the enactment of the 1993 Constitution customary international law was always 
deemed part of South African common law.64 Customary international law can be 
described as the common law of the international community.65 South Africa followed a 
monistic approach with regard to customary international law; regarding international law 
and national law as one system of law. Courts could take judicial notice of customary 
international law if it was found that the requirements for the creation of a customary rule 
of international law were met.66 For an international law principle to be regarded as 
customary international law, there needed to be a settled practice (usus) in the state of 
adhering to such principle and the state had to accept the obligation to be bound by such 
rule (opinio juris).67 If the court decided that these criteria were fulfilled it would apply 
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customary international law, except where such principles were in conflict with 
legislation.68  
 
It is clear from judgements handed down before the 1993 Constitution that the courts were 
hesitant to regard principles such as those contained in the UDHR;69 the ICCPR;70 and the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 
„European Convention‟)71 as customary international law.72 In S v Rudman, the Eastern 
Cape Local Division of the High Court stated: „However laudable the ideals which have 
inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the European and American conventions they do not form part of 
customary international law‟.73 In S v Petane,74 the court denied that Protocol 1 to the 
Geneva Conventions75 forms part of international customary law and consequently the 
defendants were unable to prove that they should be treated as prisoners of war and that 
the court had no jurisdiction to try their matter. Dugard argues that certain rights contained 
in these declarations and conventions are part of customary international law, such as the 
right to non-discrimination, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of cruel, inhumane and 
degrading treatment.76 Therefore, courts need to apply such conventions since, as 
customary international law, they form part of South African law. 
 
Leaving aside the fact that South African courts were reluctant to accept certain principles 
as customary international law, customary international law was also subject to certain 
qualifications during this period. If a specific matter was governed by an act of Parliament 
where the meaning was clear, or the meaning of the act could easily be determined, the 
South African courts had to apply the act even if it contravened customary international 
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law.77 This qualification was softened by the presumption that the legislature did not intend 
to violate customary international law.78 Where customary international law had undergone 
a change, the South African courts were not bound to follow precedent set down by earlier 
decisions.79 This was settled in the cases of Inter-Science Research Development 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Republica Popular de Mocambique80 and Kaffraria Property Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Government of the Republic of Zambia,81 both instances in which the courts relied on 
an English case, Trendex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria.82  
 
Treaties, charters and conventions could previously be used by the courts only if they had 
been incorporated into South African national law by means of legislation.83 Treaties were 
the responsibility of the national executive, who had to negotiate, sign, ratify and accede to 
such treaties. Although the courts were reluctant to make use of international law 
principles as stated above, „international human rights conventions and declarations not 
binding on South Africa either as custom or treaty might be invoked by courts as a guide to 
judicial policy in the formulation of a rule of law‟.84 Before the 1993 Constitution three 
possibilities have crystallised as to how treaties could be made part of South African law: 
Treaties could be embodied in the text of an act of Parliament; included as a schedule to 
an act passed by Parliament; or brought into operation by means of proclamation in the 
Government Gazette if an act of Parliament granted the executive the power to bring the 
treaty into operation in this manner.85 
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2 3 3 International Law in the Interim Constitution of 1993 
The bill of rights in both the 1993 Constitution and the 1996 Constitution was drawn up 
with specific international human rights instruments in mind. In drafting the bill of rights, the 
African National Congress relied strongly on the UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR, the 
European Convention and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights.86 
Therefore, international law and its interpretation will have to play a prominent role in the 
development of South Africa‟s human rights jurisprudence.87 This might be one of the 
reasons why reference to international law is made in the 1993 Constitution and retained 
in the 1996 Constitution. A further reason for the inclusion of these provisions in the 
constitutions is the idea of achieving harmony between international law and South African 
law.88 The inclusion of certain clauses in both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions and the 
change it brought about in relation to the pre-1994 position is further discussed and 
analysed below. 
 
With the coming into force of the 1993 Constitution, international law was set to play a 
more prominent role in South Africa‟s jurisprudence, especially with regard to human rights 
law and humanitarian law.89 In the 1993 Constitution, international law was dealt with in 
sections 35(1) and 231; the former concerning international law in the interpretation of the 
bill of rights, while the latter concerned international agreements (treaties), conventions 
and customary international law. In addition, sections 116(2) and 227(2)(d) were 
concerned with international law in relation to the Human Rights Commission and the 
national defence force respectively. This chapter focuses on the different approaches with 
regard to the use of international law in interpreting the bill of rights, customary 
international law and treaties in each of the periods under discussion. Therefore, sections 
116(2) and 227(2)(d) will not be discussed.  
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Concerning customary international law, section 232 gives the common law position 
regarding customary international law constitutional standing. Customary international law 
is binding in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the constitution itself or another act 
of Parliament.90 This provision changes the position regarding the application of customary 
international law. Before the 1993 Constitution, at a time when the Parliament was 
sovereign, customary international law could be applied if it was not in conflict with an act 
of Parliament. With the new constitutional dispensation and the constitution being the 
highest law in the Republic,91 any law inconsistent with it is invalid. Therefore, customary 
international law is still applicable, under the condition that it is not in conflict with the 
constitution or an act of Parliament. 
 
As a result of section 232, common law and case law are subordinate to customary 
international law because customary international law is applicable in as far as it is not in 
conflict with the constitution or an act of Parliament. Therefore, if customary international 
law changes, case law recognizing an earlier rule cannot prevent the new rule of 
customary international law from being applied. This means that the principle of stare 
decisis does not apply in the case of customary international law, as was stated in 
Kaffraria Property Co (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Zambia.92 
 
Various authors, including Dugard93 and Mulawa,94 submit that as a result of this provision 
it is no longer necessary for the courts to state the reasons why they apply a certain rule of 
customary international law and that only those rules of customary international law that 
are inconsistent with the constitution or an act of Parliament do not form part of South 
African law. However, the courts will still determine whether the rule is in fact a rule of 
customary international law. If customary international law is inconsistent with an act of 
state, precedent or a Roman-Dutch common law rule,95 it will not hamper the applicability 
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of customary international law, thereby leaving wide scope for customary international law 
to be applied by the courts.  
 
Treaties are referred to as international agreements in the new constitutional text. The 
approach to international agreements before 1994 was altered by the 1993 Constitution in 
section 231(1)-(3). Section 231(1) did not negate international agreements, but kept such 
agreements in force. In terms of section 82(1)(i) of the 1993 Constitution, the negotiation 
and signing of international agreements remains the responsibility of the President, but 
Parliament has to agree to the ratification of or accession to such international agreements 
in terms of section 231(2). Furthermore, where Parliament agrees to ratification and 
accession, such agreement will be binding on the Republic if Parliament expressly so 
agrees and if such agreement was not inconsistent with the 1993 Constitution.96  
 
The effect of section 231(2) was that the President does not have the sole discretion to 
bring an international agreement into operation. Parliament could also ratify and accede to 
international agreements if such agreement was not in conflict with the 1993 Constitution. 
The purpose of the inclusions of these sections was to incorporate international 
agreements into South African law. However, as a result of these provisions only a few 
treaties were ratified by Parliament to be incorporated into South African law.97 As it was 
never the intention that only a few treaties should be incorporated into South African law, 
the position regarding international agreements changed slightly in the Constitution of 
1996.  
 
From the inclusion of provisions dealing with international law in the 1993 Constitution, and 
later in the 1996 Constitution, it is evident that international law has to play a greater role in 
relation to the interpretation and application of South African law in the new constitutional 
dispensation. The 1996 Constitution builds on the position of international law that the 
Constitution of 1993 established, albeit with a few changes and adaptations, which are 
discussed below. 
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2 3 4 The 1996 Constitution and the Position of International Law 
The Constitution of 1996 was enacted into law on 4 February 1997. It contains the bill of 
rights in chapter 2. The Constitution is the highest law in the Republic and any conduct 
that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid.98 It aims at greater reference to 
international law in South African law, and it is this relationship that will be discussed 
below. 
 
Section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution has the effect that international law is applicable 
in all matters concerning the interpretation of the bill of rights in chapter 2 of the 
Constitution. In chapter 14, where general provisions are found, the manner in which 
international law should be applied is set out in sections 231, 232 and 233. Section 231 
deals with matters concerning international agreements, section 232 with customary 
international law and section 233 with the application of international law in the 
interpretation of legislation. 
 
Section 232 of the 1996 Constitution makes customary international law part of South 
African law, except if it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. Section 
232 of the Constitution supersedes section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution and is in its 
essence the same. In the 1996 Constitution, the word „binding‟ was omitted from the 
phrase „customary international law binding in the Republic‟. Keightley argues that 
customary international law to which South Africa objects will still be deemed part of South 
African law.99 In contrast, Botha100 argues that the omission of the word „binding‟ is of no 
real consequence, and Dugard and Currie agree with this viewpoint as „the omission of the 
word “binding” ... paves the way for a more generous approach to the question whether a 
customary rule has sufficient usus and opinio juris to support it‟.101  
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In Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa,102 the Constitutional Court had to 
decide whether or not the applicants, South African nationals who were apprehended in 
Zimbabwe on charges that they planned a coup against the President of Equatorial 
Guinea, qualified for diplomatic protection. The Court first considered whether a state has 
an obligation to protect its nationals under the rules of customary international law, by 
seeking diplomatic protection for them while they are in another country.  
 
After the Constitutional Court decided that there was no principle in customary 
international law that could force a state to seek diplomatic protection for its citizens, the 
Court turned its attention to whether or not South African law could compel the South 
African government to seek diplomatic protection for its citizens. This led to the conclusion 
that, in certain cases, customary international law needed to be considered first before an 
answer is sought in national law. A possible explanation for this may be that the issue of 
diplomatic protection has been a controversial topic in international law. Therefore, there is 
more literature, including case law, academic writings and published research, in 
international law on the specific topic of diplomatic protection that can aid the Court in 
delivering judgment on a matter that is not so familiar to South African law. 
 
The provision governing international agreements in South African law is found in section 
231 of the 1996 Constitution. The negotiation of international agreements remains the 
responsibility of the national executive. Furthermore, in terms of section 231(2) of the 
Constitution, international agreements only become binding in the Republic if both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces agree thereto. However, in terms 
of section 231(3), international agreements become binding in the Republic through mere 
signature by the national executive when it is „an international agreement of a technical, 
administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either 
ratification or accession‟.103 According to Botha, agreements of a technical, administrative 
or executive nature are agreements that flow from the day to day activities of the 
government departments.104 Furthermore, such agreements do not have major political 
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significance, have no financial consequences and do not affect national law.105 The 
approval of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces is not required in 
this instance, but the agreement must still be tabled in the National Assembly and the 
Council of Provinces within a reasonable time. This provision was inserted in the 1996 
Constitution in order to increase the number of treaties being incorporated into South 
African law. From this it can be concluded that the 1996 Constitution seeks greater 
inclusion of international law in South African jurisprudence than the 1993 Constitution. 
 
2 4 The ‘New’ Constitutional Obligation of Interpretation 
2 4 1 Introduction 
A bill of rights as found in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, which expanded and built on 
chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution, is a novelty in South African law. None of the previous 
constitutions fully entrenched fundamental human rights in South African law in an 
instrument that is the highest law in the Republic.106 The interpretation of the bill of rights 
and legislation with reference to international law has not yet been given sufficient 
attention during the pre-1994 period. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various 
provisions that attempt to effect the implementation of international law into domestic law. 
 
Section 233 of the Constitution requires the courts, when interpreting legislation, to prefer 
an interpretation that is consistent with international law rather than inconsistent. This 
obligation is mandatory on the courts if such an interpretation is reasonably possible. This 
section also gives constitutional standing to the interpretive presumption that legislation 
intends to comply with international law.107 In Kaunda v President of the Republic of South 
Africa,108 the court found that all legislation, including the bill of rights and the Constitution 
as a whole, needs to be interpreted according to this provision. Therefore, international law 
is not only relevant when interpreting the bill of rights as mandated by section 39(1)(b), but 
it is also relevant when interpreting legislation.109  
                                                                                                                                                 
Meaning of the Term “International Agreement” and its Significance for South African Law and Treaty Making 
Practice‟ (2001) 26 SAYIL 1-40 at 5-8. 
105
 Botha N „Treaty-making in South Africa: A Reassessment‟ (2000) 25 SAYIL 71-96 at 76. 
106
 S 2 of the 1996 Constitution. 
107
 Keightley R „Public International Law and the Final Constitution‟ (1996) 12 SAJHR 405-418 at 415. 
108
 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) para 33. 
109
 See Keightley R „Public International Law and the Final Constitution‟ (1996) 12 SAJHR 405-418 at 415. 
31 
 
 
The interpretation clauses in sections 35 and 39 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions 
respectively are not comparable with any legislation passed before 1994. The 
interpretation clause and its application in constitutional adjudication are discussed below 
with reference to landmark Constitutional Court cases where international law played, or 
could have played, an important role. 
 
Section 35(1) in chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution provides: 
„In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which 
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights 
entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.‟ 
 
Dugard states that section 35(1) could be hailed as a „jewel in the Constitution‟110 as it 
placed public international law firmly within the South African legal context. Public 
international law should come to the foreground every time a dispute regarding the 
interpretation of the rights contained in chapter 3, fundamental human rights, comes 
before a court of law. Previously, the courts had not been under an obligation to consider 
international law when handing down judgment, but through the operation of section 35(1), 
courts are under a new obligation to consider international law when interpreting the bill of 
rights.  
 
Section 35 of the 1993 Constitution was succeeded by section 39 of the Constitution of 
1996. With regard to international law, section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution differs from 
section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides: 
„When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
b) must consider international law; and 
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c) may consider foreign law.‟111 
 
The obligation imposed on the courts under section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution was that 
the courts shall have regard to public international law only when applicable, while under 
section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution the courts must consider international law when 
interpreting the bill of rights. The courts, as well as any tribunal or forum, are under a strict 
obligation to consider international law in every case that deals with the interpretation of 
the rights contained in the bill of rights.112 The 1993 Constitution placed this obligation on 
courts only and not on tribunals and forums as the 1996 Constitution does. The question is 
whether or not the courts have fulfilled this obligation imposed on them and also how they 
interpreted this interpretation clause in proceedings before them. The following judgments 
handed down by the Constitutional Court are examined to analyse the courts‟ approach to 
the use of international law: S v Makwanyane;113 Azanian Peoples Organisation v 
President of the Republic of South Africa;114 and Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom.115 
 
2 4 2 S v Makwanyane 
In S v Makwanyane (hereafter „Makwanyane‟),116 a case concerning the constitutionality of 
the death penalty and heard under the 1993 Constitution, the Constitutional Court was 
presented with both international and foreign law with regard to the admissibility of the 
death penalty. The case was brought before the Court on the assumption that 
administering the death penalty contravenes section 11(2) of the 1993 Constitution, the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment.  
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In terms of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, the Court concluded that the term 
„international law‟ includes both binding and non-binding international law.117 The Court 
noted that comparable decisions by international tribunals such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights, have dealt with the admissibility of the death penalty.118 
Although the comparable instruments the Court referred to are not binding in South African 
law, they aided the Court in reaching its ultimate decision. This illustrates the importance 
of considering international law to receive guidance on certain matters, because the issue 
has already been dealt with and debated in international law.119 
 
The following principles can be established from the Makwanyane decision with regard to 
the application of international law concerning constitutional interpretation.120 Firstly, it is 
competent for a court to consider both international (and foreign) law because such laws 
are of value in their own right.121 Secondly, binding and non-binding international law 
creates the framework for constitutional interpretation.122 This framework in which the bill 
of rights „can be evaluated and understood‟ consisted in the Makwanyane case of 
international agreements and customary international law.123 Guidance could therefore be 
found in international law, but courts should be mindful of the fact that the constitution is 
the highest law in the Republic and that any law, including international law, that is 
inconsistent with it is invalid.124 
 
Thirdly, the context of the constitution needs to be kept in mind. The administering of the 
death penalty is not prohibited by international law, and there is no universal rule as to the 
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admissibility of the death penalty. In article 6 of the ICCPR,125 which is binding on South 
African law, it is stated that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of their life and that the 
death penalty may only be imposed on those who have committed the most serious of 
offences. Amongst these and other international law authorities, the position of the death 
penalty in the United States of America and India was discussed. The Court returned to 
the crucial question whether the punishment of the death penalty is permissible under the 
South African Constitution of 1993. Therefore, the Court had regard to the international law 
(as well as comparable foreign law), but found it of utmost importance to abide by the 
position of the 1993 Constitution, and found that administering the death penalty 
contravenes section 11(2) of the 1993 Constitution, the section that prohibits cruel, 
inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
2 4 3 Azanian Peoples Organisation v President of the RSA 
In Azanian Peoples Organisation v President of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter 
„Azapo‟)126 the constitutionality of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
(the „Amnesty Act‟),127 which granted amnesty to perpetrators of political crimes that took 
place during the apartheid era, was brought to the Constitutional Court in terms of section 
22 of the 1993 Constitution. Section 22 protects the right to have justiciable disputes 
settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent or impartial forum. 
During the course of argument, the applicants relied on international law to invalidate the 
Amnesty Act,128 because support could not be found in South African law.129 The 
applicants argued that the state is under an obligation under international law to prosecute 
those guilty of gross human rights violations.  
 
The issue before the Constitutional Court was whether an interpretation of the 1993 
Constitution that renders an act of Parliament invalid should be preferred by relying on 
international law. Various international law conventions were cited in the heads of 
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argument and in the case,130 but were dismissed by the Court. Mohammed DP stated that 
if the Amnesty Act131 is inconsistent with the 1993 Constitution, the reliance on 
international law becomes irrelevant.132 Although the constitution is the highest law in the 
Republic and any conduct in conflict with it is invalid, the Court should have conducted a 
thorough investigation into international law because the 1993 Constitution requires it in 
section 35(1) and the arguments brought by the applicants were based on international 
law.  
 
Dugard and Currie, although agreeing with the constitutional interpretation, states that this 
judgment is disappointing from an international law perspective as it disregards 
international law from the outset.133 The Court failed to make a proper inquiry into 
international law and as a result failed to recognise that persons are generally prosecuted 
for crimes against humanity and therefore excluded from an amnesty provision, but that 
this is not an absolute rule in international law as state practice is too unclear to support 
such an argument.134 Unfortunately, the Court never got to this stage, as it first ruled that 
international law was irrelevant, or inconsistent with the constitution, before attempting to 
reconcile the constitution with international law.135  
 
The position taken by the Court in the Azapo case was a regression from the position with 
regard to international law that the same Court took in Makwanyane.136 In Makwanyane, 
the Constitutional Court made it clear that both binding and non-binding international law 
creates the framework for interpretation. The position taken in the Azapo137 decision, that 
international law is irrelevant if the constitution renders it invalid, makes section 39(1)(b), in 
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this case section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, unnecessary because courts are in any 
event bound to follow international law that is binding on the Republic.138 The position 
taken in the Azapo case deviated from the position in the Makwanyane139 case and turned 
out to be an ad hoc instance, and „openness to and generous reliance on international law 
has most recently been the default (judicial) disposition in constitutional interpretation in 
South Africa‟.140 
 
2 4 4 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (hereafter „Grootboom‟)141 was 
heard by the Constitutional Court concerning, amongst others, the proper approach to 
section 26 of the 1996 Constitution. Section 26 concerns the right of all to have access to 
adequate housing, the state‟s responsibility to realise this right and the right of all persons 
not to be evicted from their homes or have their homes demolished without an order of 
court. During the course of argument the Court referred to international law in interpreting 
section 26 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court accepted the position in 
Makwanyane142 that international law for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 
Constitution (section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution) includes both binding and non-binding 
international law to create the framework for interpretation. However, Yacoob J, placed a 
proviso on this, stating that while international law might be a guide to interpretation „the 
weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary‟.143 
 
The Constitutional Court in Grootboom144 relied on the ICESCR145 to determine whether or 
not the Court could formulate a minimum core obligation in respect of the right to have 
access to adequate housing and, more specifically, shelter. The United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitors state parties‟ obligations with regard to 
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the Covenant. The Court relied heavily on the General Comments of the Committee, who 
formulated the minimum core obligation with regard to this right after many years of 
examining the reports it received from member states. Therefore, the comments of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contain substantive information that it 
received over a long period of time from which to determine what the minimum core 
obligation is in respect of the right to adequate housing. The Constitutional Court ruled that 
it did not have sufficient information to determine what the minimum core with regard to 
access to adequate housing is in the South African context. 
 
The Constitutional Court emphasised that the state‟s obligation to provide access to 
adequate housing depends on the relevant context and will sometimes differ from city to 
city and person to person.146 The same is also true for international law. International law 
also needs to be understood in the context in which it has been developed or 
formulated.147 This leads to the conclusion that international law can in no circumstances 
just be applied blindly, but that the context and its relevance to the dispute need to be 
highlighted in order to make a proper inquiry into international law.148 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
With the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 the principle of the sovereignty of 
Parliament was incorporated into South African law. This principle, together with the 
courts‟ inability to test the substance of legislation, made the implementation of the 
apartheid system possible. The apartheid system led to the isolation of South Africa from 
the international community and the developments that took place in international law. 
During the apartheid era the government regarded international law as an inferior area of 
the law and the apartheid policy itself violated principles of international law.149 Therefore, 
international law and the protection of human rights were neglected during this period. 
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In the beginning of the 1990s South Africa moved away from this culture of authority 
towards a culture of justification,150 with the acceptance of a supreme constitution and a 
justiciable bill of rights. Any law or conduct in conflict with the Constitution is now invalid.151 
The bill of rights grants fundamental individual human rights, such as the right to human 
dignity,152 life,153 property154 and adequate housing.155 The courts are further entrusted to 
safeguard the human rights of all citizens.156 With regard to international law, the 1996 
Constitution emphasises the position regarding international agreements,157 thereby 
seeking to include South Africa once again in the international community by making it 
possible, and somewhat easier, for international agreements to be incorporated into South 
African law. The Constitution also makes reference to areas of international law, such as 
customary international law and gives such law constitutional standing in South African 
law.158 When courts interpret legislation, they are under an obligation to interpret 
legislation in favour of international law if such an interpretation is reasonably possible.159 
It can therefore be concluded that international law is deemed to be important in the new 
constitutional era. 
 
The manner in which the courts must interpret the bill of rights is set out in section 39(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution. In section 39(1)(b), the courts are placed under an obligation to 
consider international law when interpreting the bill of rights. Since 1995, the courts have 
developed its approach to this interpretation. In Makwanyane,160 it was established that 
international law for purposes of this section includes binding and non-binding international 
law. In Grootboom,161 the principle laid down in Makwanyane162 was accepted, but the 
Court stated that the weight to be attached to each principle of international law will vary, 
thereby seeking an interpretation that is context sensitive. 
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The obligation imposed on the courts to consider international law in the interpretation of 
the bill of rights has not been adhered to in all cases before the court. It might be that 
courts are not aware of all the international law sources available to them in interpreting 
the various rights contained in the bill of rights. For example, in a case that was heard in 
terms of section 25 of the 1996 Constitution, First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance,163 which will be discussed in chapter 3, the Constitutional Court 
accepted its obligation to consider international law as well as the discretion that the court 
has concerning the use of foreign law. Although the court did extensive research into 
foreign law, it failed to do a study of international law. Subsequent case law regarding the 
interpretation of the rights in relation to section 25 has not dealt with international law 
instruments and principles or regional international law instruments and principles 
either.164  
 
In contrast, courts have proven to be more willing to consult international law when 
interpreting the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the right to adequate housing and the right of access to adequate housing in 
domestic law will be discussed in chapter 4 to indicate the extent to which international law 
was useful in interpreting the right. The right referred to includes the right of access to 
adequate housing as well as the right protecting an existing right to housing. 
 
Therefore, the aim of the following chapters is to identify the sources of international law 
that courts must consider when interpreting the relevant rights in the bill of rights as there 
is a vast number of sources that can aid the courts in the interpretation process. The 
following chapters will identify those international law instruments and principles that the 
courts may and should consult when interpreting the right to property, guaranteed in 
section 25 of the 1996 Constitution, and the right of access to adequate housing in section 
26. 
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3 
Property Rights in International Law 
3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated that South Africa was isolated from the developments that took place 
in the area of the protection and advancement of human rights in international law, mainly 
due to the implementation of the system of apartheid. Various human rights were 
disregarded by the South African apartheid Government at a time when the protection of 
human rights in international law became increasingly important. It became clear that the 
protection of human rights is emphasised in the new democratic South Africa. This 
becomes evident from the extensive protection of human rights in the Constitution of 1996, 
which is the highest law in the Republic. 
 
As indicated in chapter 2, all the rights in the bill of rights need to be interpreted with 
international law in mind as mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. This chapter 
will focus on the utilisation of international law in interpreting the right to property as found 
in section 25 of the Constitution. The property clause in section 25 of the Constitution has 
a twofold purpose. It has a protective purpose (section 25(1)-(3)) and a reform purpose 
(section 25(5)-(9)). The protective purpose entails that existing property rights and interest 
are protected against deprivation and expropriation, while the reform purpose legitimizes 
land reform and „related land reforms in property holdings and property law‟.1 Section 
25(4) is an interpretation provision relating to both the protective and reform purpose.2 The 
courts have indicated that they would interpret these seemingly contradictory rights 
purposively so that both the objectives of section 25; the protection of existing property 
interest and the guarantee of state action to promote land and other related reforms, are 
respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled.3 Therefore, Van der Walt submits that section 
25 requires an (internal) interpretation that seeks to balance these two competing 
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purposes in seeing them as part of „one integrated guarantee‟4 instead of viewing them as 
two distinct and separate duties.5  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to indicate that the Constitutional Court is not fulfilling its 
obligation to apply international law when interpreting the right to property as mandated by 
section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. In addition, it will be explained that the Court confuses 
international law with foreign law when interpreting the right to property. This confusion is 
in conflict with section 39 of the Constitution, because section 39(1)(b) obliges courts to 
consult international law in interpreting the bill of rights, while section 39(1)(c) of the 
Constitution makes it possible for the courts to consider foreign law when interpreting any 
right in the bill of rights. To illustrate that the Constitutional Court does not consider 
international law when interpreting the bill of rights and that they confuse international law 
with foreign law, the case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance,6 in which the Constitutional Court had to hand down judgment in terms of the 
protective purpose of section 25, will be discussed. Later cases by the Constitutional 
Court, also concerning the protective purpose of section 25, such as Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng7 and Du Toit v 
Minister of Transport,8 will serve as further illustration of the Constitutional Court‟s 
reluctance to discuss international law. 
 
Therefore, the international law sources protecting property rights will be spelt out in order 
to enable a discussion on the use of these sources in interpreting the right to property in 
the South African context. In that discussion it will become clear that the right to property is 
controversial in international law, which may lead to the conclusion that international law 
may not add much value to the interpretation of the right to property. Furthermore, the right 
to property in regional international law will be discussed. It will be suggested that the right 
to property in regional international law is more developed and more easily enforceable 
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than in international law. Therefore, the available regional international law that might be 
able to aid the interpretation of the right to property in the South African context will be 
discussed.  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the „UDHR‟)9 will be considered as it contains 
a property provision in article 17. Since the right to property is a controversial issue in 
international law, the right to property was excluded from the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights10 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,11 the covenants that give binding effect to the rights contained in the 
UDHR. However, it has been possible to include the right to property in binding regional 
international law instruments, as the legal and social customs of geographical areas are 
similar.12 Therefore, the regional international law that will be discussed include the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights,13 the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms14 and the American Convention on Human Rights,15 as all these 
regional law instruments contain a right to property. The right to property in these systems 
has been the source of case law or communications by the various regional international 
human rights courts and commissions. These cases and communications give further 
clarity to the interpretation of the rights contained in the respective conventions. 
 
In international law, the property rights of specific groups of peoples, for instance refugees 
and women are more developed than the general protection of property rights. Therefore, 
the property rights of these specific groups of people will be discussed since these sources 
can aid the courts in interpreting these specific groups‟ property rights. 
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3 2 Property Rights in International Law 
In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996,16 the Constitutional Court stated with 
regard to the right to property: 
„If one looks to international conventions [and foreign constitutions] one is immediately 
struck by the wide variety of formulations adopted to protect the right to property, as well as 
the fact that significant conventions and constitutions contain no protection of property at all. 
Although art 17 of the UHDR provides that „(e)veryone has the right to own property‟ and 
that „(n)o-one shall be arbitrarily deprived‟ of property, neither the ICESCR nor the ICCPR 
contains any general protection of property.‟17 
 
This dictum illustrates the various formulations with regard to the right to property accepted 
in international law and foreign jurisdictions as well as the difficulty in formulating a general 
right to property in international law. The tension between the protection of property rights 
on the one hand and social rights on the other explains this difficulty. Generally, property 
rights guarantee the institution of private property and protect acquired rights from arbitrary 
interferences, while social rights‟ purpose is the distribution of wealth and resources.18 
According to Krause and Alfredsson, the constitutions and general laws of most 
democracies have long protected the right to property.19 The right Krause and Alfredsson 
refers to is generally a specific right protecting „the institution of private property and 
acquired rights‟.20 However, this right is not absolute, as limitations can be placed on the 
right. Due to the different views of states with regard to the concept of property as well as 
the limitations that can be placed on the right to property, the adoption of an international 
property standard is difficult.21 As a result, the drafting of article 17 of the UDHR,22 which 
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contains the right to property, was rife with debates concerning the content and limitations 
of the right. It was also considered to omit the right to property from the UDHR altogether. 
Therefore, property rights in international law are controversial when compared to the 
other internationally protected human rights.23 This is evident from the examples below of 
the different views states expressed during the drafting of article 17 of the UDHR. 
 
During the drafting of the property provision in the UDHR, various formulations and ideas 
were introduced in the debates that took place in the Drafting Committee of the 
Commission on Human Rights. The Drafting Committee consisted of representatives from 
the Human Rights Commission.24 In the preparatory work, the representatives from the 
United Kingdom and Australia felt that a clause protecting property rights should be 
omitted altogether.25 Western countries, with the United States at the forefront, sought 
strong protection of the right to property, while the third world and socialist countries 
sought stronger recognition of the social function of property, arguing for easier 
interference with property rights in the public interest.26 
 
Three proposals were presented by the Drafting Committee of the Commission on Human 
Rights during the first, second and third sessions. The first proposal, which guaranteed 
everyone the right to own personal property, was criticized by the United States in that the 
term „personal property‟ is used to distinguish goods from real property in Anglo-American 
law.27 Both the United Kingdom and China were critical of the inclusion of the right to 
property in the UDHR; both states opted for a more general protection of the right to 
property, which they proposed should read „everyone is entitled to protection from 
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reasonable interference with his property‟.28 On this point the Soviet Union criticised the 
vagueness of the words such as „unreasonable interferences‟.29 
 
During the third session of the Commission of Human Rights, article 17 as it stands today 
was formulated. Krause and Alfredsson note that although the draft was still the subject of 
further debates, the „end result was article 17 as we know it.‟30 The fact that article 17 was 
included in a declaration (a non-binding document) with great difficulty foreshadowed the 
debates that took place when the drafting of the international covenant took place. 
 
During the drafting of the international covenant that was to follow the UDHR, ideological 
differences that prevailed between the Eastern and Western countries made it impossible 
to produce a single covenant to give effect to the Declaration. As a result two covenants, 
namely the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
„ICESCR‟)31 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the „ICCPR‟)32 
were adopted by the General Assembly.33 When it came to the drafting of the right to 
property in order to give effect to article 17 of the UDHR, consensus could not be reached 
as to which Covenant this right should be included under.34 According to Rosas, the 
drafters of the international covenants opted to include the right of property in the ICESCR; 
although some felt that it should be included in the ICCPR since property „also had the 
character of civil freedoms‟.35 According to Krause it was possible to agree on the 
formulation of article 17 of the UDHR because it is a „legally non-binding declaration,‟ but 
impossible to include a right to property in the universal conventions that require more 
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precise formulations, especially with regard to the permissible limitations.36 The debates 
that took place concerning the inclusion of the right to property in the international 
covenants can be categorised into four groups, namely those concerned with inclusion of 
the right in a Covenant, the formulation of the right, the limitations of the right, and the 
restriction on state action respectively.37 
 
Arguments against the inclusion of the right to property related to the problems of non-
consensus on the concept of the right to property and the limitations that the right to 
property should be subject to. On the contrary, it was argued by some states that the 
exclusion of the right to property might create the impression that it is not a fundamental 
human right. With regard to the inclusion or exclusion of the right to property in the draft 
covenants, the differences regarding the concept of the right to property and the 
restrictions to which the right should be subject became evident. Regarding the formulation 
of the right to property, the same arguments were brought forward as during the drafting 
procedure of article 17 of the UDHR. Some states wanted the right to property to be broad 
and in general terms, resembling article 17 of the UHDR, while others sought an article 
which is drafted in precise legal terms and spells out the specific limitations and 
qualifications pertaining to the right.38 
 
While it was agreed that the right to property is not absolute, it was emphasised that the 
limitations placed on rights differ „from time to time and from country to country‟.39 Some 
states wanted to include the text of paragraph 2 of article 17 of the UDHR in the covenant, 
which states that no one shall be deprived of property arbitrarily. However, it was argued 
that the text of the UDHR lacked legal precision and that the term „arbitrarily‟ carried 
different meanings in different jurisdictions.40 As the limitations that could be placed on the 
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right to property were the most debatable,41 especially with regard to the wording of the 
right, it was decided that the right to property should be left out of the covenants.42 
 
Therefore, the only reference to a general right to property in international law is found in 
the UDHR. While the rights contained in the International Covenants are binding on state 
parties to the extent that they were ratified, the UDHR can have no binding force. The 
UDHR is not a treaty that is open for ratification by states. Dugard states that the UDHR is 
a „recommendatory resolution of the United Nations‟ General Assembly and is therefore 
not legally binding on states‟.43 However, because the UDHR can be regarded as „an 
authoritative statement of the international community‟,44 some of the provisions in the 
UDHR have acquired the status of customary international law. Nevertheless, it seems to 
be debatable whether the right to property has acquired the status of customary 
international law. Tladi does not argue against accepting that the right to property forms 
part of customary international law, but is of the opinion that it should not be a fact that is 
assumed lightly.45 Tladi further states that the right to property (as forming part of 
customary international law) „is a right which, if relied upon, needs to be substantiated by 
providing the elements of customary international law, namely usus and opinio iuris‟.46 If it 
can be proven that the right to property, as contained in article 17 of the UDHR, forms part 
of customary international law, it can be applicable in terms of section 232 of the 
Constitution of 1996. Section 232 makes customary international law applicable in South 
African law unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. Article 17 
of the UDHR cannot be so construed that it is inconsistent with the Constitution or with an 
act of Parliament. Therefore, article 17 should, as a starting point, be used in interpreting 
the right to property. 
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In considering article 17, which states that, „everyone has the right to own property alone 
as well as in association with others [and] no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of property‟, 
Krause and Alfredsson are of the opinion that this article does not recognise the right to 
property as an absolute right; persons may, in certain instances, be deprived of their 
property.47 However, the deprivation of property may not be arbitrary. According to Krause, 
there are diverging opinions whether compensation is a requirement in the event of a 
deprivation, and if so, how compensation should be calculated.48 The issue of 
compensation can be regarded as the most contested aspect of the right to property and 
was the main reason for the exclusion of the right to property in the International 
Covenants of 1966.49 However, the term „arbitrary‟ gives an indication that a state may not 
take property without paying compensation.50 In addition, Cotula argues that the 
arbitrariness requirement can be „interpreted as requiring public purpose, non-
discrimination, and adherence to due process of law‟.51 Therefore, the right to property 
under the UDHR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and the „arbitrariness 
requirement‟ may mean that the deprivation must be accompanied by compensation, must 
be for a public purpose, may not be discriminatory and must be done in accordance with 
due process of the law. 
 
3 3 Property Rights in Regional International Law 
3 3 1 Introduction 
If the definition of international law can be described as „a body of rules and principles 
which are binding upon states in their relations with one another‟52 or „those rules and 
norms that regulate that conduct of States and other entities which at any time are 
                                            
47
 Krause C and Alfredsson G „Article 17‟ in Alfredsson G and Eide A (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) 359-378 at 364. 
48
 Krause C „The Right to Property‟ in Eide A, Krause C and Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (2
nd
 revised ed 2001) 191-209 at 200. 
49
 Krause C „The Right to Property‟ in Eide A, Krause C and Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (2
nd
 revised ed 2001) 191-209 at 200-201. 
50
 Krause C and Alfredsson G „Article 17‟ in Alfredsson G and Eide A (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) 359-378 at 364; Krause C „The Right to 
Property‟ in Eide A, Krause C and Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2
nd
 
revised ed 2001) 191-209 at 201; Cotula L „International Law and Negotiating Power in Foreign Investment 
Projects: Comparing Property Rights Protection under Human Rights Investment Law in Africa‟ (2008) 33 
SAYIL 62-112 at 66-67. 
51
 Cotula L „International Law and Negotiating Power in Foreign Investment Projects: Comparing Property 
Rights Protection under Human Rights Investment Law in Africa‟ (2008) 33 SAYIL 62-112 at 67. 
52
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 1. 
49 
 
recognised as being endowed with international personality‟,53 then regional instruments 
can also be applicable under the broad term of international law. These regional law 
instruments are the result of the geographic and ideological similarities that tend to exist 
between neighbouring states. This fact makes it easier for states to agree to the 
formulation of certain rights. Therefore, Shaw states that international law may also be 
regional, „whereby a group of states linked geographically or ideologically may recognise 
special rules applicable only unto them‟.54 These instruments need to be approached with 
caution as terms and methods of interpretation might differ from region to region. As a 
result, using these regional international instruments in domestic jurisdictions should still 
remain context sensitive. As an example, in the preamble to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (the „European Convention‟)55 it is stated that 
the governments of European countries „are likeminded and have a common heritage of 
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law‟. 
 
This part of the chapter will describe regional international law instruments regarding the 
right to property. The right to property in regional international law compensates for the 
lack of any real protection of property in international law.56 Since the ICCPR57 and the 
ICESCR58 do not contain a property provision, the regional international law systems are 
the only human rights systems available to persons whose property rights were violated in 
the event that domestic remedies have been exhausted.59 As indicated, there are three 
prominent regional bodies that have drawn up documents to bind the different regions and 
contain provisions protecting property. Of particular relevance to the South African context 
is the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (the „Banjul Charter‟),60 which is 
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binding on South African law in terms of section 231 of the Constitution.61 Property is 
protected in article 14 of the Banjul Charter. In addition, article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
European Convention and article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights (the 
„American Convention‟)62 protect property. The protection afforded the right to property 
differs from region to region and the effectiveness of the implementation of remedies adds 
significantly to this difference. 
 
3 3 2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The Banjul Charter was adopted in July 1981 by the Organization of African Unity in 
Nairobi. The Organization of African Unity was replaced by the African Union in 2002 as a 
result of the Organization of African Unity‟s failure to „satisfy the needs and aspirations of 
the Continent‟.63 Currently there are 52 African states that form part of the African Union,64 
South Africa being one of them. The Organization of African Unity had as its mandate 
issues including the struggle against colonialism; preserving territorial integrity; and the 
non-interference by foreign states in the internal affairs of another state. Human rights and 
the protection thereof was never a central concern for the Organization of African Unity.65 
With the development of African countries and the decolonization that took place, it was 
necessary to change these objectives. Therefore, the African Union has the protection and 
advancement of human rights as its central theme.66 
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The monitoring of the rights contained in the Banjul Charter is entrusted to the 11 
independent African personalities who together form the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples‟ Rights (the „African Commission‟).67 In terms of article 45 of the Banjul 
Charter, the purpose or function of the African Commission is to promote and protect 
human and peoples‟ rights; to interpret the provisions of the Charter; and to perform any 
task assigned to it by the Assembly of the Organization of African Unity. The African 
Commission is often criticised because its decisions have no binding legal force and state 
parties often neglect to implement its recommendations.68 Therefore, the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, which sets up the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights, was adopted by the Organization of African Unity in Burkina Faso on the 10th of 
June 1998. This Protocol was adopted to solve the problem that the non-binding nature of 
the Commission‟s recommendations posed. The Protocol has not been ratified and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights is not yet operative.69  
 
The Banjul Charter is unique in the sense that it contains civil and political rights;70 
economic, social and cultural rights;71 and group rights,72 all in one charter. Article 14 of 
the Charter, which forms part of the collection of civil and political rights, reads as follows: 
„The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of 
public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provision 
of appropriate laws.‟ 
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In terms of article 14, state parties should refrain from arbitrarily interfering in one‟s 
possession of property and should prevent third parties from the doing the same.73 
However, article 14 does not clarify who the holder of the right to property is and does not 
make provision for the payment of compensation. According to Cotula,74 the lack of 
compensation requirements weakens the protection of the right to property if it is 
compared to the protection afforded in European and American regional international law. 
Olaniyan is of the opinion that if article 14 of the Banjul Charter is read with article 21, the 
problem resulting from the omission of any compensation requirement is solved.75 Article 
21 of the Banjul Charter guarantees the right of people to freely dispose of their natural 
resources and in the event of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the 
lawful recovery of their property as well as to adequate compensation.76  
 
Article 14 of the Banjul Charter protects existing access to one‟s property as well as the 
right not to have property removed without due process. This was stated in Constitutional 
Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria.77 The 
central matter in these three related communications concerns the government‟s actions to 
prohibit the publishing and circulation of several newspapers. The government‟s agents 
sealed off the newspapers‟ buildings and they were occupied by the armed security 
personnel and policemen in defiance of court orders. In addition, it was alleged that the 
government violated the proprietary rights of the owners of the newspaper companies. The 
African Commission found that the actions of the military government constituted a 
violation of article 14 of the Banjul Charter. The Commission held that the right to property 
includes a right to have access to one‟s property and not to have the property encroached 
upon. It was also emphasised that if it cannot be shown that the seizure was in the public 
interest or for a public purpose, such seizure violates the right to property.  
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Huri-Laws, a non-governmental organisation registered in Nigeria, alleged certain 
violations on the part of the Nigerian government against the Civil Liberties Organisation in 
the communication of Huri-Laws v Nigeria.78 Huri-Laws contended that the agents of the 
military government of Nigeria, the State Security Services (the „SSS‟), searched the 
premises of the Civil Liberties Organisation in search of incriminating materials without a 
search warrant. The SSS confiscated 13 computers, official files and diskettes without any 
warrants. All computers barring one were released to the Civil Liberties Organisation. As a 
result, the complainant alleged that the search and seizure of the Civil Liberties 
Organisation‟s property without a warrant was in breach of article 14 of the Banjul Charter. 
On the basis of article 14, the plaintiffs argued that „owners have the right to undisturbed 
possession, use and control of their property, however they deem fit‟.79 In addition, the 
complainant alleged that there was no evidence that the search and seizure was for a 
public need or in the public interest. The commission found that there was a violation of 
article 14. The African Commission agreed with the complainant that the right to property 
in article 14 includes the rights of owners to undisturbed possession and to use and control 
their property however they may deem fit.  
 
Due to the limited communications on the right to property, the right to property in the 
African regional system has not been clarified to the same extent as in the European and 
Inter-American systems.80 In the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria,81 the plaintiffs alleged that the Nigerian 
government violated article 14 of the Banjul Charter by destroying the Ogoni peoples‟ 
homes. However, the failure on the Commission‟s part to find a violation of the right to 
property may signal reluctance on the part of the African Commission to give this right 
normative content.82 Nevertheless, the African Commission has interpreted the right to 
property to include a right of access to one‟s existing property, the right to undisturbed 
possession as well as the right to control and use one‟s property. In addition, Olaniyan 
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states that the „[c]ommission‟s jurisprudence has shown, somewhat, a willingness to strike 
a fair balance between the demands of the „general interest of the community‟ and the 
requirements of the protection offered in Article 14‟.83 Although the African Commission‟s 
communications have no binding force, they can still be used to interpret the right to 
property in the South African context. 
 
3 3 3 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
In 1949, the Council of Europe84 was founded to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation, 
to achieve greater unity between the member states85 and to counter the communist threat 
posed by the Soviet Union.86 The European Convention was signed in Rome on the 4th of 
November 1950 and entered into force 3 September 1953. As of 2006, the European 
Convention has 14 protocols87 which either alter rights or procedures in the Convention 
itself or are the subjects of new rights and obligations not initially contained therein. Of 
these protocols, Protocol 188 concerns the right to property; the right to education; and the 
right to regular and fair elections. 
 
The drafting of the right to property to be included in the European Convention was just as 
controversial as was the case in drafting article 17 of the UDHR as discussed above.89 
State parties to the European Council could not agree on the formulation that a right to 
property should take in the European Convention. Therefore, it was decided by the 
Committee of Ministers of the European Union that the right to property, together with the 
right to education and political rights, was to be omitted from the European Convention 
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and included later in a separate protocol to the Convention when consensus could be 
reached. 
 
When consensus was reached concerning the right to property, article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights was accepted and it reads as 
follow: 
„Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
conditions provided for by law and the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or 
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.‟ 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that the right to the „peaceful 
enjoyment of possession‟ in substance guarantees a right to property.90 The European 
Court has also given a broad definition to „possession‟ to include a wide range of legal 
interests.91 Allen is of the opinion that article 1 of Protocol 1 applies to all rights in property 
and also includes the rights to acquire and dispose of property.92 According to Cotula the 
term „possession‟ not only includes disputed ownership over land, „but also rights based on 
licences, welfare benefits, and legal claims based on arbitration awards or tort 
compensation.‟93 
 
In Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden94 three rules in article 1 of Protocol 1 were indentified 
and distinguished. The first rule encapsulates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions; the second concerns the deprivation of property; while the third deals with 
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the state‟s power to control the use of property.95 According to Van der Walt, this means 
that the first rule can be regarded as a „separate, independent guarantee of property‟ as 
well as a „guarantee for the existence of institutions that enable people to have peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions‟.96 In terms of the second and third rule, the European 
Court of Human Rights has developed a proportionality rule. There has to be a fair balance 
between an individual‟s right to property and the public interest.97  
 
Although the European Convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights can never be directly binding on South African law, it can still be considered 
by the South African courts to interpret the right to property. In S v Makwanyane,98 as 
discussed in chapter 2, the Constitutional Court stated that the decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights „may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular 
provisions‟99 in the bill of rights. In addition, the abundant jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights has influenced jurisdictions outside Europe which would indicate 
that the law developed around the European Convention by the European Court is worth 
considering in the interpretation of the right to property in the South African context.100 
Therefore, article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention should be considered by any 
South African court in interpreting the right to property as regional international law.  
 
3 3 4 The American Convention on Human Rights 
The Charter of the Organization of American States101 and the American Convention on 
Human Rights,102 also known as the Pact of San José, are the two sources protecting 
human rights in the inter-American system.103 The American Convention on Human Rights 
was adopted in San José, Costa Rica, in 1969 by an inter-governmental conference 
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convened by the Organization of American States.104 This Convention came into force on 
the 18th of July 1978 when it was ratified.105  
 
As with the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention cannot be 
directly binding on South African law. However, the Constitutional Court also included the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights under the sources to provide guidance as to the correct 
interpretation of a right in the bill of rights.106 Therefore, South African courts are able to 
consult the jurisprudence of these institutions to find the best possible interpretation of the 
right to property. 
 
The right to property is contained in article 21 of the American Convention, which reads as 
follows: 
„Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate 
such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. No one shall be deprived of his property 
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, 
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. Usury and other forms of 
exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.‟ 
 
Most cases concerning article 21 of the American Convention which have been referred to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights deal with indigenous peoples‟ right to their ancestral land.107 For instance, in 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v Nicaragua,108 the state did not demarcate the 
communal lands of the Community, nor did they adopt effective measures to ensure the 
property rights of the community to its ancestral lands and natural resources. The state 
granted a concession on community lands without the permission of the community and 
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did not give effective relief when the community lodged a complaint against the state‟s 
actions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered the Nicaraguan state to „carry 
out the delimitation, demarcation and titling of the territory belonging to the Community‟.109 
In addition, the Nicaraguan state was ordered to refrain from doing anything that might 
negatively affect the „existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the 
geographical area where the members of the Community live and carry out their 
activities‟.110 Therefore, states also have a duty to improve the security of property from 
interference from third parties through registration systems.111 
 
Similarly, the case of Saramaka People v Suriname112 dealt with the concession of the 
indigenous peoples‟ ancestral land without their prior consent. With regard to the claim 
made on behalf of the indigenous people that their property rights were infringed, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights reiterated that the state may restrict the use and 
enjoyment of property in terms of article 21 of the American Convention. However, such 
restrictions may only take place if four conditions are met. The restriction should have 
been previously established by law, must be necessary, proportional and have the aim of 
achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.113 In the case of Ivcher-Bronstein 
v Peru,114 which dealt with the deprivation of the plaintiffs‟ nationality resulting in his loss of 
control over a Peruvian television network, the court stated that  
„[p]roperty may be defined as those material objects that may be appropriated, and also any 
right that may form part of a person‟s patrimony; this concept includes all movable and 
immovable property, corporeal and incorporeal elements, and any other intangible object of 
any value‟.115 
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In terms of this brief discussion concerning the right to property in the Inter-American 
regional international law system it can be concluded that property in terms of the 
American Convention is interpreted widely.116 In addition, although the use and enjoyment 
of property may be restricted, it may only be restricted when certain requirements are 
fulfilled.  
 
3 3 5 Conclusion 
In this part of the chapter it was shown that the right to property in regional international 
law is more developed than in international law. The supervisory organs of the different 
regional systems have come a long way in interpreting and giving effect to the right to 
property as contained in their respective instruments. It was also indicated that the Banjul 
Charter‟s formulation of the right to property in article 14 is much broader and weaker, due 
to the absence of compensation requirements, when compared with the property 
provisions found in article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention and article 21 of the 
American Convention. However, the Banjul Charter is binding on South African law, and 
as a result, the Banjul Charter has to be considered whenever the right to property needs 
to be interpreted. Similarly, through the judgment of S v Makwanyane117 and by operation 
of section 39(1)(b), the regional international law of the European Council and the 
Organisation of American States, as developed by their respective supervisory organs, 
could also be consulted. 
 
Although the right to property is found in the three regional systems as discussed, 
protecting and enforcing the right to property in the African region is less developed and as 
a result weaker than in the European and Inter-American systems. Although the African 
system does not pose the same strict requirements for admissibility of a claim based on 
the Banjul Charter as the European and Inter-American systems, the African Commission 
is less effective than the supervisory organs of the European and Inter-American regions 
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in monitoring compliance with the Banjul Charter.118 This is in part attributable to the fact 
that the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights is not yet operative and the African 
Commission on Human Rights does not give binding decisions. Furthermore, the African 
Commission‟s communications do not have strong persuasive powers. Nevertheless, as 
these regional international law conventions and jurisprudence have interpretational value, 
it is still necessary for courts, tribunals and forums to consult these instruments and the 
interpretation, however limited, given them. 
 
3 4 Cases Relating to Section 25 of the Constitution 
Several cases that have been heard by the Constitutional Court concern section 25 of the 
Constitution. Amongst these, the Court attempted to use international law in just one case, 
namely First National Bank of SA LTD t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
(hereafter „FNB‟).119 In this case the South African Revenue Service (the „SARS‟) detained 
and established a statutory lien in terms of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act120 
on vehicles on the premises of Lauray Manufacturers (CC). SARS also detained and 
established a lien over two additional vehicles; the first leased and the second sold under 
an instalment sale agreement by FNB to Airpark Halaal Cold Storage (CC). In all three 
instances FNB retained ownership of the three vehicles. 
 
The vehicles that were detained on the premises of Lauray and Airpark in securing the 
payment by them for outstanding customs and/or excise debt belonged to a third party, 
namely Wesbank, a subsidiary of FNB. FNB questioned the constitutionality of section 114 
of the Customs and Excise Act;121 stating that this particular section allowed for the 
execution and sale of goods without an order of the court. It further alleged that the 
detention and ultimate sale of the goods amounted to an expropriation without making 
provision for compensation to be paid as required by section 25 of the Constitution of 
1996, and therefore argued that it should be declared invalid. 
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In the Cape High Court,122 the application was denied and FNB appealed directly to the 
Constitutional Court. In the Constitutional Court it was submitted that the provisions of 
section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act123 were inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, and therefore invalid. Relying on a list of factors, the Court ruled that there is 
insufficient reason for the deprivation and accordingly found that the deprivation of 
property was arbitrary.124 As a result, the Court concluded that section 114 of the Act is 
invalid in as far as it subjects the property of a person other than the person who is liable 
to a lien, detention and sale. 
 
In the judgment, written by Ackermann J, it was acknowledged that the Court has an 
obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution to consider international law 
when interpreting the bill of rights. The Court further mentioned the discretion that the 
Court has in terms of section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution in applying or using foreign law in 
interpreting the bill of rights.125 Although international and foreign law can be an 
interpretive tool that can aid the Court in interpreting rights in the bill of rights, the Court 
stated that it should not lose sight of the context in which the property clause came into 
existence.126 Therefore, with reference to the obligation in terms of section 39(1) of the 
Constitution, it could have been reasonably expected that the Court would discuss 
international and regional international law that could aid the interpretation of section 25 of 
the Constitution, before turning to a discussion on foreign law. 
 
However, from paragraphs 71 to 97 of the judgment the Court considered foreign law 
under the heading; „Comparative law on deprivation of property‟. The Court noted that in 
dealing with the deprivation of property many jurisdictions use some concept of 
proportionality, although the context and analytical methodology differs from the South 
African Constitution. Therefore, the Court investigated the approaches concerning the 
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proportionality question in other democratic jurisdictions before attempting to conclude 
what „arbitrary‟ deprivation means in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. The foreign 
law discussed by the Court will be highlighted below to indicate the extensive use or 
reliance on foreign law, while the reference to international law is almost non-existent.  
 
The Court considered the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States of 
America‟s federal Constitution.127 The Fifth Amendment read with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, constitutes the property clause.128 This property clause consists of two parts, 
the „due process clause‟ and the „takings clause‟. In terms of the due process clause, a 
person may not be deprived of his/her property without due process of law. In terms of the 
takings clause, private property may not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation.129  
 
The Court also discussed section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution.130 This section, 
although not a typical property guarantee, is „recognized and treated as a constitutional 
property guarantee by the courts, and it has generated extensive and influential case law 
on the constitutional provision and of the relevant cases‟.131 Section 51(xxxi) reads as 
follows:  
„The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: the acquisition of 
property on just terms for any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the 
Parliament has the power to make laws.‟132  
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Furthermore, the Court discussed article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention133 of the Council of Europe. Article 1 protects the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions, requires deprivation to be for a public purpose and in accordance with the 
relevant laws and entitles the state „to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest‟.134  
 
The property clause of the Federal Republic of Germany, contained in article 14 of 
Grundgesetz is also discussed by the Court.135 Article 14(1) guarantees property and the 
right of inheritance and provides that its substance and limits shall be determined by the 
law. Article 14(2) states that property also entails obligations and that its use should serve 
the public interest. Article 14(3) makes provision for expropriation. However, such 
expropriation should be in the public interest and if expropriation does occur, the 
compensation that is paid must represent a fair balance between the public interest and 
the interest of those affected. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court admitted that the law of the United Kingdom is not 
entirely relevant to the question at hand. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the applicable 
administrative principles of the United Kingdom.136 
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The lengthy discussion on comparative law concerning the deprivation of property in the 
FNB137 decision is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the Court did not investigate 
property rights in international law at all; making no reference to property rights in 
international law. Although the Court stated that foreign law „cannot, by simplistic 
transference,‟138 provide for a proper interpretation of the South African property clause, 
the Court nevertheless consulted foreign law to a large extent while simply ignoring 
international law principles that are available. Although the foreign law that was discussed 
is helpful and courts are at liberty to consult foreign law in the interpretation of the bill of 
rights, reliance on international law in the interpretation of the right to property would have 
been more appropriate as section 39(1) of the Constitution renders international law a 
more appropriate tool for interpretation. This is made evident through the wording and 
structure of section 39(1): courts are obliged to use international law in the interpretation of 
the bill of rights, but have discretion to use foreign law in the interpretation of the bill of 
rights. Before entering into a discussion on foreign law, a thorough investigation and 
discussion should have been undertaken of property rights and the deprivation of property 
in international law. Since all courts, tribunals and forums must consider international law, 
the Court should have mentioned article 17 of the UDHR,139 the difficulties with formulating 
an international standard on the right to property and the subsequent exclusion of the right 
to property in the international covenants. Thereafter, the Court should have turned to 
regional international law, before turning to foreign law.  
 
Secondly, insufficient reference was made to regional international law. There is no 
reference to the article 14 of the Banjul Charter,140 which is binding on South African law. 
As a result, the communications of the African Commission concerning the right were not 
discussed or even mentioned. In the communications discussed above at 3 3 2 it was 
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established that the right to property includes a right of access to one‟s property. 
Furthermore, if property is seized, it needs to be justifiable in the public interest or for a 
public purpose. In addition, if the Constitutional Court considered the African 
Commission‟s interpretation of article 14 of the Banjul Charter, the Court would have noted 
the African Commission‟s willingness to balance the demands of the community with the 
protection of property.141 
 
The Constitutional Court discussed article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention, but confused it with foreign law by discussing it with the laws of the United 
States of America, Australia, Germany and the laws of the United Kingdom. Regarding the 
law of the Council of Europe as foreign law makes it applicable to the interpretation 
process under section 39(1)(c); courts may consult foreign law. However, as explained 
above, the law of the Council of Europe is regional international law, is higher in status 
than foreign law and has to be considered in interpreting the rights in the bill of rights in 
terms of section 39(1)(b). Although the Court reached sensible conclusions based on the 
European Convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that 
was considered, the Court confused regional international law with foreign law and 
miscalculated its importance as international law. 
 
The Constitutional Court identified the three rules as laid out in Sporrong and Lönnroth v 
Sweden142 which were confirmed in James v United Kingdom.143 Furthermore, it stated 
that under the third rule it has been held that dispossession without compensation is lawful 
in cases where heavy property taxes have been imposed,144 exchange control impositions 
have been levied,145 compulsory contribution to a state pension scheme levied,146 fines 
imposed for a criminal offence and smuggled goods forfeited147 and property involved in a 
criminal act forfeited.148 This is in line with the principle that the Court in the FNB149 case 
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formulated with reference to the comparative foreign law discussion, namely that it is 
permissible in certain circumstances to deprive persons of their property without paying 
compensation if it is in the public interest. Furthermore, from the discussion concerning 
Protocol 1, the Court derived that a proportionality analysis has been developed to 
determine whether a deprivation of property is lawful or not. Furthermore, the deprivation 
(or regulatory measure) must be lawful, in the public interest as well as establish a fair 
balance between the public interest and the property interest affected.150 
 
Article 21 of the American Convention151 was not discussed either. As illustrated above, 
article 21 of the American Convention is usually used to assert indigenous peoples‟ right to 
their ancestral land. However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated 
that the use of enjoyment of property may be restricted, but only if certain requirements 
are met. In addition, article 21 requires the payment of compensation if deprivation takes 
place. 
 
In the almost 30 paragraphs in which the Constitutional Court discussed foreign law in the 
FNB152 judgment, two principles are derived. The first is that it is permissible under certain 
circumstances to deprive persons of property in the public interest without paying 
compensation. The second principle is that there has to be an „appropriate relationship 
between means and ends, between the sacrifice the individual is asked to make and the 
public purpose this is intended to serve‟.153  
 
Relying on article 1 of the First Protocol, the Court could have justified its finding that a 
person may be deprived of his/her property without being paid compensation. Article 14 of 
the Banjul Charter, article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention and article 21 
of American Convention require such deprivation to be in the public interest or for a public 
purpose. In addition, these regional international law instruments dealing with the right to 
property require that a balance has to be struck between the sacrifice of the individuals 
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and the public purpose being served. Therefore, the principle derived from the study on 
comparative law on the issue of deprivation of property, could also have been reached by 
considering regional international law. 
 
It is regrettable that in subsequent cases heard by the Constitutional Court, no reference 
was made to international law in interpreting section 25 of the Constitution at all. For 
instance, in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng,154 the constitutionality of section 118(1) of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act155 and section 50(1)(a) of the Gauteng Local Government Ordinance156 was 
challenged. These sections require that a certificate be issued in order for the landowners 
to transfer their immovable property. This certificate states that consumption charges for 
services relating to the immovable property in the preceding two years were paid. Without 
this certificate, transfer of the property cannot take place, which placed a restriction on the 
landowners‟ power to transfer their immovable property. In these cases, the landowners 
rented their immovable property to third parties. These third parties failed to pay the 
consumption charges which meant that the required certificate could not be issued when 
the landowners wanted to dispose of the property. Therefore, sections 118(1) and 50(1) 
were being challenged on the basis that they give rise to a deprivation of property contrary 
to section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
 
In answering the question whether or not these provisions amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation of property, the Constitutional Court relied on its previous judgment, namely 
the FNB157 decision. The Court applied the test as it was laid down in the FNB judgment, 
although the Court applied it incorrectly.158 However, no mention is made of the discussion 
of international and foreign law in the FNB case. The Court did not elaborate on it, nor did 
it approve or disapprove of the FNB Court‟s reasoning with regard to the use of 
international and foreign law. It is disappointing that in determining whether the legislation 
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in place arbitrarily deprives the affected landowners of their property, no reference was 
made to section 39(1)(b) and international law. 
 
In Du Toit v Minister of Transport,159 the issue before the Court was whether the 
compensation paid to the plaintiff was in line with section 25 of the Constitution. In this 
case, the South African Roads Board extracted 80 000 cubic metres of gravel from the 
plaintiff‟s land in order to build a public road. When compensation was calculated, a 
dispute occurred. The plaintiff insisted that what was expropriated was the gravel, while 
the Roads Board stated that it was only the right to use the 3.03 hectares for a temporary 
period that was expropriated. The applicant sought compensation in accordance with 
article 12(1)(a) of the Expropriation Act;160 that is, market value. In the alternative, the 
applicant sought compensation that is just and equitable in line with section 25(3) of the 
Constitution. 
 
Writing for the majority, Mokgoro J made no reference to international law or regional 
international law regarding the duty of states to pay just and equitable compensation in the 
event of an expropriation. Langa CJ, who wrote a minority judgment, made no reference to 
the principles of international law regarding the payment of just and equitable 
compensation either. On the point of expropriation and compensation, the Banjul Charter 
is an important source as it deals with the issue of compensation in the event of 
spoliation.161 
 
There are various reasons that can explain why the courts and especially the 
Constitutional Court do not consider international law when the right to property is 
adjudicated. As indicated above, the protection of property rights in international law is 
controversial. Property seems to lie at the heart of what states regard as that which makes 
them sovereign.162 Therefore, states hesitate to agree to conventions regulating the right 
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to property. By comparison, conventions regarding the rights pertaining to women,163 
children,164 refugees165 and the like have been agreed to by various states, making it 
evident that states will agree to these rights more easily. Therefore, when cases relating to 
women,166 children,167 refugees168 and the environment169 are at issue, South African 
courts are more readily prepared to consult international law, because it is on a subject 
that states could agree to with relative ease. 
 
The second reason is related to the first. When investigating property rights in international 
law, the labyrinth of laws and regulations that are found as a result of a lack of consensus 
regarding the content and limitation on the right to property is staggering. As a result of this 
labyrinth that would be encountered if a judge wanted to consult property rights in 
                                            
163
 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, adopted for signature, ratification and accession by 
Resolution 640 (VII) on the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 1952, entered into force on 7 
July 1954, 193 UNTS 135; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by Resolution 1040 (XI) of the United Nations General Assembly on 29 
January 1957, entered into force on 11 August 1958, 309 UNTS 65; Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 2263 
(XXII) on 7 November 1967, UN doc A/RES/2263; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981, 1249 
UNTS 13, 19 ILM 33. 
164
 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 
1386 (XIV) on 20 November 1959, UN doc A/4354; Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 
1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990, 1557 UNTS 3, 28 ILM 1456; Declaration on the Promotion 
among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples, proclaimed by 
Resolution 2037 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1965, UN doc 
A/RES/20/2037(XX). 
165
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, General Assembly Resolution 429(V) of 12 December 
1950, adopted on 28 July 1951 at Geneva, entered into force on 22 April 1950, 189 UNTS 150; Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, General Assembly Resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered 
into force on 4 October 1967, 606 UNTS 267; Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 28 September 1954 at New York, entered into force on 6 
June 1960, 360 UNTS 117; Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted by the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on 30 August 1961 at New York, entered into force on 13 December 1975, 989 UNTS 175. 
166
 In Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated that the South African Government has a duty under international law imposed on it by s 39(1)(b) to 
protect women against violent crime and gender discrimination.  
167
 In De Gree v Webb 2007 (5) SA 185 (SCA), a case involving the inter-state adoption of a South African 
child, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that what should be taken into account is the best interest of the 
child, a well established principle in international law; an obligation imposed on them in terms of s 39(1)(b). 
168
 In Tantoush v Refugee Appeal Board 2008 (1) SA 232 (T) the court accepted the obligation in terms of s 
39(1)(b) to make use of international law. The court made use of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1950, 189 UNTS 150, in order to determine when refugee status or asylum can be granted. 
169
 For instance, in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 158 the court stated that „when interpreting the constitutional right to a safe 
and healthy environment entrenched in section 24, it is permissible to take cognisance of international law as 
provided for in section 39(1)(b)‟. 
70 
 
international law, it seems as though judges are reluctant to do so. And if the venture into 
international law is not done properly, it can easily be done incorrectly. 
 
Although property rights in various jurisdictions vary considerably and the „concept of 
property and the permissible limitations differ significantly … [making] it difficult to adopt 
international property rights standards,‟170 regional human rights instruments do contain a 
right to property. Therefore, the regional international law and the continuous development 
that takes place should be taken into account when the right to property is interpreted.  
 
3 5 Property Rights of Specific Persons in International Law 
3 5 1 Introduction 
As illustrated in the previous sections, due to the diverging opinions of different states on 
the protection of property rights, the right to property is not effectively protected in 
international law. In regional international law, property rights are protected to a larger 
degree and have been developed by the relevant supervisory organs. In international law, 
the property rights with regard to specific groups of persons are in most instances the 
subject of further development. These groups of persons, for instance refugees and 
women, are seen as vulnerable and therefore in need of special protection.171 The sources 
relating to the property rights of these peoples that are binding on South African law 
through ratification should be able to assist the courts when interpreting the property rights 
of these specific groups of people. Therefore, the sources that are binding on South 
African law, pertaining to the property rights of refugees and women will be discussed. 
 
3 5 2 Refugees 
As a consequence of the Second World War many people in Europe were displaced and 
in order to deal with this problem the United Nations established the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.172 Consequently, the Convention Relating to the Status of 
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Refugees (the „Refugee Convention‟)173 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees174 were adopted. The Organization of African Unity (the „OAU‟) Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa175 was concluded in 1969 in 
order to regionally implement the Refugee Convention in Africa.176 South Africa has ratified 
the Refugee Convention, the Protocol Relating to the States of Refugees and the OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, making these 
instruments binding on South African law. In South Africa, aspects regarding refugees and 
asylum seekers are governed by the South African Refugee Act 130 of 1998, as amended 
by the Refugee Amendment Act 33 of 2008.177 The purpose of the Refugee Act178 is to 
give effect to the international law instruments mentioned above. In the Preamble to the 
Act, the accession to these international law instruments regarding refugees is 
acknowledged and in doing so, the South African government has „assumed certain 
obligations to receive and treat in its territory refugees in accordance with the standards 
and principles established in international law‟.179 In article 8(1) of the OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, member states are 
encouraged to co-operate with the United Nations‟ High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Therefore, these international and regional international laws should be consulted as they 
provide additional protection for refugees‟ property rights. 
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When a person is granted refugee status, he is given certain rights in terms of 
international, regional international and South African law. The Refugee Act180 does not 
explicitly grant refugees (or asylum seekers) a right to property. However, section 27(b) of 
the Refugee Act,181 as amended by the Refugees Amendment Act,182 states that refugees 
are entitled to full legal protection, which includes all the rights set out in the bill of rights of 
the Constitution of 1996, except those rights which only apply to citizens.183 Therefore, it is 
possible to protect refugees‟ property rights in terms of the Constitution and the Refugee 
Convention of 1951.  
 
Therefore, property of a refugee is protected from deprivation and expropriation by section 
25(1)-(3) of the Constitution.184 However, refugees will not be able to claim any right in 
terms of access to land and restitution programmes in terms of section 25(5)-(9).185 In 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, refugees may only be deprived of their property 
in terms of law of general application and only if the deprivation is not arbitrary.186 Law of 
general application includes original and delegated legislation as well as rules of common 
and customary law.187 In addition, these laws of general application should be specific, 
accessible and should not target certain individuals in an unfair manner.188 Section 25(1) 
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also prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property. In FNB189 the Constitutional Court 
adopted a „substantive interpretation of the non-arbitrariness requirement‟.190 The Court 
firstly considered whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. If not, the 
deprivation will be arbitrary. In determining whether there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation, the Court considered a list of factors.191  
 
In terms of section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution, refugees‟ property may only be 
expropriated in terms of a law of general application. The expropriation should be for a 
public purpose or in the public interest and must be accompanied by the payment of 
compensation.192 Since the decision in FNB, an enquiry in terms of section 25(1)-(3) will 
have to start with section 25(1). Therefore, to answer the question whether an 
expropriation took place in terms of section 25(2), deprivation in terms of section 25(1) as 
described above has to be considered first.193 The law of general application as described 
in terms of section 25(1) above is also applicable to an enquiry in terms of section 25(2). 
Therefore, if refugees have property, their property will be protected from deprivation and 
expropriation in terms of the Constitution. As has been stated before, refugees will not be 
able to claim any rights in terms of land redistribution or access to land programmes.  
 
To support and supplement the property protection of refugees in terms of the 
Constitution, the Refugee Convention could be considered, since it is binding on South 
African law. Article 13 of the Refugee Convention protects the movable and immovable 
property of refugees.194 It reads as follow:  
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„The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, 
in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other 
rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and 
immovable property.‟ 
 
As indicated above, refugees would be able to rely on section 25(1)-(3) if they were 
deprived or expropriated from their property, but will not be able to claim any right in terms 
of land access and restitution programmes. However, article 13 of the Refugee Convention 
seems to indicate that the South African government needs to treat refugees at least as 
favourably as aliens generally in the same circumstances, with regard to the acquisition of 
both movable and immovable property. This means that there should be no undue 
limitations placed on refugees, due to their status as refugees, in acquiring property as this 
might result in discrimination based on race, religion and country of origin, which is 
prohibited by article 3 of the Refugee Convention195 and section 9 of the Constitution of 
1996. This would supplement refugees‟ property rights in terms of section 25 of the 
Constitution. Article 13 of the Refugee Convention supports the rights available to 
refugees in section 25(1)-(3), by recognising the rights pertaining to property, which in the 
South African context will be protection from deprivation and expropriation. 
 
3 5 3 Women 
In international law, women‟s property rights have also received specialized attention. The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the 
„CEDAW‟)196 is binding on South African law197 and has the purpose to eliminate 
discrimination based on sex. It also contains certain articles pertaining to equality with 
regard to property. Article 14 of the CEDAW concerns the role of rural women in the 
economic survival of their families and article 14(g) affords women equal rights to those 
                                            
195
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, 189 UNTS 150. Art 4 of the OAU Convention 
Regarding the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969, 1001 UNTS 45, denounces 
discriminations based on „race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinions‟. 
196
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 
18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 December 1981, 1249 UNTS 13, 19 ILM 33. 
197
 South Africa signed the CEDAW on 29 January 1993 and it entered into force in South Africa on 14 
January 1996. See Henys C and Viljoen F „The Impact of Six Major UN Human Rights Treaties in South 
Africa‟ (2001) 16 SAPL 28- 67 at 29. 
75 
 
granted to men in relation to land reform. Furthermore, article 15, which pertains to 
equality in legal and civil matters, provides in article 15(2) that women should receive 
equal treatment to that which men receive to conclude contracts and administer property. 
The aim of this article is to give women the right, which in some countries is not enjoyed by 
women, to enter into contracts without their husbands‟ consent with regard to their own 
property and earnings.198  
 
Equality in family law is governed by article 16 of the CEDAW. Article 16(1)(h) states that 
state parties must ensure „[t]he same right for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether 
free of charge or for a valuable consideration‟. These articles are drawn up to eradicate 
discrimination against women. Property regimes throughout the world had at some stage 
discriminated against women by using property rules. For instance, in certain jurisdictions 
property law made it impossible for females to inherit the family land while in other 
jurisdictions husbands automatically acquired the wife‟s property upon entering into 
marriage.199 
 
In the case of Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa,200 the discrimination that South 
African women face in the event of intestate succession in African customary law was 
brought to light. In this case, the constitutional validity of male primogeniture was 
challenged, as well as section 23 of the Black Administration Act201 and section 1(4)(b) of 
the Intestate Succession Act.202 The principle of male primogeniture entails that only a 
male related to the deceased qualifies to be an intestate heir.203 When the deceased has 
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no male descendants, his father is regarded as the intestate heir.204 If the deceased father 
does not survive the deceased, „an heir is sought among the father‟s male descendants 
related to him through the male line‟.205  
 
In the Bhe case, the two minor daughters of the deceased were barred from inheriting from 
his estate. In the Shibi case, the deceased had no surviving wife, descendents, parents or 
grandparents. The nearest male relatives were the deceased‟s cousins. Therefore, the 
sister of the deceased (Ms Shibi) was not eligible to be an heir in terms of the rules of 
intestate succession under African customary law.206  
 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the principle of male primogeniture, as it has come to 
be applied with regard to the inheritance of property, is unconstitutional, because it unfairly 
discriminates against women. The Court also found that section 23 of the Black 
Administration Act is invalid, because it violates the right to equality and dignity found 
respectively in section 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court ruled that 
section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act207 is invalid in as far as it excludes estates 
in terms of section 23 of the Black Administration Act.208  
 
Therefore, South African courts have effectively tried to eradicate discrimination based on 
sex, especially in relation to women‟s property rights. As a result of the Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the 
Republic of South Africa209 case, the discrimination women faced in inheriting property has 
been eradicated. This is in line with the established international law principles on the 
matter as well the CEDAW which is binding on South African law. 
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3 6 Conclusion 
It became clear in this chapter that the Constitutional Court does not adhere to the 
obligation placed on it by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution to consider international law 
when interpreting the right to property. In the FNB210 decision it became evident that the 
Constitutional Court, although accepting that it has an obligation to consider international 
law, failed to make proper reference to international law in interpreting the right to property. 
In the subsequent Constitutional Court cases concerning the right to property that were 
discussed, namely Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v 
Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng,211 and Du Toit v Minister of Transport,212 no reference was made to 
internatonal law either. Furthermore, in the FNB213 case it became clear that the 
Constitutional Court confuses international law with foreign law. This is evident through the 
discussion of article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention which is merged with the 
discussion of the legal principles of other countries such as Australia, Germany and the 
United States of America. This collapses the distinction made by the Constitution in 
section 39(1)(b) and 39(1)(c). In terms of section 39(1)(b) courts must consider 
international law when interpreting any right in the bill of rights, and in terms of section 
39(1)(c) courts may consider foreign law when interpeting any right in the bill of rights 
 
As discussed above, property rights are controversial in international law. Due to diverging 
views on the part of states; a right to property, although included in the UDHR, was 
excluded from the international covenants. Therefore, the right to property remains 
underdeveloped in international law. However, since there are provisions in international 
law that attempt to regulate the general protection of property, such as article 17 of the 
UDHR, it could be worth considering when the right to property needs to be interpreted.  
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It also became clear in this chapter that the right to property is more developed in regional 
international law. The relevant supervisory organs of the relevant regional systems have 
given interpration, although in some instances limited, as to what the right to property 
consists of. It was made clear that the protection afforded property in the Banjul Charter is 
weaker when compared to the European and American Conventions because of the lack 
of effective monitoring of adherence to the Banjul Charter as well as the lack of 
enforceable remedies. However, the communications by the African Commission should 
still be able to guide the courts towards an interpretation of the right to property that is both 
in line with international law and the Constitution. The decisions and communications 
given by the supervisory organs in terms of the European and American Conventions 
should also be used by the court in interpreting the right to property since they can be 
regarded as international law and are part of the „framework in which the bill of rights can 
be evaluated and understood‟.214 
 
Furthermore, the property rights of refugees and women have been subject to further 
developments. In cases where refugees and women‟s rights stand to be adjudicated, 
South African courts can take cognisance of the international law sources, which as was 
seen in this instance, are binding on South African law. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that courts, tribunals and forums are not justified in not 
fulfilling their obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b). Since there are international law 
sources that might be able to guide courts in attaining the best possible interpretation of 
the right to property in the new South African context, these international law sources 
should be considered.  
 
In the following chapter, it will be considered whether or not the Constitutional Court is 
more prepared to consult international law when the right to adequate housing in terms of 
section 26 of the Constitution needs to be adjudicated. In contrast with the right to 
property, it will become clear that courts are more prepared to consult international law 
when interpreting the right to housing. Furthermore, it wil become clear that with regard to 
the right to housing, international law is more developed than regional international law.  
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4 
Housing Rights in International Law 
4 1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the right to property in international law was discussed. It became 
clear that the Constitutional Court does not utilise international and regional international 
law effectively in interpreting the right to property as mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. This chapter will focus on section 26 of the Constitution. The aim is to enquire 
whether the Court is more willing to consult international law when interpreting the right to 
housing in comparison with the right to property. Section 26 of the Constitution of 1996 
contains the right of access to adequate housing, the state‟s duty to realise the right and to 
protect it from arbitrary interferences once the right is obtained. In terms of section 
39(1)(b), courts must consider international law when they interpret the right to housing. 
Since the right of access to adequate housing is a well developed area of international law, 
it is possible to identify international law that concerns the right to adequate housing that 
might be useful in guiding the courts to interpret the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
Therefore, this chapter will analyse the sources of international law with regard to the right 
to adequate housing. To fulfil the obligation imposed on courts, tribunals and forums to 
consider international law, the starting point will be the international bill of rights; the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the „UDHR‟)1 followed by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the „ICESCR‟),2 since the ICESCR 
contains a right to housing similar to the UDHR. In addition, reports of the United Nations‟ 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will be discussed. These reports, 
regarded as soft international law, may serve as helpful tools to interpret the right and to 
provide guidance as to which direction the development of the right should follow. 
Furthermore, the use of these international law sources by the South African courts in 
interpreting and giving effect to the right of access to adequate housing in terms of section 
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26(1) and (2), especially in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom3 and 
in Jafta v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz4 will be discussed in order to 
illustrate to what extent, if any, the Constitutional Court has considered international law in 
fulfilling their obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
 
Once a right of access to housing is obtained, protection against evictions becomes 
important. This protection is included in section 26(3) of the Constitution. As indicated by 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there is a strong 
connection between the protection against forced evictions and security of tenure, which is 
an integral part of the right to housing under international law.5 Without the specific 
protection against forced evictions the right to housing, both under international and 
domestic law, has no real meaning. The protection against forced evictions under 
international law is further explored in this chapter to enable a discussion about the 
possible influence international law may have on the domestic law of evictions. Cases 
such as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers6 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg7 are of 
special interest in ascertaining the possible impact of binding, non-binding and soft 
international law in eviction cases. The aim is to explore whether international law has, in 
its quest to protect the right to adequate housing, shed further light on the interrelationship 
between housing rights and the protection against forced evictions; and whether such 
explanations of the possible interdependence of these two concepts could have further 
application within domestic case law. 
 
The regional international law that might further aid the court in interpreting the right to 
adequate housing will also be discussed. While it is clear that the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (the „Banjul Charter‟),8 the European Convention for the 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the „European Convention‟)9 and 
the American Convention on Human Rights (the „American Convention‟)10 do not contain 
any right to housing or shelter, reference to these regional international law conventions is 
still deemed important. The courts and commissions responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing these conventions have strived to protect a right to housing in some form or 
another. Of particular relevance to South Africa is the Banjul Charter, which is binding on 
South African law and therefore directly applicable. In the case of Social and Economic 
Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria,11 the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights has found that the right to housing can be 
derived with reference to other rights in the Banjul Charter. Similarly, the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights that has considered protecting the home in terms of 
articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention will briefly be discussed. Furthermore, the 
right against arbitrary evictions in light of the American Convention, as given effect to by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, will be analysed. 
 
The specific housing rights of certain vulnerable persons, such as children, refugees and 
women have received ample attention in international law. The protection afforded to these 
vulnerable groups in international law will be explored in order to indicate that there are 
arguments in international law that could in some instances shed greater light on the 
issues that are relevant when the housing rights of these groups are infringed. These 
sources that are available in international law and specifically relate to the housing right of 
these vulnerable groups can support arguments for the protection of similar rights in South 
Africa. 
 
4 2 International Law and the Right to Adequate Housing 
4 2 1 Introduction 
As already indicated, the right to adequate housing is a highly developed area of 
international law. This is evident in the numerous international law sources that contain a 
                                            
9
 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 222, ETS 5. 
10
 Signed at San Jose, Costa Rica on 22 November 1969, entered into force on 18 July 1978, 1144 UNTS 
123, OASTS 36. 
11
 African Commission, Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 51 (ACHPR 2001). 
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right to adequate housing. A general right to adequate housing, as a subset or requirement 
for an adequate standard of living, is found in article 25 of the UDHR,12 which was later 
adopted in article 11(1) of ICESCR.13 Housing rights of specific groups of people are also 
found in article 27 of the Convention of the Right of the Child,14 article 14(1) of the 
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women15 and article 
43(1)(d) of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their 
Families.16 In relation to these rights, article 5(e)(iii) of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination17 further seeks to eradicate all forms of discrimination 
based on various grounds in respect of housing rights. 
 
Article 25 of the UDHR gives everyone the right to an adequate standard of living, 
„adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care‟.18 Explaining the subordinate position of the right to adequate 
housing, which is not an independent right, Craven maintains that the drafters of the 
UDHR were of the view that the fulfilment of economic and social rights, such as the right 
to housing, was dependent upon the social or economic development of the particular 
state.19 Craven also states that the right to adequate housing was not afforded 
independent protection in the UDHR, possibly because the drafters of the UDHR were of 
the opinion that the rights to privacy and property were able to protect the right to 
                                            
12
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
Resolution 217(III) of 10 December 1948, UN doc A/810. 
13
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force on 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
14
 General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990, 1577 
UNTS 3, 28 ILM 1456 (Text is reproduced as amended by General Assembly Resolution 50/155 of 21 
December 1955 and as amended on 19 November 2002). 
15
 General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981, 
1249 UNTS 13, 19 ILM 33 
16 
 General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990, entered into force on 1 July 2003, 2220 
UNTS 93. 
17
 General Assembly Resolution 2106A (XX) of 21 December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, 
660 UNTS 195. 
18
 Own emphasis. 
19
 Craven M „History, Pre-history and the Right to Housing in International Law‟ in Leckie S (ed) National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 43-61 at 51. 
83 
 
housing.20 In addition, the drafters viewed homelessness as a widespread occurrence of 
social ill, which could not be legislated away.21 
 
4 2 2 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR 
The ICESCR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the „ICCPR‟)22 
were drafted and promulgated to give effect to the rights declared in the UDHR. According 
to McLean, the essential international law instruments for interpreting the right to housing 
are the ICESCR and the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ General 
Comments 3, 4 and 7.23 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR provides that all state parties (to the 
Covenant) are to „recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions‟.24 Although it was argued by some states that 
the right to housing should be an independent right, separate from the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the United Nations‟ General Assembly‟s Third Committee decided that 
these two aspects (the right to housing and the right to an adequate standard of living) 
needed to be discussed together. As a result, the right to adequate housing is included 
under the broad right, namely the right to an adequate standard of living.25 According to 
Eide and Eide, „[f]ood, housing and care are the three most important elements for an 
adequate standard of living‟.26 Consequently, the right to housing plays a central role in 
determining what would constitute an adequate standard of living. As will be discussed, 
housing has an impact on various other fundamental human rights, such as the right to 
human dignity. 
                                            
20
 Craven M „History, Pre-history and the Right to Housing in International Law‟ in Leckie S (ed) National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 43-61 at 51. 
21
 Craven M „History, Pre-history and the Right to Housing in International Law‟ in Leckie S (ed) National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 43-61 at 51. 
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 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 171. 
23
 McLean K „Housing‟ in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2
nd
 ed 
2006) 55:1-57 at 32. 
24
 Eide A and Eide WB „Article 25‟ in Aflredsson G and Eide A (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) 523-550 at 539. According to Eide and Eide, „article 25 
of the UDHR is wider in scope than article 11 of the CESCR; the elaboration of the right to medical care is 
addressed in article 12 of the latter. Issues relating to motherhood are also addressed in article 10 
(protection of the family) of the CESCR, and, above all, in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women‟. 
25
 See Craven M „History, Pre-history and the Right to Housing in International Law‟ in Leckie S (ed) National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 43-61. 
26
 Eide A and Eide WB „Article 25‟ in Aflredsson G and Eide A (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) 523-550 at 541. 
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In relation to the right to adequate housing, it is important to consider article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR. Unlike civil and political rights, which are negative in nature, socio-economic 
rights place both positive and negative obligations on states. Therefore, states that have 
ratified the ICESCR are required to realise socio-economic rights 
„to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures‟.27  
 
The state parties are also required to take steps in order to realise the right contained in 
the Covenant.28 Although it is understood that the rights in the Covenant cannot be 
realised immediately, state parties should take steps to realise these rights. With this in 
mind, the ICESCR devised certain mechanisms to ascertain the level of state co-operation 
with regard to the state parties‟ obligations in the Covenant. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is responsible for monitoring the 
ICESCR.29 The Committee receives national reports from state parties to the Covenant.30 
On the basis of this accumulated information it then presents General Comments. In its 4 th 
General Comment,31 the Committee has given extensive interpretive information 
concerning the right to adequate housing. This Comment can also be regarded as the 
most authoritative comment with regard to the right to housing in international law.32 In this 
Comment, the Committee states that „article 11(1) of the Covenant is the most 
comprehensive and perhaps the most important of the relevant provisions‟33 with regard to 
the right to adequate housing in international law. 
 
                                            
27
 ICESCR art 2(1). S 26 of the South African Constitution of 1996 contains similar provisions. 
28
 In the French translation the undertaking is „to act‟ (s’engage à agir) and in the Spanish translation „to 
adopt measures‟ (a adopter medidas). 
29
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 321. 
30
 This is done in terms of arts 16 and 17 of the ICESCR. 
31
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 13 December 1991, UN doc E/1992/23. 
32
 See Leckie S „Where it Matters Most: Making International Housing Rights Meaningful at the National 
Level‟ in Leckie S (ed) National Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 3-41 at 9. 
33
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 13 December 1991, UN doc E/1992/23 para 3. 
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In the 4th General Comment, the Committee acknowledges the gap between reality and 
the standard set by the Covenant with regard to the right to adequate housing,34 since it is 
estimated that over one billion people in the world are inadequately housed.35 The 
Committee is of the view that the right to housing, interpreted broadly, should be seen as a 
right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.36 Therefore, the right to housing is 
interwoven with other human rights, such as the rights to dignity, work, health and 
education.37 Violations of these and other human rights often lead to the violation of the 
right to adequate housing. According to the United Nations, the right to housing, although 
sometimes regarded as a right to property, is in fact broader than a right to property as a 
focus on property rights may lead to violations of the right to (adequate) housing, an 
example being forcible eviction of slum-dwellers that reside on private property.38 
Therefore, the right of access to housing and security of tenure once housing is acquired 
should be kept in mind when the landowner, with a property right, wants to institute 
eviction proceedings. The balancing of the right to housing and the right of property (the 
protection of existing property interest) creates tension in the adjudication of these 
respective rights.  
 
In protecting human rights, the right of access to housing in both international and 
domestic law is of critical importance. In order to minimize the gap between housing 
standards internationally and domestically and in view of the current housing situation in 
South Africa, regard should be given to the principles of international law pertaining to the 
right to housing. These international law instruments are helpful in guiding national policy 
and more importantly, the courts. Due to globalization and the fact that many foreigners, 
especially from the rest of Africa, come to South Africa in search for work, housing rights in 
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 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 13 December 1991, UN doc E/1992/23 para 4. 
35
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights The Right to Adequate Housing Fact 
Sheet 21 (Rev 1 2009) 1. 
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 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 13 December 1991, UN doc E/1992/23 para 7. The fact that human dignity 
plays a role in the right to have access to adequate housing has been accepted by the Constitutional Court 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 23 and Jaftha v 
Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 21. 
37
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights The Right to Adequate Housing Fact 
Sheet 21 (Rev 1 2009) 9. The Preamble of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR states that the rights contained 
therein flow from the inherent dignity of the human person. 
38
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights The Right to Adequate Housing Fact 
Sheet 21 (Rev 1 2009) 8.  
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international law is worth considering in giving effect to the right of access to adequate 
housing as well as security of tenure to those who already have access. 
 
4 2 3 Applicability of the ICESCR on South African Law 
South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994. Although it was expected that South Africa 
would ratify it soon afterwards,39 it has not been ratified yet. Therefore, the ICESCR is not 
directly binding on South African law.40 However, it can be argued that the ICESCR, 
together with the United Nations‟ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ 
General Comments, can be used as an interpretive guide by the South African courts for 
the reasons that follow. Firstly, the drafters of the Constitution relied heavily on the 
ICESCR in formulating the bill of rights, thereby making the Committee‟s interpretation and 
General Comments valuable sources of interpretation for the South African courts.41 This 
view is also adopted when arguments are made before the courts.42 Secondly, the 
Constitutional Court stated in S v Makwanyane43 that binding and non-binding international 
law principles for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) create the framework within which the 
bill of rights can be interpreted.44 Thirdly, comparative study as provided for by section 
39(1)(c) of the Constitution45 would be less effective, since South Africa is one of a few 
                                            
39
 Liebenberg S „The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for 
South Africa‟ (1995) 11 SAJHR 359-378 at 359. 
40
 S 231(2) of the Constitution states that an international agreement, for instance the ICESCR, can only bind 
the Republic after it has been approved by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. 
The ICESCR can also not be regarded as an international agreement of a technical, administrative or 
executive nature in terms of s 231(3) which would make it binding in South Africa without the approval of the 
National Assembly or National Council of Provinces. 
41
 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 107; Currie 
I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 575; Budlender G „Justiciability of the Right to 
Housing: The South African Experience‟ in Leckie S (ed) International Perspectives on Housing Rights 
(2003) 207-219 at 217. Liebenberg states that „[t]he ICESCR is of particular relevance to the interpretation of 
ss 26, 27 and 29 because the Covenant was a major source of reference for the drafting of these provisions‟. 
Budlender states as follows: „These General Comments were helpful [to the Grootboom court] because of 
their standing in international law, and because they are authoritative interpretations of an instrument [the 
Covenant] which clearly had a major influence in the drafting of the South African Constitution.‟ In similar 
vein, Currie and De Waal write that the Committee‟s Comments on State Reports are a „valuable source of 
guidance to South African courts‟.  
42
 In the Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) in the case of Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2010 (3) SA 454 (CC), the amici stated that „[t]he International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) is of particular relevance in the interpretation of section 26 of the Constitution because the 
Covenant was a major source of reference for the drafting of this provision‟. 
43
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
44
 This was accepted by the same Court again in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 26.  
45
 S 39(1)(c) makes it possible for courts, tribunals and forums to consider foreign law when interpreting the 
bill of rights. 
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countries which has entrenched socio-economic rights.46 Fourthly, on signature of the 
Convention, South Africa „incurred an international obligation’47 in terms of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.48 According to article 18 of the Vienna Convention, a 
country that has signed a treaty but not yet ratified it must resist „acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty.‟49 
 
Both section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa and article 11(1) of the ICESCR require 
housing to be adequate. The Committee laid down certain factors in General Comment 450 
that could be used to determine what „adequate housing‟ means. From the courts‟ 
perspective, this should be an important indication as to what would constitute adequate 
housing, since there are no other indicators in South African jurisprudence to indicate to 
the courts what the concept would entail. An important difference between these two 
provisions is the fact that the Constitution states that the right of access to adequate 
housing is available to everyone, while the ICESCR simply states that it is a right to 
adequate housing.  
 
The first factor to be considered is security of tenure. The state should provide protection 
against forced eviction, irrespective of whether occupation occurs in private or rental 
accommodation, lease, emergency housing or informal settlements. An adequate house 
should further have certain facilities essential for the well-being and security of the 
inhabitants. Therefore, the availability of materials, facilities and infrastructure is a pre-
requisite for adequate housing. Costs associated with housing should be at a level that 
does not compromise or threaten the right. This will include establishing housing subsidy 
schemes for those in need of financial assistance. 
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 Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 575 state that South Africa, together with 
Sri Lanka, Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal are the only countries that have „an extensive list of directly-
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 Liebenberg S „The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for 
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Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 13 December 1991, UN doc E/1992/23 para 8. 
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Furthermore, for housing to be regarded as adequate it needs to be habitable. It has to 
provide the occupants adequate space and protect them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind, 
structural hazards and diseases. Adequate housing should also be accessible. Vulnerable 
groups such as the elderly, children and those living with diseases and disabilities should 
be given special recognition in housing laws and policies. Adequate housing should also 
be in a location that is in close proximity to employment opportunities, schools, hospitals 
and other facilities to allow for easy access. Finally, adequate housing should be culturally 
adequate. Cultural identity and diversity of housing should be possible.51 
 
4 2 4 The State’s Duty to Respect, Protect, Promote and Fulfil 
In addition to the concept of adequacy explained above, states also incur obligations in 
relation to the right to housing.52 In international law, these obligations are found in 
General Comment 14, where the Committee states that „[t]he right to health, like all 
human rights, imposes three forms of state obligations on State parties: the obligation to 
respect, protect and fulfil‟.53 It is accepted by the United Nations54 and various authors55 
that these obligations are at least also applicable with regard to the right to adequate 
housing. 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution, which applies to all rights in the bill of rights, requires the 
state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the bill of rights. This section 
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 According to the Committee, this means that „[t]he way housing is constructed, the building materials used 
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relates these obligations as also found in international law to South African domestic law. 
However, section 7(2) goes even further in that it contains an additional obligation, 
namely the obligation to promote. These obligations can be classified as either negative 
or positive obligations. The negative obligation that relates to this section is the state‟s 
duty to respect the right to housing. In General Comment 1456 the Committee interpreted 
this to mean that the state should not interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the 
enjoyment of the right. The duty to respect the right to housing is given more vigour in 
section 26(3) of the Constitution, which states that 
„no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstance [and] no legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions‟. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the negative obligation to respect the right to housing would 
be breached if the state were to allow arbitrary evictions, either on state or private parties‟ 
insistence.57 The positive obligations of the right to housing, which can also be found in 
international law, concern the objective to protect and fulfil the right. Under the obligation 
to protect the right to housing, the state must adopt measures to ensure that third parties 
do not interfere with other individuals‟ housing rights.58 This is also applicable in cases 
where third parties are „landlords, property developers, land owners or any third party 
capable of abusing these rights‟.59 The Committee has stated that under the obligation to 
fulfil the right to adequate housing, states must aim through legislative, administrative, 
budgetary and judicial measures to fully realize the right.60 
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Another positive requirement set by section 7(2) of the Constitution is the state‟s duty to 
promote the right to housing.61 However, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom,62 the Court stated that legislation and government policies should make it 
possible for individuals to provide housing. Leckie argues that the state must revise all 
legislation that erodes the right to adequate housing and implement housing policies as a 
means to place sufficient emphasis on the right in order to achieve the full realisation of 
the right.63 In addition, Budlender argues that administrative bodies should bear the 
promotion of the right to adequate housing in mind when making administrative decisions 
that might have an effect on the right to housing.64 This was the case in Minister of Public 
Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association,65 where it was made clear that the 
right to housing has to be kept in mind in all administrative decisions that have an 
influence on the right.66 
 
In order to highlight the use of these international law instruments and principles in South 
African law in relation to the right of access to adequate housing and the state‟s duty to 
implement reasonable measures to realise this right, two Constitutional Court cases are 
discussed below. They are Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom67 
and Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz.68 The purpose of this discussion is to 
indicate the effectiveness of the use of the international law sources in interpreting the 
right of access to adequate housing as mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
The prohibition against the arbitrary eviction of a home in terms of section 26(3) is 
discussed later at 4 5. 
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4 3 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (hereafter „Grootboom‟),69 Mrs 
Irene Grootboom and the other respondents lived under intolerable conditions in an 
informal squatter camp in Wallacedene. She and her sister‟s family lived in a shack about 
20 square metres in size. Half of the population in Wallacedene were children, while a 
quarter of the inhabitants of Wallacedene had no income at all. Adding to the fact that the 
people were living in shacks, there were no sewage or refuse removal services available. 
In addition, only 5% of the shacks had electricity and there was no water available. When 
the respondents realised that they would have to continue living in such conditions until 
their application for a low-cost housing subsidy would be approved, they moved onto 
vacant private land. The private land owner succeeded in evicting the respondents from 
the land and the respondents were forced to resettle on a nearby sports field, since their 
previous site in Wallacedene was already occupied by other occupiers. Shortly after the 
eviction order was executed, during which event the respondents lost most of their building 
materials and personal belongings due to the inhumane fashion of the eviction, the winter 
season started. The structures that the respondents erected on the sports field offered 
meagre protection against the elements. 
 
The respondents asked the municipality to fulfil its constitutional obligation and provide 
them with temporary accommodation. When the municipality could not give a satisfactory 
response, the respondents brought proceedings against the Oostenberg Municipality in the 
then High Court of the Cape of Good Hope.70 They wanted the government to provide 
them with basic shelter or housing until they received permanent housing.71 The High 
Court ordered that the government had to provide the applicants who were children, 
together with their parents, with adequate housing in terms of section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution. The government contested the correctness of the High Court order. After 
further deliberations, the government made an offer to the respondents that would 
immediately improve their crisis situation, which the applicants accepted. However, the 
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government failed to fulfil their undertaking in terms of the agreement. As a result, the 
respondents approached the Constitutional Court. 
 
The case before the Constitutional Court was mainly based on section 26 of the 
Constitution.72 This section reads as follows: 
„(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.‟ 
 
As indicated, section 26 imposes both positive and negative obligations on the state. The 
positive obligations on the state are to protect, promote and fulfil, while the negative 
obligation is the one of respect. According to Budlender, section 26(1) specifies the general 
scope of the right, while section 26(2) and 26(3) „are simply manifestations of the general 
right set out in Section 26(1)‟.73 However, section 26(1) and 26(2) are related and must 
therefore be understood together.74 
 
Section 26(2) places a positive obligation on the state to provide adequate housing by 
implementing legislation and other measures (such as housing policies), taking into 
account the available resources the state has at its disposal, in order to progressively 
realise the right. In other words, to determine whether or not the state has met the 
requirements set by sections 26(1) and (2), three factors need to be considered.75 Firstly, 
the state must take reasonable legislative or other steps. Although the state has the 
discretion to determine the detail of such legislation or policies, such instruments must be 
reasonable and the courts have laid down certain criteria in order to determine whether the 
state‟s action is reasonable. The policy has to be flexible and balanced, should not exclude 
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a significant segment of society and the policy should be clear and efficient in assigning the 
relevant functions to the three spheres of government.76 Furthermore, legislation on its own 
is not enough: the implementation of the policy formulated has to be effective in order to 
realise the right.77 
 
Secondly, the steps implemented must have the ability to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right. It is acknowledged that the right has to be realised over time, since 
immediate realisation will in most instances not be possible. Therefore, the Court in 
Grootboom stated that „legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be 
examined and, where possible, lowered over time‟ in order to facilitate the progressive 
realisation of the right‟.78 Furthermore, the Court drew reference from the ICESCR,79 
stating that 
„there is no reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in the Constitution as in the 
document [the ICESCR] from which it was so clearly derived‟.80 
 
The Committee accepts that the realisation of the right takes place over time, but that this 
does not deprive the right of all meaningful content. Furthermore, the Committee states 
that any retrogressive measures would need careful consideration and will have to be 
justified.81 This was also accepted in the Grootboom82 case, which would indicate to the 
state that careful consideration must be given to all relevant factors before acting in a way 
that may directly or indirectly cause a regression in the standard of housing currently in 
place. 
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Thirdly, the progressive realisation of the right has to be undertaken within the state‟s 
available resources. Although the steps taken by government should be implemented 
immediately, the progressive realisation of the right may take place over a longer period of 
time. This is due to the fact that the obligation to take steps does not necessarily have big 
budgetary implications. Therefore, the state is not obliged to do more than what its 
resources permit. However, the Committee has indicated that states should seek 
international support if their policies go beyond their available resources.83 
 
Although article 11(1) of the ICESCR does not, like the South African Constitution, state 
that it is a right of access to adequate housing, the Committee is of the view that „adequate 
housing must be accessible to those entitled to it‟.84 Particular attention should be paid to 
those forming part of disadvantaged groups, such as children, victims of natural disasters 
and people living in disaster-prone areas. According to the Committee, people who fall into 
these groups should be given preference. This view of the Committee, that adequate 
housing should be accessible, is not the same as what is mandated by the Constitution in 
section 26(1). In relation to this difference, Yacoob J stated: 
„The right delineated in s26(1) is a right of “access to adequate housing” as distinct from the 
right to adequate housing in the Covenant. This difference is significant. It recognises that 
housing entails more than bricks and mortar. It requires available land, appropriate services 
such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all these, 
including the building of the house itself. For a person to have access to adequate housing 
all of these conditions need to be met: there must be land, there must be services, there 
must be a dwelling.‟85 
 
The accessibility factor laid down by the Committee is aimed at specific groups of people, 
while the section 26 reference to access applies to all citizens, as section 26(1) of the 
Constitution states that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
Therefore, the provision of the Constitution is open to all who are in need of housing and 
cannot be interpreted in the narrower sense as is seen in international law. 
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Section 26(3) of the Constitution spells out the negative obligations with regard to the right 
to adequate housing. This section denounces arbitrary evictions. It can be argued that one 
of the factors of adequate housing as given by the Committee in their 4th General 
Comment, namely security of tenure, is linked to section 26(3). A more detailed discussion 
on evictions in South African and international law as well as security of tenure will follow at 
4 5. 
 
In addition, section 26 cannot be seen in isolation.86 Section 26, together with the right to 
health care, food, water and social security;87 the rights of children;88 the right to 
education;89 the rights of detained persons (including sentenced prisoners);90 the right of 
property (specifically the right of equitable access to land, land restitution and tenure 
security);91 labour rights;92 environmental rights93 and the right to language and culture,94 
forms part of the socio-economic rights contained in the bill of rights.95 The Committee has 
stated that the right to housing should not be interpreted narrowly, but that it should be 
seen as a right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.96 Furthermore, the 
Committee reiterated that, apart from human dignity and non-discrimination, 
„the full enjoyment of other rights – such as the right to freedom of expression, the right to 
freedom of association …, the right to freedom of residence and the right to participate in 
public decision-making – is indispensible if the right to adequate housing is to be realized 
and maintained by all groups in society‟.97 
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This makes it necessary to keep all these rights in mind when the right of access to 
adequate housing is interpreted or implemented. As a result, Yacoob J made the following 
observation in the Grootboom decision: 
„All the rights in the Bill or Rights are inter-related and mutually supporting. There can be no 
doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are 
denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter.‟98 
 
Consequently, the right of access to adequate housing requires an interpretation that is 
contextual; one that is understood in the textual setting of the Constitution and one that 
must be understood in the social and historical context.99 Therefore, the socio-economic 
rights must „be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole‟.100 However, the 
obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) should be considered. Where international law is 
able to shed greater light, as an interpretive tool, on the development of a specific right, 
such international law should be considered. 
 
Therefore, the Court considered what the relevant international law would be in this 
instance, as well as what its impact might be. The Court admitted that it had an obligation 
in terms of section 39 to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights and that 
non-binding international law, according to the previous judgment in S v Makwanyane,101 
may also be used.102 However, the Court noted that although international law may be 
used as a valuable source of interpretation, the weight attached to each principle of 
international law may vary.103 
 
The amici in the Grootboom case presented the Court with article 11(1) of the ICESCR, 
arguing that it may help the Court understand the positive obligation imposed on the state 
by socio-economic rights.104 The differences between the right to adequate housing in the 
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Constitution and article 11(1) of the ICESCR were duly noted by the Court.105 The 
Constitution provides for a right of access to adequate housing, while the ICESCR merely 
provides for a right to adequate housing. The Constitution requires the government to take 
reasonable steps to realise the right, while the ICESCR requires member states to take 
appropriate steps in order to realise the right.106 Furthermore, the amici urged the Court to 
accept the international law concept of the minimum core obligation into South African law. 
Even though the court rejected this argument, it is important to highlight this discussion 
because it brings important considerations to light on what might constitute adequate 
housing in the South African legal context. 
 
In the Grootboom case, the amici requested the Court to adopt the minimum core 
obligation as formulated by the Committee in its 3rd General Comment.107 In this Comment 
the Committee stated that a minimum core obligation should be placed on the state to see 
to it that „at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights‟108 are met. 
Therefore, the minimum core obligation aims to serve as a threshold beneath which a 
state party may not regress. The Court emphasised that the Committee did not clearly 
define what the minimum core is.109 However, in General Comment 3, with reference to 
housing, the Committee stated that if a significant segment of society is deprived of 
adequate housing, it will be assumed prima facie that the state is not fulfilling its obligation 
in terms of the Covenant.110 States in breach of their Covenant duties are, therefore, 
forced to justify their breach. In this regard article 2(1) of the ICESCR, as discussed above, 
should be kept in mind, as the state is required to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right within its available resources. 
 
The Constitutional Court refused to accept the minimum core in South African law because 
the Committee itself did not precisely indicate what the minimum core would be in a 
specific case. The Court was of the opinion that it is beyond its reach to decide what the 
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minimum core should be, since the Court did not have sufficient evidence to determine this 
issue. As the minimum core would constitute a threshold beneath which a state may not 
regress, different factors need to be taken into account in different scenarios. The Court 
indicated that before a minimum core could be established, it had to identify the need and 
opportunities for the enjoyment of the right. In relation to this the Court stated: 
„These [needs and opportunities] will vary according to factors such as income, 
unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences between city and rural 
communities will also determine the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. 
Variations ultimately depend on the economic and social history and circumstances of a 
country.‟111 
 
The Court further found it difficult to determine the minimum core because it has to be 
determined in a specific context. This difficulty arises since the need to adequate housing 
differs from the perspective of defining it in general terms or in light of specific groups of 
people. For some, the right to have access to adequate housing might mean access to 
land, to others land and housing and yet to others it might mean financial assistance.112 
The argument was also put forward that it would be incompatible with the „institutional 
roles and competencies of the courts‟113 if the Court were to define the minimum core.114 
The Court concluded that it did not have sufficient information before it to decide what the 
minimum core would be, therefore rejecting the minimum core obligation argument 
presented by the amici. With the rejection of the minimum core obligation argument, the 
Court only had to consider whether the state‟s action in realising the right to adequate 
housing was reasonable. 
 
Bilchitz has written extensively on the minimum core obligation and advocates the 
acceptance of such an obligation in South African law.115 He argues that the minimum core 
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should be understood in light of two thresholds, interests or components which can 
specifically be explained in relation to housing in section 26(1). The first interest, being the 
first threshold interest or the minimum core, would mean that a person is entitled to at least 
having or obtaining minimal shelter to protect him from natural elements such as rain, 
which could negatively impact on a person‟s health, in order to survive.116 The first 
threshold interest would be available to all persons, immediately. In other words, all should 
have access to adequate housing, which in the first threshold sense would mean shelter 
from the elements. However, this minimal interest is not all that is protected by the 
Constitution. The second interest, put forward by Bilchitz, is one that would allow for 
human flourishing.117 It is on the first interest, that of the minimum core, that this part of the 
chapter will focus on. 
 
With regard to the right to adequate housing, the minimum core 
„can be made more concrete so as to require that individuals can at all time have access to 
accommodation that offers protection from the elements, sanitary conditions, and access to 
basic services such as sanitation and running water‟.118 
Therefore, if all have access to accommodation that offers protection from the elements 
and such accommodation also provides for access to the relevant services, the minimum 
interest of the right of access to adequate housing is met. 
 
As a result, Bilchitz criticizes the Courts reasons in the Grootboom119 case for denying the 
minimum core obligation as presented in international law. Bilchitz argues that the 
arguments of the Court  
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„exhibit confusion as to the nature of a minimum core obligation, which arises from failing to 
draw a crucial distinction . . . between the invariant, universal standard that must be met in 
order for an obligation to be fulfilled, and the numerous particular methods that can be 
adopted in order to meet this standard and thus comply with a constitutional obligation‟.120 
 
Bilchitz advocates a general standard that would constitute a minimum core. This standard 
would, in the case of housing, comprise of access to housing that provides protection from 
the elements, at the very least, in sanitary conditions, as well as access to basic services, 
such as toilets and running water.121 This general standard relates to the realising of the 
minimal interest, while the legislature and executive still retain their discretion as how best 
to achieve this general standard. 
 
Bilchitz further argues that it is not necessary for the Court to have been presented with a 
lot of information to understand what the minimum interest of people is.122 The minimum 
core of the right (to housing) need only be laid down as it applies to all people and not with 
reference to specific groups of people, which would admittedly make the formulation of the 
minimum core difficult. Bilchitz further contends that the fact that some need land, while 
others need land and housing and yet others need financial assistance is irrelevant in 
considering what would constitute a minimum core. If it can be assumed that the minimum 
core means that all need shelter from the elements, those who have shelter have no basis 
to claim, but those who have land can, for instance, claim building materials. The general 
obligation does not vary; the position of each person in relation to the minimum core will 
influence the relief that will be granted.123 
 
Brand, in turn, argues that understanding the minimum core as a general standard is 
suitable for the international enforcement of socio-economic rights, but is not useful for the 
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domestic context.124 This is understandable, according to Brand, if one considers the 
difference between the institutions and manner in which socio-economic rights are 
enforced in the national and international spheres.125 Furthermore, Brand argues that it is 
necessary to be more specific in laying down a minimum core entitlement, but that it 
should, in addition, also be „particular, concrete, context-sensitive and flexible‟.126 
Therefore, Brand argues that the minimum core obligation would necessarily be a shifting 
concept.127 Bilchitz, in response to this argument, maintains that the general standard 
should still be set, but that it should allow for latitude and flexibility in determining what the 
survival interest of specific people is in a specific context.128  
 
Another relevant question in relation to the acceptance of the minimum core obligation is 
whether or not the minimum core can be enforced as an individual right. It is argued that 
courts may grant relief to individuals, which would mean that individuals may claim 
particular goods from the state. The problems with this approach are that it prioritises 
some individuals above others and, if courts hand down numerous orders granting 
individual relief, it may hamper the government‟s efforts to implement a coherent plan.129 
This reasoning is in line with Yacoob‟s reasoning in Grootboom where he stated that 
neither section 26 nor section 28 entitles an individual to claim shelter on demand. Rather, 
it obliges the government to devise and implement a coherent plan designed to meet the 
section 26 obligation.130 
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There are also arguments in favour of the granting of individual relief. Traditionally, courts 
have been concerned with the plight of individuals, making individual relief a natural 
consequence of adjudication. Furthermore, if courts refused to grant individual relief it 
might scare future litigants from bringing cases before courts. If individual relief is not 
granted, it may negatively affect the individual if such individual‟s minimal interests are not 
met.131 
 
The solution, as put forward by Bilchitz,132 entails that there should be no rigid policy when 
it comes to individual relief. Individual relief should be granted if government policy fails to 
treat the individual equally, treats the individual without insufficient respect or fails to 
address a particular individual‟s individual need.133 This does not preclude individuals from 
seeking appropriate (individual) relief from the courts, given the courts‟ discretionary 
powers. 
 
The Constitutional Court also raised an objection to the acceptance of the minimum-core 
in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (hereafter „TAC‟).134 In elaborating on 
their previous discussion in Grootboom,135 the Court in the TAC136 case stated that the 
minimum core can possibly be relevant to the question of reasonableness under section 
26(2); it cannot be seen as a self-standing right in terms of section 26(1). In addition, the 
Court in the TAC case reasoned that the acceptance of the minimum core would mean 
that all are entitled to the minimum core immediately. The Court stated that it would be 
impossible to give all who require it access to the minimum core services immediately, but 
that the state would do well to reasonably provide access to the rights in question on a 
progressive basis.137 
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Using the two-tier interest approach, Bilchitz explains the relationship between section 
26(1) and 26(2) and the „progressive realisation of the right‟ in section 26(2). Simply put, 
Bilchitz is of the opinion that progressive realisation would apply in the case of moving 
from the minimal interest (the minimum core obligation) to the realisation of the maximum 
interest (the human flourishing interest).138 Bilchitz is also of the opinion that the 
Committee‟s interpretation on progressive realisation and their finding that there is a 
minimum core obligation in relation to the right to housing cannot be separated.139 
Therefore, in accepting the Committee‟s interpretation regarding the progressive 
realisation of the right to housing, the Constitutional Court should also have accepted the 
minimum core argument.140  
 
Although the Court in Grootboom141 admitted that there exists a minimum core obligation 
in international law as developed by the Committee, it refused to accept the minimum core 
obligation in South African law. In subsequent Constitutional Court cases concerning the 
right of access to adequate housing, such as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers142 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg,143 no mention was made of the minimum core 
obligation. 
 
Given the arguments presented against the acceptance of the minimum core obligation in 
South African law, it is difficult to predict whether or not the Constitutional Court would 
have accepted the minimum core obligation in South African law had the ICESCR and the 
additional literature that relates to the Covenant been binding on South African law. The 
Court was very determined not to accept the minimum core obligation in the Grootboom144 
case, a decision that was repeated in TAC.145 However, this does not mean that the 
minimum core cannot be used at all. In the Grootboom case, as in most socio-economic 
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rights cases, the Court preferred the reasonableness test; asking whether the actions of 
the executive are reasonable in realising the rights in question. The minimum core may still 
support arguments that the measures adopted by the government were unreasonable. In 
relation to this, Liebenberg states as follows: 
„The furthest the Court was prepared to go was to hold that, where the evidence in a 
particular case revealed that it was appropriate, regard could be had to the content of a 
minimum core obligation in evaluating the reasonableness of the state‟s measures.‟146 
 
However, the question may be raised as to what ruling the Court would have made if the 
ICESCR was a binding instrument. It would have been interesting to know whether or not 
the Court would have accepted the minimum core obligation and formulated the core 
obligation in the South African context, irrespective of the insufficient information before 
the Court. It can be argued that a flexible approach where various principles are identified 
as to what would constitute adequate housing would have been the better option. It is to 
this question that the next part of the chapter will turn. 
 
In relation to both domestic and international law, the Grootboom147 Court could further 
have discussed the concept of adequacy in greater detail, since both the South African 
Constitution and international law require housing to be adequate. In determining the 
extent to which the Covenant may be used as a guide to interpret section 26, the 
difference between this constitutional provision and article 11(1) of the ICESCR was 
highlighted by the Court.148 In Grootboom, Yacoob did not give real meaning to the term 
adequate; he simply stated that in order to realise the right in section 26(1) there must be 
land, services and a dwelling.149 
 
Therefore, what is lacking in the discussion of international law and its impact in the 
Grootboom decision is the Committee‟s viewpoint on what can be regarded as adequate. 
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As was seen above, the Committee laid down certain factors in General Comment 4150 as 
to what would constitute adequate housing. According to the Committee, adequacy of 
housing is determined by „social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other 
factors‟.151 Although these factors differ according to time and place, the Committee saw it 
fit to identify certain factors that must be taken cognisance of. Furthermore, the National 
Department of Housing accepted the Committee‟s interpretation of „adequacy‟ in the 
National Housing Code, which indicates that the interpretation given in international law 
can be adopted in South African law.152 The Court missed a valuable opportunity to give 
meaning to the concept of adequacy, since this concept has not been given any 
meaningful content in South African law through proper interpretation. 
 
In giving content to the concept of adequacy, the Committee stated that legal security of 
tenure should be afforded to all people. Tenure for this purpose includes emergency 
housing and informal settlements, as tenure takes on a variety of forms.153 Furthermore, 
immediate measures should be taken to confer legal tenure security upon those who lack 
such protection. Therefore, the lack of security of tenure of the respondents in 
Grootboom154 should have been noted. On this basis the respondents might have been 
protected against eviction from the private land until such time as alternative 
accommodation could have been made available to them. The respondents were forced to 
move onto the private land due to the intolerable conditions in which they lived in 
Wallacedene. In that event, the balance between the private property owner‟s rights and 
the respondents‟ need for housing should have been considered.155 On the basis of legal 
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security of tenure, it is evident that even the respondents in Grootboom were entitled to be 
protected against the initial eviction. 
 
Adequate housing as defined in international law also entails the availability of services, 
materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability; habitability and location, as described 
above. South Africa‟s housing policy also contains these factors. In section 1 of the 
Housing Act,156 „housing development‟ is defined as follows: 
„The establishment and maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable public and private 
residential environments to ensure viable households and communities in areas allowing 
convenient access to economic opportunities, and to health, educational and social 
amenities in which all citizens and permanent residents in the Republic will, on a 
progressive basis, have access to- 
(a) permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring internal and external 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and 
(b) potable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy supply.‟ 
 
The factors included in this definition mirror the factors mentioned above as required by 
the Committee and as accepted by the National Department of Housing. For that reason, 
the factors identified by the Committee, accepted by the National Department of Housing 
and further expanded in legislation157 could have been of value to the Court‟s ruling in 
Grootboom to determine what would constitute adequate housing. When courts consider 
these factors, they could also have given further content to these factors and explained 
what they may mean in the South African context. 
 
Cultural adequacy is also a factor in determining what would constitute adequate housing 
as it is understood by the Committee. According to the Committee, the cultural identity and 
diversity of housing should be expressed.158 In an attempt to evaluate the standard at 
which housing should be regarded as adequate, Bilchitz states that adequate housing will 
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be such that it is adequate according to the level of economic development of a particular 
country. This is also in accord with the reasoning in Grootboom that the right should be 
interpreted in the specific context. This links with the third standard put forward by 
Bilchitz159 in relation to which adequacy can be judged. This third standard asks the 
question whether or not the people „have access to the general conditions in their 
particular society to realize a wide range of purposes‟.160 
 
The Grootboom161 Court ruled that those in need of socio-economic rights have the right to 
enforce such right. Neither section 26 nor section 28 of the Constitution entitles any of the 
parties to claim shelter on demand. The Constitutional Court overturned the ruling of the 
High Court which held that the government, in terms of section 28(1)(c), has a duty to 
provide those respondents who are children, and their parents, with shelter. Section 26 of 
the Constitution obliges the state to devise a plan to meet the obligation placed on it. 
Although legislation exists that enable the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government to meet the obligation in terms of section 26, in as far as the legislation does 
not provide assistance for those in need of immediate relief, the obligation was not met. 
 
In Grootboom the Constitutional Court gave a declaratory order, stating that the state 
needs to take action to meet the obligation that section 26(2) of the Constitution places on 
them. The obligation the state has in this regard is to devise, fund, implement and 
supervise certain measures that can aid those in desperate need.162 It was shown that 
there are numerous sources in international law concerning the right to adequate housing. 
As was indicated the Court referred to these sources, in so doing fulfilling its obligation to 
consider international law as mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. However, it 
is regrettable that the Court did not attach greater weight to international principles in 
reaching its conclusion. The concept of adequacy in section 26 of the Constitution as 
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found in international law could have been an indication that the Court needed to give 
further clarity to the concept of „adequacy‟ in domestic law. 
 
4 4 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
Another case decided by the Constitutional Court that dealt with the right to adequate 
housing in which arguments based on international law were presented is the case of 
Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz (hereafter „Jaftha‟).163 Mrs Jaftha received a 
state housing subsidy in 1997 with which she obtained her home where she and her two 
children resided. Due to ill health Mrs Jaftha was unable to work and, according to the 
Court, Mrs Jaftha could be described as „poor‟. As a result of her surrounding 
circumstances she borrowed R200. Mrs Jaftha was unable to repay the amount owed and 
the creditor handed the matter over to his attorney. In 2001, Mrs Jaftha discovered that the 
amount owed had escalated to R7000 and when she was unable to pay, her house was 
sold in execution for R5000. 
 
Similarly, Mrs Van Rooyen, a poor widow who inherited a state house from her late 
husband, who in turn acquired it from the state subsidy scheme, was unable to repay a 
grocery debt of R190. On the same day that Mrs Jaftha‟s house was sold in execution, Mrs 
van Rooyen‟s house was sold in execution for a mere R1000 as a result of her inability to 
repay the debt. Due to the fact that the houses in both instances were acquired from the 
state housing scheme, both applicants were disqualified from receiving housing subsidies 
in future. 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the applicants challenged the constitutionality of sections 
66(1)(a) and 67 of the Magistrates‟ Court Act.164 Sections 66(1)(a) of the Act allows for the 
sale and execution of immovable property for judgment debt if the movable property of the 
debtor is insufficient to satisfy the debt. In turn, section 67 of the Act excludes certain 
movables from sale and execution. The applicants contended that the right in section 26 of 
the Constitution was violated, since these provisions made it possible for the state and 
private parties to interfere unjustifiably with their right to adequate housing. Furthermore, 
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they argued that section 66(1)(a) was unconstitutional „to the extent of its over-breadth in 
that it allows a person‟s right to have access to adequate housing to be removed even in 
circumstances where it is unjustifiable‟.165 
 
As in the Grootboom166 case, Mokgoro J considered the right to adequate housing in 
international law.167 The Court recognised the obligation to consider international law as 
mandated by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. In addition, it was stated that guidance 
might be sought from international law instruments that have considered the meaning of 
adequate housing. Mokgoro J stated that the concept of adequate housing was briefly 
discussed in Grootboom,168 but admitted that the Court had not yet considered it in any 
detail. As in Grootboom, the Court in the Jaftha169 case considered article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR170 as well as General Comment 4171 of the Committee, which gave further content 
to the right to adequate housing. 
 
For purposes of the Jaftha172 case, the Court regarded the concept of adequacy as central 
to the right to housing, which mirrors the view of the Committee‟s 4th General Comment.173 
This is a different approach to the one followed in Grootboom,174 where the Court drew no 
inference from the concept of adequacy as developed by the Committee. 
 
In Jaftha,175 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the concept of adequacy is 
determined by social, economic, cultural, climatic and ecological factors. Nevertheless, the 
Court accepted the Committee‟s viewpoint that one of the factors that must be taken into 
account when determining what would constitute adequate housing is legal security of 
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tenure, „which guarantees legal protection against forced evictions, harassment and other 
threats‟.176 The Court considered the historical context of forced removals and racist 
eviction and found that the international law concept of adequacy and security of tenure is 
central to an understanding of section 26. Therefore, the aim of section 26 is to break with 
apartheid-style evictions in order to prevent the removal of people in a manner that is 
contrary to their human dignity and that would render them homeless. It was at this stage 
that international law proved to be useful in guiding the Court. By considering international 
law on the right to adequate housing, the Court was prompted by the Committee‟s 
interpretation of the right to also consider security of tenure.  
 
As a result, the Court evaluated the negative aspect of the right of access to adequate 
housing in terms of section 26(1)-(2).177 This entails that the state or individuals should not 
frustrate existing access to adequate housing. In the High Court, the argument based on 
this negative formulation of the right was dismissed. However, the Constitutional Court re-
affirmed that a negative obligation can be placed on the state and individuals. Therefore, in 
the Jaftha178 case the negative obligation of section 26 was placed beyond doubt. Owing 
to the concept of adequacy and security of tenure, the Court concluded that „any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing limits the 
rights protected in section 26(1)‟.179 
 
However, the Court still conducted a further inquiry into whether or not the deprivation of 
existing access to adequate housing can be justified in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution. The Court ruled that the sale in execution of Jaftha and Van Rooyen‟s 
immovable property cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution due to the 
fact that section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrate‟s Courts Act180 places a severe limitation on the 
right to housing. In addition, the result of the limitation, that of permanently depriving the 
applicants of their homes, is too severe for the small amounts of debt incurred. 
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The Constitutional Court ruled that section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Court Act181 was 
unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed for the execution of the homes of indigent 
debtors, where they lost their security of tenure. The remedy the Court gave was one of 
reading in. The Court read into the Act that execution of someone‟s home cannot take 
place without an order of the court after having considered all the circumstances. 
 
Therefore, in the Jaftha182 case, the Constitutional Court acknowledged the Committee‟s 
work on the concept of adequate housing and one of the factors – that of security of tenure 
– encouraged the Court to analyse the negative obligation imposed in section 26(1)-(2). 
Security of tenure also bears relation to forced evictions, which will be discussed at 4 5 
below. However, the Court merely used the factors found in international law regarding the 
concept of adequacy. The Court did not give it meaningful content in South African law. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court showed a willingness to consider the international 
law available to them in interpreting the right of access to adequate housing, in doing so 
fulfilling the obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b). As a result, it can be accepted that 
security of tenure is an element of adequate housing. Therefore, security of tenure needs 
to be considered in all cases where the right of access to adequate housing is an issue. 
This will be in line with both international law and the Court‟s ruling in the Jaftha case.  
 
In both the Grootboom183 and Jaftha184 cases, the Constitutional Court used the ICESCR 
and the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to 
interpret the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution. In 
Grootboom, the Court considered the minimum core obligation as developed in 
international law. However, as was discovered, the Court did not adopt the minimum core 
obligation because the Court did not have sufficient information to determine the minimum 
core in respect of the right to adequate housing.185 However, the Court did not clearly 
stipulate the status of the ICESCR in South African law, not did it make the hierarchy of 
the ICESCR in relation to the General Comments clear. In Jaftha,186 where the 
Constitutional Court also considered the ICESCR and the General Comments of the 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, especially in relation to security of 
tenure, the status of these sources were not stipulated. Although courts are able to 
consider non-binding international law when interpreting a right in the bill of rights, setting 
out the status of the international law sources used would be helpful for future cases 
considering international law.  
 
4 5 Protection Against Forced Evictions 
According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there are basically 
two ways in which the right to adequate housing can be violated. The first is in the event 
that the living and housing conditions in a particular country decline, while the second is 
when forced eviction occurs.187 The international community has for a long time concerned 
itself with the eviction of people who already enjoy a right to housing.188 Given that 
evictions may violate a range of fundamental human rights, because it is generally 
accompanied by violence or is discriminatory against women or certain groups of people, 
the regulation of eviction is an important consideration in international law. Therefore, 
eviction may take place,189 but the Committee has indicated that states must procedurally 
and substantively regulate the practice of forced eviction.  
 
Since there is no independent right to adequate housing in the ICESCR,190 the Committee 
has emphasised that the right to adequate housing (as a subset of a right to an adequate 
standard of living) includes protection against forced evictions. Closely related to this 
concept is security of tenure.191 Therefore, in its 7th General Comment,192 the Committee 
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considered the right to adequate housing with specific emphasis on evictions.193 In 
international law, forced evictions are regarded as being a prima facie violation of the right 
to adequate housing.194 The Committee defines forced eviction as follows: 
„The permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or 
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and 
access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.‟195 
 
Mindful of the fact that state parties are to use legislative means to protect the rights in the 
ICESCR, the Committee has indicated that it is essential for state parties to adopt 
legislation specifically designed to eradicate forced evictions.196 According to the 
Committee, legislation with this purpose should provide security of tenure to occupiers of 
land and housing, conform to the Covenant and set procedures in place that have to be 
followed in the event that eviction is allowed.197 
 
The Committee has also indicated that women, children and other minorities are 
vulnerable groups that suffer disproportionately from forced evictions.198 Therefore, these 
groups need special protection and special consideration in the case of forced eviction. 
The Committee has further laid down procedural safeguards which should apply in all 
cases where forced evictions take place.199 These include consultation with the affected 
parties, adequate notice of the eviction date, information on proposed eviction, information 
on government officials that will be present during eviction proceedings, as well as those 
carrying out the eviction and the provision of legal remedies. Furthermore, eviction should 
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not take place during the night or during bad weather. According to Chenwi, „[p]arliament 
and government should take these international standards into account in drafting 
legislation and policies relevant to evictions‟.200 
 
The concept of forced eviction in international law as briefly set out directly above provides 
guidelines to the state parties as to how to domestically try to prevent evictions from taking 
place in contravention of human rights. These guidelines are spelt out in broad terms with 
certain pointers as to where the problem areas regarding forced eviction lie, for instance 
the atrocities women suffer once evicted. Eviction law in terms of South African law is, 
however, more developed and more defined than in international law. Section 26(1)-(2) 
protects the right of access to adequate housing while section 26(3) prohibits arbitrary 
evictions once the right in section 26(1)-(2) is enjoyed. In relation to section 26(3), further 
substantive safeguards are also found in legislation.201 Before entering a new democratic 
era, forced removals and evictions were rife in South African law. To consider the impact 
of international law in the development of security of tenure in realising that evictions may 
have negative impact on human rights, the history of evictions in the South African context 
will be considered to enable a discussion on the possible effect that international law had 
on the development of eviction law. 
 
In the apartheid years in South Africa, millions of black people were forcibly removed and 
evicted due to the apartheid land law.202 The history of forced removals and evictions in 
South Africa and the weak tenure security black people had during apartheid is a major 
cause of the housing crisis that currently prevails.203 Therefore, apartheid land law was 
eliminated and black people‟s weak tenure security had to be strengthened in order to 
prevent future eviction of people without due process resulting in further homelessness. 
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As a result, when apartheid ended and the emphasis was placed on the protection of 
human rights, protecting occupiers against arbitrary evictions had to be safeguarded. In 
order to solve the problem of the disparity between the weak protection black people had 
in common law in relation to their homes (and land) against the strong protection of the 
property rights protected in common law and legislation, reform was needed.204 Therefore, 
section 26(3) of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary evictions. In addition, 
„the government has enacted legislation and policies which give effect to the housing and 
tenure rights enshrined in the Constitution and provide procedural and substantive 
protection to people faced with evictions‟.205 
 
Consequently, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the view on evictions in domestic law 
before 1994 in order to understand how international law had an impact on domestic law 
concerning the protection against evictions. 
 
Before the enactment of the Constitution of 1996, a landowner could evict people 
occupying his land in terms of the common law by using the rei vindicatio. The principles 
that applied to the rei vindicatio were laid down in Chetty v Naidoo.206 In order to succeed 
with the rei vindicatio, the plaintiff (landowner) only had to show that he was the owner of 
the land and that the defendant (occupier) was in occupation. The burden then shifted to 
the defendant to show that he had a right, in contract or statute, which prohibited the 
eviction.207 Although eviction by way of the rei vindicatio could not take place without legal 
process, the right afforded to the landowner was much stronger than that of the occupier, 
leading to an imbalance in standing. In other words, landowners‟ rights to exclusive 
possession more often than not trumped other rights the occupiers might have enjoyed. 
The Interim Constitution of 1993208 did not alter the common law position applicable in 
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eviction cases. The position was altered with the enactment of section 26(3) of the 1996 
Constitution.209 
 
The constitutional framework with regard to security of tenure and protection against 
eviction includes sections 25(5) and (6), 26(3) and 28(1).210 Section 25(5) requires the 
state to implement legislative and other measures which would enable citizens to gain 
access on an equitable basis to land within its available resources, while section 25(6) 
requires the state to strengthen legally insecure tenure of land. Section 26(3) requires a 
court to consider all the relevant circumstances before granting an eviction order and 
prohibits arbitrary evictions. According to Budlender there are mainly two ways in which 
the negative obligation to respect the right to housing can be violated.211 A statute may 
permit evictions that are procedurally or substantively unfair and private parties or the state 
may bring eviction proceedings against occupiers which will have the effect of rendering 
them homeless. Finally, section 28(1) gives children the right to shelter. 
 
It has been submitted that the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (hereafter „ESTA‟)212 
and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (hereafter 
„PIE‟)213 have been promulgated to reform the common law of eviction and to improve 
security of tenure in South Africa.214 There are also other acts that deal with improving 
security of tenure.215 This is in accordance with international law that requires legislation to 
be enacted in order to provide greater security of tenure. PIE is the most important of the 
legislation enacted to protect unlawful occupiers against eviction.216 To understand the 
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relationship between these acts set out to improve tenure security, as part of the concept 
of adequate housing as discussed above, it is of interest to explore the correlation 
between these acts and various principles of international law. The application of the PIE 
Act has further been analysed by the Constitutional Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers,217 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main 
Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg,218 which will be discussed below. 
 
PIE replaced the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act219 as well as its subsequent 
amendments.220 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act allowed for the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers, who were usually black and poor. The PIE Act, drafted to preclude such 
discriminatory practices, provides for procedural protection to persons who unlawfully 
occupy land.221 An unlawful occupier is defined as someone „who occupies land without 
the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge, or without any other right in 
law to occupy such land‟.222 However, this excludes an occupier in terms of ESTA223 and a 
person whose informal right to land, but for the provisions in PIE, is protected by the 
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act.224 The PIE Act does not only protect 
occupiers who never had consent to occupy the land, but also those who previously had 
consent (being lawful occupiers), but whose consent ended (making them unlawful 
occupiers), so called „holders-over‟.225 
 
The PIE Act distinguishes between persons who have been in unlawful occupation for less 
than 6 months and those that have been in unlawful occupation in excess of 6 months.226 
In the case of occupation for less than 6 months, section 4(6) applies. It provides that the 
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court may grant an eviction order if it is just and equitable to do so and only after the 
relevant circumstances have been considered, which includes the rights and needs of the 
elderly, children, disabled persons and female-headed households. In the event that 
occupation has exceeded 6 months, section 4(7) applies. In this instance, the rights and 
needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and women-headed households also need 
consideration. Additionally, the courts must also consider whether alternative land was 
made available or whether alternative land can reasonably be made available. 
 
Section 6 of the PIE Act allows for an organ of state to institute eviction proceedings. In 
such an event the court, upon determining whether it is just and equitable to grant such an 
order, must have regard to the availability of alternative accommodation or land.227 In 
cases where the state sought eviction orders and have been able to show that they have a 
rational plan to re-accommodate the occupiers, such eviction orders were usually granted. 
In cases where no plans of re-accommodation were presented, the eviction orders were 
usually denied.228 
 
The purpose of the PIE Act is in accordance with international law. This Act provides 
security of tenure for people with weak tenure security rights who have already have 
housing and stand the risk of being rendered homeless as a result of the eviction. In 
General Comment 7,229 the Committee voices the opinion that the state should take 
measures to provide alternative adequate housing in the event that an eviction order will 
render people homeless. This is in accordance with section 6 of PIE and case law on the 
matter. 
 
Furthermore, the Committee states that vulnerable groups such as women and children 
suffer disproportionately from forced evictions.230 Therefore, it is fitting that PIE makes 
special reference to the plight of women, children, the elderly and disabled groups, as a 
consideration before an eviction order is granted. 
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In their 7th General Comment, the Committee has laid down certain procedural protection 
measures, which include that an opportunity for consultation with those affected by 
eviction has to take place.231 The PIE Act does not make mention of the requirement set 
by international law that consultation with the affected parties should take place before an 
eviction order is granted. However, the practice of consulting with affected parties before 
eviction takes place was established in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.232 
In this case unlawful occupiers, including children, occupied undeveloped private land. The 
occupiers were willing to move from the land if they were given alternative 
accommodation. However, the municipality sought an eviction order and an order 
confirming that they are not constitutionally bound to provide the occupiers with alternative 
accommodation once evicted. The Constitutional Court stated that the parties concerned 
should have engaged with each other amicably in order to arrive at workable solutions.233 
The presence or absence of mediation will be an important factor in reaching a decision 
whether it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order. 234 
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that in relation to section 26(3) of the Constitution, an 
eviction order may be granted, even if it results in the loss of the occupiers‟ homes.235 
However, if the occupiers that stand to be evicted are well-settled in the place they occupy, 
courts should be hesitant in granting an eviction order if no alternative accommodation is 
available.236 The Court refused to grant the eviction order since the municipality did not 
make an effort to enter into negotiations with the occupiers. 
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In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg237 some 400 occupiers stood to be evicted from the buildings they 
occupied due to the fact that these building were unsafe and unhealthy. The eviction 
proceedings were brought in terms of section 12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations 
and Building Standards Act,238 which allows for the eviction of persons due to health and 
safety concerns. The Supreme Court of Appeal granted the eviction order and the 
occupiers appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Court gave an engagement order; an 
interim order that forced the City and the occupiers to engage with each other meaningfully 
on all pressing issues. The fact that the eviction would render the occupiers homeless was 
a grave concern to the Court and weighed heavily in the favour of the occupiers. 
 
In addition, the Court found that section 12(6) of National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act239 was unconstitutional. The Court stated that section 12(6) 
violated section 26(3) of the Constitution in that it made it possible for the state organ, 
without first obtaining a court order, to levy a fine on occupiers that do not vacate the 
premises after they have received notice to vacate the premises. 
 
South African eviction law has come a long way in protecting the vulnerable from arbitrary 
evictions by strengthening tenure rights and including substantive protection in the event 
that eviction is allowed. Legislation enacted to give greater security of tenure should be 
central in any case concerning the eviction of people, because it prevents the injustices of 
the past from repeating itself and is in line with international law. Furthermore, the courts 
are inclined to make findings that are in accordance with international law, such as 
requiring the state and those who stand to be evicted to meaningfully engage with each 
other to find a plausible solution and providing alternative accommodation for those who 
will be evicted. 
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4 6 Regional International Law 
4 6 1 Introduction 
As indicated, South Africa is not a party to the ICESCR.240 Therefore, international law on 
the right to housing is not directly binding on South Africa law, but it can be considered as 
an interpretive guide for the various reasons stipulated above. However, South African 
courts are bound to consider the protection afforded to adequate housing that might exist 
in the African Union. Furthermore, to the extent that the right to housing is protected within 
the European Union and the Organisation of American States, it should be considered by 
the courts.241 It will become clear that none of the regional international law systems 
discussed contains a right to housing or shelter. Even so, the relevant interpretive and 
enforcement bodies of these regional international law systems have tried to protect the 
right to adequate housing and the development in this regard that took place will be 
discussed. 
 
4 6 2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The regional international law developed under the African Union is of specific relevance 
to South Africa, since South Africa is part of this Union. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights (the „Banjul Charter‟)242 was adopted in July 1981 and is currently 
regulated by the African Union and monitored by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights (the „African Commission‟). Therefore, the Banjul Charter and the 
subsequent reports made by the African Commission are useful in guiding courts in 
interpreting the right of access to adequate housing, since the Banjul Charter is directly 
applicable in South African law in terms of section 231 of the Constitution. 
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As already indicated, neither a right to housing nor a right to shelter is included in the 
Banjul Charter. However, the right to housing has been derived from other articles in the 
Banjul Charter in the communication of the African Commission relating to the case of 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v Nigeria.243 In this communication it was submitted that the Nigerian 
Military Government is greatly involved in oil production in the country. They exploit the 
country‟s oil reserves with not a thought spared to the health of its citizens and the well-
being of the environment. The communication alleged that the Nigerian Security Forces 
had attacked, burned and destroyed several of the Ogoni peoples‟ villages and homes, 
leaving these peoples homeless. 
 
The Commission decided that the complaint was admissible in terms of article 56 of the 
African Charter. The Federal Republic of Nigeria incorporated the Banjul Charter into its 
domestic legal system, which would allow the Nigerian national courts to utilise the rights 
contained in the Charter. However, since the Nigerian Military Government ousted the 
jurisdiction of the national courts, the Ogoni people would be unable to seek redress in the 
courts for violation of their human rights.244 
 
The complaint was based on articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the Banjul Charter. 
Of these articles, only articles 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 were considered in detail by the 
Commission. Article 14 protects the right to property and requires certain requirements to 
be present before the right to property can be encroached upon. Article 16 protects mental 
and physical health and urges the state to provide those who are sick with sufficient care. 
Article 18(1) recognises that the family is the natural unit basis of society and that the 
family and its physical and moral health shall be protected by the state. Article 21 confers 
on all the right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources and provides that in 
case of spoliation, recovery of the disposed thing and compensation are required. Article 
24 affords all people the right to have a satisfactory environment that is favourable to their 
development. 
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Based on articles14, 16 and 18(1), the African Commission stated the following: 
„Although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the African 
Charter, the corollary of the combination of provision protecting the rights to enjoy the best 
attainable state of mental and physical health, cited under Article 16 above, the right to 
property, and the protection accorded to the family forbids the wanton destruction of shelter 
because when housing is destroyed, property, health, and family life are adversely affected. 
It is thus noted that the combined effect of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) read into the Charter a 
right to shelter or housing which the Nigerian Government has apparently violated.‟245 
 
The African Commission, relying on their finding that there is a right to housing or shelter 
in the Charter, laid down certain obligations pertaining to the right. The Commission found 
that, as a minimum, violation of the right to housing would occur if the government were to 
destroy the homes of people and, in addition, if they prevented the people from rebuilding 
their homes after it had been destroyed. 
 
Therefore, the African Commission also explained the duty to respect and protect the right 
to housing: 
„The State‟s obligation to respect housing rights requires it, and thereby all of its organs and 
agents, to abstain from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal 
measure violating the integrity of the individual or infringing upon his or her freedom to use 
those material or other resources available to them in a way they find most appropriate to 
satisfy individual, family, household or community housing needs. Its obligations to protect 
obliges it to prevent the violation of any individual‟s right to housing by any other individual 
or non-state actors like landlords, property developers, and land owners, and where such 
infringements occur, it should act to preclude further deprivations as well as guaranteeing 
access to legal remedies.‟246 
 
The Commission was of the opinion that the right to shelter meant something more than a 
right to a roof over one‟s head. It also means to live somewhere in peace and privacy. In 
addition, the African Commission found that the protection against forced evictions is a 
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component of the implicit right to adequate housing. The Commission drew on the work 
done by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concerning forced 
evictions and found that evictions may be dramatic and cause physical, psychological and 
emotional distress; break up families; increase homelessness and in some instances even 
lead to death. Relying on the 4th General Comment247 of the Committee, the Commission 
stated that there has been a violation of the right to adequate housing enjoyed by the 
Ogoni people.248 Therefore, the Commission ruled that there were violations of articles 2, 
4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the African Charter, which includes a right to adequate 
housing. The Commission further urged the Nigerian State to ensure the effective 
protection of the Ogoni people. 
 
Realising that the practice of forced eviction has a negative impact not only on the right to 
housing, but also on various other human rights, the Commission offered protection to the 
housing rights of the Ogoni people. When the right to housing is protected, other rights 
such as the right to health and family life are also protected. In this regard, South African 
courts should take note of the importance of protecting the right to adequate housing, 
since the right to housing consists of more than just protecting a roof over a person‟s 
head.249  
 
4 6 3 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the „European Convention‟)250 does not contain a right to housing. However, in many 
instances, article 8 and article 1 of the First Protocol251 of the European Convention are 
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used to assert the right to housing.252 In addition, article 6 is often used to make a finding 
that the eviction that took place was arbitrary. Article 8(1) of the European Convention 
grants everyone the „right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence‟. Article 8(2) spells out the manner in which interference by a public 
authority with the right in article 8(1) may take place.253 Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
European Convention protects the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and allows for the 
interference with the right as prescribed by the article. The right to property in houses is 
protected by article 1 of Protocol 1.254  
 
In terms of article 8 of the ECHR, certain rights flow from the right of respect for the home. 
In Chapman v the United Kingdom,255 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
article 8 of the European Convention does not give a plaintiff the right to receive a home 
but only protects interference with an established home.256 Therefore, where it is 
established that premises constitute a home for the purposes of article 8, the right of 
access and occupation as well as the right not to be evicted from the home are put in 
                                            
252
 Clements L and Simmons A „European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic Unease‟ in Langford M (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 409-427 at 416. 
There is also tension between the right to housing and the right to property which the European Court of 
Human Rights has to reconcile. This tension mostly arises in the relationship between the landlord and 
tenant or unlawful occupier. According to Clements and Simmons, the European Court will give precedence 
to the right to housing to the less affluent in society over the economic rights of the property owner. In 
Akdivar v Turkey, 99/1995/605/696, Council of Europe, 30 August 1996 para 88 the European Court stated 
that „there can be no doubt that the deliberate burning of the applicants' homes and their contents constitutes 
at the same time a serious interference with the right to respect for their family lives and homes and with the 
peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. No justification for these interferences having been proffered by the 
respondent Government - which have confined their response to denying involvement of the security forces 
in the incident -, the Court must conclude that there has been a violation of both Article 8 of the Convention 
(art. 8) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)‟. 
253
 In terms of art 8(2), interferences with the right in art 8(1) may take place on the grounds of national 
security, public safety, economic well-being of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
254
 Harris DJ, O‟Boyle M and Warbrick C Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995) 319. The 
right to property in article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention was discussed in chap 3 at 3 3 3. 
255
 (2001) 3 EHRR 18.  
256
 This point of view was first adopted in a decision made by the European Commission on Human Rights in 
the case of X v Germany (1956) 1 Yearbook ECtHR 202, and later confirmed in rulings of the European 
Court: Fox L Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) 460; Leckie S „The Human Right to 
Adequate Housing‟ in Eide A, Krause C and Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook (2
nd
 revised ed 2001) 149-168 at 160; Kenna P „Housing Rights: Positive Duties and Enforceable 
Rights at the European Court of Human Rights‟ (2008) 2 EHRLR 193-208 at 203. Kenna agrees that art 8 
does not require the state to provide a home for everyone but argues that in terms of the decision in Marzari 
v Italy (2000) 30 EHRR DC 218 there are certain circumstances in which a positive obligation may be placed 
on the state to solve an applicant‟s housing problem. In this case the applicant was severely disabled and 
obtained an allocated apartment. The applicant ceased to pay rent for reason that the apartment was 
inadequate to cater for his needs. The European Court stated that although art 8 does not require the state 
to solve the applicant‟s housing needs, if such refusal has a negative impact on the applicant‟s private life, it 
might raise concerns in terms of art 8. 
126 
 
place.257 In addition, Kilkelly states that where it is established that the premises occupied 
constitute a home for the purposes of article 8, article 8 will protect the plaintiff‟s rights in 
the following instances: protection from wilful damage, protection from nuisance and 
protection from environmental damage.258 This interference is normally interpreted to 
mean interference from the state, thereby making the European Convention apply 
vertically.259  
 
In terms of article 8 of the European Convention, cases are usually brought on the grounds 
that the eviction of people from their homes is in violation of article 8.260 Most cases heard 
by the European Court of Human Rights concerning homes relate to armed forces that 
destroy people‟s houses, leaving them homeless.261 As was mentioned above, the 
European Court, with due cognisance of the margin of appreciation in article 1 of the 
European Convention, has refrained from ordering a state to provide housing. However, 
according to Kenna there are certain circumstances in which a positive obligation may be 
placed on the state to solve an applicant‟s housing problem.262 In Marzari v Italy,263 the 
applicant was severely disabled and obtained an allocated apartment. According to the 
applicant the apartment was inadequate to cater for his specific needs and, therefore, he 
ceased to pay rent until such time as alterations could be effected to render it suitable for 
his needs. The European Court stated that although article 8 does not require the state to 
solve the applicant‟s housing needs, if such refusal has a negative impact on the 
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applicant‟s private life, it might raise concerns in terms of article 8. With regard to 
homelessness, the European Court has refrained from inferring a right to housing in terms 
of article 8 of the European Convention.264 However, as Clements and Simmons explain:  
„[t]he Convention may impose a positive duty to provide housing where it is established that 
the State is directly culpable for the homelessness. In such situations the Convention 
obligation to provide accommodation may be more accurately characterised as remedial – 
to compensate for a deprivation of housing.‟265  
 
The European Court has also made evictions subject to the protection of article 6 of the 
European Convention. Article 6 of the European Convention states that when a person‟s 
civil rights and obligations (as well as any criminal charge against him) need to be 
determined, he/she „is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law‟. In Connors v United Kingdom,266 
the European Court found that the eviction (a serious interference with the applicant‟s 
rights) that took place without being properly justified, was in breach of article 6.267 The 
European Court held that the plaintiff had no „effective access to Court against the very 
serious interference with his home and family.‟268 Therefore, „the deprivation of a home 
requires a fair and public hearing and the other procedural requirements which have 
developed from the jurisprudence of Art. 6 of ECHR‟.269  
 
It is clear from the jurisprudence of the European Court that a right of access to housing is 
not protected within the European Union as it has not been derived from the judgments of 
the court. In South African law the right of access to housing is entrenched in the 
Constitution, and there is unfortunately no means to compare this aspect of the right to 
housing with the law of the European Union. However, the protection afforded existing 
homes in terms of article 8 of the European Convention, the protection against deprivation 
thereof in terms of article 1 of Protocol 1 and the procedural safeguards in the case of 
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evictions in terms of article 6 may be of guidance to the South African courts when giving 
effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution, or when any matter concerning eviction is 
brought in terms of any legislation. 
 
4 6 4 The American Convention on Human Rights 
Like the European Convention, the American Convention on Human Rights (the „American 
Convention‟)270 does not contain a provision that protects a right to housing. However, 
quite different from the European Convention, jurisprudence has begun to emerge from 
the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights with regard to 
the right to adequate housing and housing related resources, such as access to land.271 
According to Melish these developments have taken place in four areas: forced eviction 
and removals; abuses of landless persons who organise themselves in order to receive 
land from the government; the slow pace and administrative inadequacy on the part of the 
governments in realising land claims; and confiscation of both property and housing.272 
The confiscation of property, which includes the physical house and possessions of the 
people in terms of the American Convention, was discussed in chapter 3.  
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has considered several cases on the 
issue of forced evictions. Although the Commission‟s communications are not binding on 
South African law, it can still be important to consider them as they might „provide 
guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions‟273 in the bill of rights. In 
Corumbiara v Brazil,274 landless people who occupied private land were evicted in terms of 
a court order. According to the Commission, the use of force and violence by the military 
police and privately hired gunmen during the eviction that took place at night resulted in 
inhumane treatment. During the eviction at least nine squatters were killed and over a 
hundred wounded. All the settlements, as well as all the evictees‟ possessions, were 
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burned. The Commission reported that Brazil violated article 4, the right to life, and article 
5, the right to humane treatment.  
 
The right to housing as such has not yet been considered by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. However, it has been addressed under articles 4 and 5 of the American 
Convention; the right to life and the right of personal integrity respectively. The Inter-
American Court has recognised that the right to health, education, food, recreation, 
sanitation and adequate housing are necessary components of a life that is dignified.275 
The Inter-American Court has,  
„rather than recognise the autonomous rights of individual to health, to education or to 
adequate housing under article 26 of the Convention, . . . preferred, at least to date, to 
subsume these basic rights into a broadly-understood concept of the „right to life‟ and, more 
specifically, the „right to harbor a project of life.‟276 
 
Although a right to housing does not exist in the American Convention, arbitrary eviction 
seems to be protected by articles 4 and 5 of the Convention. Although the courts may 
grant eviction orders, eviction should take place in a manner that does not derogate the 
right to life and the right to humane treatment. Although the right to housing is not 
protected, it is possible to protect the right to housing in terms of article 21 of the 
Convention.277 Article 21 requires that the deprivation of property can only take place with 
the payment of just compensation, if it is in the public interest and in terms of the 
established law. Therefore, if these requirements are not met when the applicant‟s house 
is confiscated, the applicant may rely on article 21.278 
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The position regarding eviction in the Inter-American system is more or less similar to the 
position described with regard to international law. The Inter-American Court has found 
that the right to housing is an important right and that violation of the right, such as 
arbitrary eviction, violates the right to housing. Furthermore, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights stated that evictions accompanied by violence, which in 
certain instances led to death, equate to inhumane treatment and cannot stand. Therefore, 
the position regarding eviction in the Inter-American system renders support to the 
international concepts described above and as a result, they should be used by South 
African courts in guiding the interpretation of the right to housing. 
 
4 7 Housing Rights of Specific Vulnerable Groups of People 
4 7 1 Children 
Children‟s right to shelter is protected in section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. The rights in 
section 28(1) are not subject to the limitations provided for in section 26, namely that of 
available resources and progressive realisation. Therefore, besides the claim under 
section 26 of the Constitution, the respondents in Grootboom279 also relied on section 
28(1)(c) of the Constitution for relief for those among the respondents who were children. 
Since the claim based on section 26 had to fail due to the fact that there was a rational 
housing programme in place, the High Court, ruling in terms of section 28(1)(c), ordered 
the state to provide all respondents who are children as well as their parents with 
shelter.280 The Constitutional Court overturned this decision by the High Court. Examining 
the layout of section 28, the Constitutional Court found that the primary responsibility of 
providing children with shelter lies with the parents. In the event that parents are unable to 
provide for their children, the duty to provide children with shelter shifts to the state. 
 
In the Grootboom281 case, the Constitutional Court took cognisance of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (the „CRC‟),282 which was ratified by South Africa in 1995. 
According to the Court, the CRC imposes obligations on state parties to ensure that 
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children‟s rights are adequately protected and section 28 of the Constitution is one such 
provision that seeks to fulfil that obligation. Article 27(3) of the CRC requires that the state 
must assist parents or others that might be responsible for children by providing material 
assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to housing. The right of a 
child to housing is deemed necessary in order for the child to ascertain „a standard of living 
adequate for the child‟s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development‟ as 
emphasised in article 27(1) of the CRC. 
 
The CRC does not add any significant guidelines for the South African courts in 
interpreting the rights of the child regarding housing. The reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court concerning children‟s right to shelter is in accordance with international law. The 
CRC envisages in article 27(2) that parents bear the primary responsibility to care for their 
children and it is the state‟s duty to share that duty if the parents are unable to care for 
their children. Furthermore, the state has a duty to implement the structures necessary to 
assist the parents to fulfil their obligations. Therefore, in the Grootboom case, Yacoob J 
recognised that the obligation placed on the parents is reinforced by the use of civil and 
criminal law as well as social welfare programmes.283 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,284 which South Africa ratified 
in 2000, is a document that could have been useful in giving meaning to children‟s right to 
shelter. Article 20(1) of this Charter, entitled „parental responsibilities‟, emphasises the fact 
that parents or other persons responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to 
care for the child. Article 20(2) of the Charter places an obligation on the state to provide 
assistance to parents who have the need and provide them with material assistance and 
support programmes particularly with regard to housing. As a result, this Charter could 
have strengthened the Court‟s reasoning in Grootboom that only in the event that parents 
are unable to provide their children with shelter, does the responsibility shift to the state. 
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It follows then, that both in international law and national law, as was found in Grootboom, 
the primary obligation to provide shelter285 is placed on the parents and only if parents are 
unable to fulfil their obligation does the obligation shift to the state. If children are without 
parents or the parents are unable to provide for their children, the obligation reverts 
automatically back to the state. Yacoob J did not allow the High Court order to stand out of 
concern that children may become „stepping stones‟286 for adults to receive shelter on 
demand. This perspective is also in line with international law.287 
 
Article 3 of the CRC states that in all matters concerning the child, „the best interest of the 
child shall be a primary consideration‟. Similarly, in section 28(2) of the Constitution, the 
child‟s best interest is of crucial importance in any matter concerning the child. As a result, 
whenever a case concerns a child or children, their best interest should always be of 
„paramount importance‟288 as both the Constitution and international law require. 
 
4 7 2 Refugees 
In chapter 3 at 3 5 2 it was indicated that refugees are entitled to certain rights contained in 
the bill of rights to the extent that they do not exclusively apply to citizens. It was submitted 
that refugees are entitled to the protection under section 25(1)-(3) of the Constitution but 
not to section 25(5)-(9). It was also indicated that the Refugee Act289 gives effect to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (the „Refugee Convention‟)290 the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees291 and the Organization of African Unity (the „OAU‟) 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,292 all of which 
are binding on South African law.  
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In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development,293 
Mokgoro J stated that refugees have the right of access to adequate housing in terms of 
section 26(1)-(2). According to Van Wyk, refugees require special attention in terms of 
section 26(1) because they can be regarded as a vulnerable group.294 At the very least 
refugees would have access to adequate housing on an equal footing as citizens in need 
of housing and at the very most refugees would be able to receive special treatment with 
regard to the right.  
 
If refugees already have a home, they can rely on section 26(3) of the Constitution if there 
is an infringement of their right to adequate housing. The protection afforded to refugees in 
terms of section 26(3) will be protection against eviction as discussed above. Similar to the 
protection of property, which is not explicitly protected by the Refugee Act,295 courts may 
use article (21) of the Refugee Convention296 to support the protection of the right to 
adequate housing of refugees.  
 
Article 21 of the Refugee Convention297 states this right as follows: 
„As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or 
regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully 
staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less 
favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.‟ 
 
Therefore, it is clear that persons who have received refugee status are entitled to the full 
protection of section 26 of the Constitution. Refugees are entitled to the right of access to 
adequate housing and they have the right in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution not 
be evicted in an arbitrary manner once the right is enjoyed.  
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4 7 3 Women 
Section 9 of the Constitution, also known as the equality clause, states that all are equal 
before the law and that discrimination may not take place on the grounds of gender or 
sex.298 Irrespective of gender or sex (and all of the other factors), equality relates to the full 
and equal enjoyment of all the rights in the bill of rights. Therefore, in relation to section 26, 
women and men are equal in claiming access to adequate housing. The case against 
discrimination is also an important area in international law, as is evident through the 
numerous sources and work done in the field of eradicating discrimination. 
 
As illustrated above, article 11(1) of the ICESCR299 includes the right to adequate housing 
as a subset to an adequate standard of living. This right is granted to „himself and his 
family‟. The Committee has indicated that this formulation came as a result of the gender 
roles and economic activity that was in place when the Covenant was adopted. Therefore, 
the Committee is of the opinion that the right to housing applies to everyone and that the 
article cannot be read to place any limitation on the rights of women to adequate 
housing.300 
 
Women‟s housing rights have long been a concern to the international community, 
especially with regard to the increase of female-headed households. In 1981, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination against Women (the 
„CEDAW‟)301 was adopted. This Convention‟s purpose is to eradicate all forms of 
discrimination against women based on their gender, and recognises the equality between 
men and women. 
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Article 14(2)(h) of the CEDAW aims to eradicate discrimination against women in rural 
areas and urges states to ensure that women enjoy „adequate living conditions, particularly 
in relation to housing‟. Since migration from rural areas to urban areas is on the increase, 
the argument is made that the protection granted to women in rural areas should be 
extended to women living in urban areas due to the fact that women may be subject to 
male oriented housing policies which apply in the urban areas.302 
 
In addition, the purpose of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (the „CERD‟)303 is to eradicate all forms of discrimination based on 
race, colour, sex, language, religion and national origin. Article 5(e)(iii) of the CERD has as 
its purpose the elimination of discrimination in the sphere of socio-economic rights with 
regard to housing. Although women‟s housing rights are protected through a liberal 
interpretation of article 11(1) of the ICECSR and additional anti-discrimination conventions, 
the Special Rapporteur on women and adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, has identified 
discriminatory cultural and social norms, which include discriminatory family and personal 
laws, as significant in determining women‟s right to adequate housing.304 For instance, 
certain cultural norms deprive women of their right to land, inheritance and property, 
having a negative impact on their right to adequate housing. 
 
As an example, Kothari describes the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where a 
woman may not inherit land from her deceased husband‟s estate, but only liquid assets. In 
addition, she may only inherit one-eighth in the event that they had children and one-fourth 
if they had none. Furthermore, single and divorced women face difficulties in acquiring 
housing in their own name for two reasons. Women in search for housing need permission 
from a male relative in order to qualify for the necessary banking schemes. Also, Kothari 
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notes that in the North American tribal regimes, women stand to lose their tribal rights if 
they marry a man outside of their own tribe.305 
 
In the case of Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa,306 which was discussed in 
chapter 3 at 3 5 3, the discrimination women faced in inheriting property under African 
customary law came to light. The Constitutional Court ruled that the principle of male 
primogeniture, which prevented female heirs from inheriting property (including houses), 
was unconstitutional. Therefore, South African courts are willing to eradicate discrimination 
based on sex or gender to have the effect that women are given equal opportunity to 
inherit housing in conformity with international law. 
 
Furthermore, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasises that 
women suffer disproportionately under the practice of forced evictions.307 Before, during 
and after evictions, women are exposed to violence and emotional distress. During 
evictions, verbal abuse, rape and other violence often occur, and following the eviction 
these hardships will continue as they are more often than not moved to informal 
settlements and inadequately housed.308 
 
The Committee further states that 
„women … are especially vulnerable given the extent of statutory and other forms of 
discrimination which often apply in relation to property rights (including home ownership) or 
right of access to property or accommodation, and their particular vulnerability to acts of 
violence and sexual abuse when they are rendered homeless‟.309 
Therefore, the Committee contends that where eviction does occur, measures should be 
taken by the state to ensure that no form of discrimination is involved. 
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It is clear that women are on an equal basis to men, bearers of the right to adequate 
housing in international law. Women‟s right to adequate housing is further enhanced by 
additional measures contained in the CEDAW and CERD discussed above. When 
women‟s right to adequate housing needs to be interpreted, international law should be 
used in addition to the protection women receive in domestic law. 
 
4 8 Conclusion 
In this chapter it became clear that the right to adequate housing is a well developed area 
of international law. It has been stated that „the right to housing has generated more 
discussion, debates, legal opinions, and comments than any other right contained in the 
ICESCR‟.310 The ICESCR,311 which contains a right to housing as a subset for an 
adequate standard of living in article 11(1), has been the source of further development in 
this area. The General Comments made by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, provide effective guidelines as to what the right to adequate housing 
entails in international law and what it could consist of in domestic legal systems. These 
General Comments set out the right to adequate housing in a clear manner, so that it can 
be used by legislative bodies when interpreting this right in their respective domestic legal 
systems.  
 
It also became clear in this chapter that a right to adequate housing is not found in the 
regional international law instruments discussed above and as a result the right to 
adequate housing is not as developed in regional international law when compared to the 
development that already occurred in international law. However, it became clear that the 
right to housing is starting to gain importance in regional international law. In the African 
regional system, a right to housing was read into the Banjul Charter. In the European 
Union, established homes are protected from arbitrary interferences while the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights regards housing as an important component of a life that 
is dignified. In addition, all three regional international law systems recognise that forced 
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evictions should be regulated and take place in a manner that is not in conflict with 
international law by violating fundamental human rights. 
 
Therefore, interpreting the right to housing and fulfilling the obligation in terms of section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution, article 11(1) of the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights‟ General Comments as well as the sources in regional 
international law that deal with the right to adequate housing should be consulted. These 
sources are available to courts in interpreting the right of access to adequate housing as 
found in section 26 of the Constitution, but the South African context needs to be kept in 
mind. 
 
In the case law that was discussed, namely Grootboom312 and Jaftha,313 it became clear 
that the Constitutional Court is prepared to consult the sources of international law when 
interpreting the right to adequate housing. However, in Grootboom314 the Constitutional 
Court failed to give any content to the term „adequacy‟ as it is used in section 26(1) of the 
Constitution and in international law. In Jaftha,315 Mokgoro J admitted that the 
Constitutional Court had not considered this term in any detail.316 However, the Court in 
Jaftha317 did not elaborate and failed to give further content to the term „adequacy,‟ but it 
used one of the factors, namely that of security of tenure, to adjudicate that case. The 
courts could consider the factors of adequacy as laid down in international law by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in future case law in order to give the 
concept of adequacy content in domestic law.  
 
After international law has been used to interpret the right to adequate housing, regard 
should be had to regional international law. It was established that the protection afforded 
adequate housing in regional international law is either limited to protecting existing 
housing rights (in which event it only addresses the negative obligation to respect the 
rights to housing) or not protected at all. However, all three regional international law 
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systems recognise that forced evictions should be regulated and take place in a manner 
that is not in conflict with international law. Therefore, any acts of violence that accompany 
forced evictions which directly or indirectly violate fundamental human rights are unlawful. 
Consequently, with reference to forced evictions and section 26(3) of the Constitution, all 
courts, tribunals and forums could draw reference from the sources in regional 
international law. 
 
The South African government accepts that forced evictions have negative effects on 
peoples‟ lives and has put legislation in place to regulate eviction which affords greater 
protection of human rights when evictions do occur. Furthermore, the National Housing 
Department and the courts have to a great extent relied on international law in order to 
give effect to and interpret the right to housing so that it is in accordance with the 
international law principles. For instance, the Constitutional Court in both Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers318 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 
197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg319 required the relevant 
government departments to consult with the occupiers before the eviction takes place and 
in some instances required that alternative accommodation be made available once an 
eviction order is granted. Therefore, the interdependence between the right to housing and 
forced evictions needs to be kept in mind whenever forced eviction is considered. 
 
In addition to the general international and regional international law that concerns the 
right to adequate housing, regard should be had to the specific plaintiffs before the courts. 
The housing rights of children, refugees and women are highly developed in international 
law and provide these vulnerable groups with additional protection. This protection flows 
from the history of injustices these groups faced in the past and still face today in many 
parts of the world. Therefore, when these vulnerable groups face difficulties in receiving 
adequate housing or their right to housing is threatened, international law as well as 
regional international law sources are useful in giving effect to their rights. 
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 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
319
 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
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In terms of the right of access to adequate housing, courts are prepared to fulfil the 
obligation placed by section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution to consider international law. As a 
result of the vast amount of literature concerning the right of access to adequate housing 
in international law, and owing to the fact that this right is defined in international law by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it is easier to consider the 
international law on adequate housing than the right to property, as discovered in chapter 
3. However, courts must be cautious to apply international law consistently. In interpreting 
the right of access to adequate housing by using international law sources, the proper 
approach should be followed. Courts, tribunals and forums should first have regard to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and then turn to regional 
international law. In the event that specific groups of people claim protection or realisation 
of their housing rights, the specific housing rights in international law should also be 
considered.  
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5 
Conclusion 
5 1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to explore whether or not courts, especially the Constitutional Court, 
optimally apply international law in interpreting the bill of rights as mandated by section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution. Using international human rights law to interpret the bill of 
rights would arguably make it possible to expand the protection of human rights in the 
South African legal system. In this thesis the Constitutional Court‟s use of international law 
was considered. The Court does not consistently apply international law in interpreting the 
bill of rights. Therefore, the aim of this thesis was to present the international law sources 
available to the courts to interpret the right to property and the right of access to adequate 
housing. In addition, a possible method for the application of international law sources will 
be discussed in this chapter. 
 
During the course of this thesis, it became apparent that international law was for a long 
time regarded as an inferior system of law. As a result, international law did not receive 
sufficient attention in the South African legal system. However, with the promulgation of 
the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, international law was set to take its rightful place in 
South African law. As discussed in chapter 2, the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions contain 
various sections dealing with international law.  
 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to highlight some important conclusions with 
regard to the position of international law in South African law, as well as the Constitutional 
Court‟s use of international law in interpreting the right to property and the right of access 
to adequate housing. A method is also proposed in this chapter to indicate to all courts, 
tribunals and forums on how they can apply relevant international law in interpreting the bill 
of rights. 
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5 2 South Africa and International Law 
The thesis commenced with an overview of the constitutional history of South Africa with 
regard to the protection of human rights and the use of international law by South African 
courts. In chapter 2 it was argued that the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, 
together with the courts‟ inability to test the substance of legislation, made the 
implementation of the apartheid system possible. As a result of the apartheid system, 
South Africa was isolated from the international community and the developments that 
took place in the area of international human rights law. Since the South African apartheid 
government regarded international law as inferior and the apartheid policy itself violated 
international law principles,1 international law and the protection of human rights were 
neglected during this period.  
 
When South Africa entered a new democratic era in 1994, a bill of rights in a Constitution 
that is the highest law in the Republic was introduced. Furthermore, the protection of 
human rights became of utmost importance and the courts were entrusted with the task to 
safeguard the human rights of all citizens. With regard to international law, the Constitution 
favours the integration of international law into South African law in order to advance and 
interpret the bill of rights. With regard to international law, the 1996 Constitution 
emphasises the position regarding international agreements,2 thereby seeking to include 
South Africa once again in the international community by making it possible, and 
somewhat easier, for international agreements to be incorporated into South African law. 
The Constitution also makes reference to other areas of international law, such as 
customary international law and gives such law constitutional standing.3 Furthermore, 
when courts interpret legislation, they are under an obligation to interpret legislation in 
favour of international law if such an interpretation is reasonably possible.4 Therefore, it 
was concluded in chapter 2 that international law is deemed to be important in the new 
constitutional era. 
 
                                            
1
 Scholtz W „A Few Thoughts on Section 231 of the South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996‟ (2004) 29 
SAYIL 202-216 at 1. 
2
 S 231 of the 1996 Constitution. 
3
 S 232 of the 1996 Constitution. 
4
 S 233 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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5 3 International Law as Interpretive Guide 
The manner in which the courts must interpret the bill of rights as set out in section 39(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution was discussed in chapter 2. In terms of section 39(1)(b), the 
courts are placed under an obligation to consider international law when interpreting the 
bill of rights. In this thesis, the use of international law by the Constitutional Court was 
considered. In S v Makwanyane (hereafter „Makwanyane‟)5 it was established that 
international law for purposes of this section includes binding and non-binding international 
law. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (hereafter „Grootboom‟)6 
the principle laid down in Makwanyane7 was accepted, but the Constitutional Court stated 
that the weight to be attached to each principle of international law will vary, thereby 
seeking an interpretation that is context sensitive. 
 
However, during the course of this thesis it became clear that the Constitutional Court 
does not consistently adhere to the obligation to consider international law when 
interpreting the bill of rights. Through the discussion of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance8 in chapter 3, it became clear that the Constitutional 
Court, although accepting that it has an obligation to consider international law, failed to 
make proper reference to international law in interpreting the right to property. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the Constitutional Court confuses international law with 
foreign law, which is evident through the discussion of article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
European Convention together with the discussion of the legal principles of national 
jurisdictions such as Australia, Germany and the United States of America. This collapses 
the distinction made by the Constitution in section 39(1)(b) and 39(1)(c). In terms of 
section 39(1)(b) courts must consider international law when interpreting any right in the 
bill of rights, and in terms of section 39(1)(c) courts may consider foreign law when 
interpeting any right in the bill of rights.  
 
                                            
5
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
6
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 26. 
7
 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
8
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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Although the Constitutional Court reached sensible conclusions based on article 1 of 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court, the 
Court confused regional international law with foreign law and miscalculated its importance 
as international law. In the subsequent Constitutional Court cases concerning the right to 
property discussed in chapter 3, namely Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng9 and Du Toit v Minister of Transport,10 no 
reference was made to internatonal law that might have been available. 
 
Furthermore, it was indicated in chapter 3 that the right to property is controversial in 
international law. However, there are international and regional international law sources 
that relate to property rights. In addition, it was discovered that property rights in regional 
international law is more developed than in international law. The property rights of women 
and refugeess are also more developed and it was argued that these sources should be 
considered when the property rights of these groups of people need to be interpreted. 
Therefore, the omission of any reference to international and regional international law 
when the right to property is interpreted is not justifiable.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that there is no justification for the practice of the Court not to 
consider international law when the right to property is interpreted. Since there are 
international law sources that might be able to guide the Court‟s interpretation of the right 
to property in the South African context, these international law sources should be 
considered.  
 
In contrast, it became apparent in chapter 4 that the Constitutional Court is more willing to 
consider international law when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing in 
section 26 of the Constitution. In chapter 4 it was discovered that the right to adequate 
housing is a well developed area of international law. The right to adequate housing is 
found in article 11(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
                                            
9
 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
10
 2006 (1) 297 (CC). 
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Rights, (the „ICESCR‟)11 as a subset of the right to an adequate standard of living. The 
General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have given 
further content to the right to adequate housing in international law and have been used by 
the Constitutional Court to interpret section 26 of the Constitution. These General 
Comments, as examined in chapter 4, can be useful in guiding South African courts to a 
better interpretation of the right to adequate housing.  
 
In the case law that was discussed, namely Grootboom12 and Jaftha v Schoeman; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz (hereafter „Jaftha‟)13 it was argued that the Constitutional Court is 
prepared to consult the sources of international law when interpreting the right to adequate 
housing. However, in Grootboom14 the Constitutional Court failed to give any content to 
the term „adequacy‟ as it is used in section 26(1) of the Constitution and in international 
law. In Jaftha,15 Mokgoro J admitted that the Constitutional Court had not considered this 
term in any detail. However, the Court in Jaftha did not elaborate and failed to give further 
content to the term „adequacy,‟ but it used one of the factors, namely that of security of 
tenure, to adjudicate the case. Furthermore, in neither Grootboom16 nor Jaftha17 did the 
Court outline the status of the ICESCR and the General Comments of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights it used. The South African government has not yet 
ratified this Covenant, so it is not directly binding on South African law. Although the Court 
is permitted to consult the ICESCR to interpret the right of access to adequate housing, 
the status of the ICESCR within South African law should have been made clear by the 
Constitutional Court before it or the additional sources pertaining to the Covenant was 
used. 
 
In addition, it was recognized in chapter 4 that a right to adequate housing is not found in 
the regional international law instruments discussed. Therefore, the right to adequate 
housing is not as developed in regional international as on the international level. 
However, the right to housing is starting to gain importance in regional international law. In 
                                            
11
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
12
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
13
 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
14
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
15
 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 23. 
16
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
17
 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
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the African regional system, a right to housing has been read into the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights.18 In the European Union, established homes are protected 
from arbitrary interferences while the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considers 
housing as an important component of a life that is dignified. In addition, all three regional 
international law systems that were discussed recognise that forced evictions should be 
regulated and take place in a manner that is not in conflict with international law by 
violating fundamental human rights. 
 
It was further illustrated in chapter 4 that the South African government accepts that forced 
evictions have negative effects on peoples‟ lives and has put legislation in place to 
regulate eviction which affords greater protection of human rights when evictions do occur. 
Furthermore, the National Housing Department and the Constitutional Court have to a 
great extent relied on international law in order to give effect to and interpret the right to 
housing so that it is in accordance with the international law principles. The Court‟s 
willingness to adhere to international law principles is seen in Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers19 as discussed in chapter 4. In that case, the Court had to consider the 
PIE Act.20 The PIE Act does not make mention of the requirement set by international law 
that consultation with the affected parties should take place before an eviction order is 
granted. However, the practice of consulting with affected parties before eviction takes 
place was established by the Court in this decision. Similarly, in Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg,21 the 
Constitutional Court also gave an engagement order. Therefore, court orders which 
obliges government departments to consult with the occupiers before evicting them and to 
provide them with alternative accommodation if they were to be evicted, is in accordance 
with established international law principles. 
 
In addition to the general international and regional international law that concerns the 
right to adequate housing it was argued that Court should have regard to the specific 
plaintiffs before the courts. It was indicated that the housing rights of children, women and 
                                            
18
 Adopted by the 18
th
 Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on 
27 June 1981, entered into force on 21 October 1986, OAU doc CAB/LEG/67/3rev5, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 
ILM 58, (1982). 
19
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
20
 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
21
 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
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refugees are highly developed in international law and provide these vulnerable groups 
with additional protection. This protection flows from the history of injustices these groups 
faced in the past and still face today in many parts of the world. Therefore, when these 
vulnerable groups face difficulties in receiving adequate housing or their right to housing is 
threatened, international and regional international law sources are useful in giving further 
content to their rights. 
 
During the course of this thesis it was discovered that in the event that international law is 
underdeveloped with regard to a certain right, regional international law compensates for 
this lacuna. This is evident from chapters 3 and 4. With regard to the right to property, 
international law is not as developed as regional international law and as a result regional 
international law compensates for the lack of clear guidelines in international law. With 
regard to the right to housing, international law is more developed than regional 
international law. This leads to the conclusion that between international and regional 
international law the necessary guidance should be found, if not from the one, then from 
the other. Therefore, not referring to international or regional international law is not 
justifiable. 
 
5 4 Recommendations 
In this thesis, two points became clear. Firstly, the Constitutional Court does not always 
fulfil its obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, and when an attempt is 
made to consult international law, it is sometimes done incorrectly. In relation to the right to 
property in section 25(1)-(3) of the Constitution this was illustrated through the discussion 
of the FNB case, where the Court confused regional international law with foreign law. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court has to date not provided a method as to how it uses the 
international law sources. As a result, the status of the international law sources used by 
the Court is not given proper regard.  
 
As a result the following method is proposed for using international law sources as a guide 
to interpretation. In this regard, the suggested method would not only find application to 
the Constitutional Court, but to all courts as well as tribunals and forums, in order to realize 
the obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b). When a right in the bill of rights needs to be 
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interpreted, the obligation in terms of section 39(1)(b) should be recognised and 
acknowledged if there is relevant applicable international law. The international law 
sources that might aid the courts in interpreting the right in question should be identified. 
Such an undertaking should start with the international bill of rights; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,22 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights23 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.24 The 
international bill of rights contains a vast array of human rights and should be consulted. 
Thereafter, published work of the committees established under the international bill of 
rights should be considered.25 These committees, responsible for monitoring compliance 
with the relevant Covenant, produce General Comments on the interpretation and 
application of specific rights contained in the relevant Covenant. The General Comments 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as illustrated in chapter 4, have 
been helpful in guiding South African courts with regard to the interpretation of the right to 
adequate housing. Courts could also consider the reports made by the Special 
Rapporteurs on the rights of specific persons as discussed in chapter 4. 
 
As discussed, when courts interpret the bill of rights, it should also have regard to regional 
international law. Special attention should be given the African Charter26 and the 
communications made by the African Commission on Human Rights, because it is binding 
on South African law. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, together with the communications 
from the Inter-American Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, should also be 
considered. Reference to these sources is important because in the event that 
international law adds little or no interpretive guidelines, regional international law may 
prove to be a guide for interpretation. This was illustrated in chapter 3, where the property 
rights in regional international law are much more developed than in international law. 
                                            
22
 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Resolution 217(III) of 10 December 1948, UN doc 
A/810. 
23
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(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. 
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(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, UNTS 171. 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is entrusted with supervising compliance with the 
ICESCR. See Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (3
rd
 ed 2005) 319-321. 
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 Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organization of African Unity on 27 June 1981, entered into force on 21 October 1986, 
OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 ILM 58, (1982). 
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In the event that the property and housing rights of specific persons are at issue, courts, 
tribunals and forums should take cognisance of the international and regional international 
law sources available. This will also include the relevant jurisprudence and 
communications of the regional supervisory organs. 
 
Finally, when the courts, tribunal and forums use international and regional international 
law sources to guide their interpretation, the status of these instruments must be made 
clear. If for instance, a court deals with international law sources, those international law 
sources should be distinguished from foreign law sources. Furthermore, whether the 
sources discussed are international treaties, recommendations of specific international 
committees or jurisprudence of regional international courts, the status of these sources 
should be outlined and explained. These international law sources each carry different 
weight when they are used to interpret the bill of rights. As a result, outlining the status of 
these sources provides for a clear method of international law to interpret the bill of rights. 
A clear framework of international law sources that are available to courts in interpreting 
the bill of rights will pave the way for sufficient regard of international law sources in future 
case law. 
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